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Abstract 
 
 
According to corporatist theory, a corporatist interest group structure leads 
to policy concertation. In this case, the relationship between one of the 
institutions in the corporatist structure, the Union of Turkish Bar 
Associations (“TBB”) and the government should be one of policy 
concertation. However, there are signs that this is not the case. This study 
therefore explores the relations between TBB and state institutions to 
understand the true nature of the relationship. Based mainly on interviews 
conducted with presidents of bar, the study finds that despite the existence 
of a corporatist structure, the relationship between TBB and the government 
does not amount to policy concertation given the monist state tradition in 
Turkey. The study further explores the reasons for conflict between TBB 
and state institutions. In addition to monism, it finds that socio-economic 
change that undermines TBB’s homogeneity; its interest group status 
swinging between a promotional and protective one; and attorneys’ interest 
in politics are all contributing factors. More importantly, they not only cause 
conflict but also make it impossible for the interest group to play the role 
expected from a corporatist partner. 
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Introduction 
 
This will be a study of the Union of Turkish Bar Associations (“TBB”) and 
its relationship with state institutions at a time when Turkey has been 
discussing its judiciary and actors as never before1. Judicial actors at every 
level2 as well as their decisions make it to the headlines on a daily basis, 
creating or fuming crises situations. Despite all this, not much is known 
about the actors of the judiciary among which attorneys constitute the 
largest number. However, their importance stems not only from sheer 
number but from the fact that they are the most accessible actor of the 
                                                       
1 Prosecutorial investigations from match fixing (“20 gün sonra tufan!”, Takvim, see: 
http://www.takvim.com.tr/Spor/2011/10/12/20-gun-sonra-tufan) to scandals in centrally 
administered exams (“Şifre dosyasına gizlilik kararı”, Vatan, see: 
http://haber.gazetevatan.com/sifre-dosyasina-gizlilik-karari/371368/1/Haber) as well as 
court decisions in high profile, political cases such as Ergenekon are daily occurrences.  
 
2 It is not only the current government that was challenged before the Constitutional Court 
with a party closure case. The backlog and delay in the appellate courts caused speculations 
as to the number of cases to be time-barred (“200 Bin Dosya Zamanaşımına Uğrayacak”, 
Dunya, see: http://www.dunya.com/200-bin-dosya-zaman-asimina-
ugrayacak_114167_haber.html. Access date: 20 October 2011) or mandatory release of 
Hizbullah militants held almost ten years in detention (without final conviction) invited 
public outcry (“Hizbullah tahliyeleri adaleti sarsıyor”, see: 
http://www.dha.com.tr/haberdetay.asp?tarih=02.10.2011&Newsid=133797&Categoryid=2. 
Access date: 20 October 2011). Differences of opinion about how to remedy the situation 
turned into accusations exchanged between the Prime Minister (“Erdoğan TÜSİAD Genel 
Kurulu’nda konuştu”, Hurriyet, see: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/16807837.asp, 
Access date: 19 October 2011) and the higher judiciary (“İstinaf mahkemesi ve hakim 
alımını engelleyen yargı oldu”, Star, see: http://www.stargazete.com/politika/istinaf-
mahkemesi-ve-hakim-alimini-engelleyen-yargi-oldu-haber-321997.htm. Access date: 20 
October 2011). Another judiciary filled institution, the Higher Election Board, caused a 
scandal before the 2011 June elections after it blocked the candidacy of mostly Kurdish 
MPs (“YSK’dan şok karar”, Yeni Şafak, see: 
http://yenisafak.com.tr/Gundem/?t=19.04.2011&i=314749. Access date: 21 October 2011). 
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judiciary for the public. Indeed, people seek their rights to a legal remedy 
through attorneys. They translate people’s demands to the language of 
courts and drive the legal system. However, the public hears about them 
only in high profile cases such as the murder of Hrant Dink or KCK3 trials 
when they protest actions of the courts4.  
 
Meanwhile, research shows that less than 20% of the urban population ever 
“had an attorney at least once in their lives” (Kalem Jahic & Elveriş 2008: 
19). The primary reason (73% of participants) for not benefiting from the 
services of an attorney was that people “thought they can represent 
themselves” (Kalem Jahic & Elveriş 2008: 21). This finding suggests that 
people do not know or understand the value of an attorney. Given this, it can 
be safely assumed that even less is known about the peak organization of 
their profession the Union of Turkish Bar Associations (Türkiye Barolar 
Birliği TBB).  
                                                       
3 KCK case is the prosecution of the alleged urban wing of PKK for being members of 
terror organizaiton. The case has roused criticism for the lining up of hundreds of 
handcuffed elected local politicians by the police who have then been put in pre-trial 
detention. It also came to a halt for the criminal defendants insistence on providing their 
defense in their mother tongue in Kurdish which the court referred as “an unknown 
language”. The defense attorneys recently withdrew from the case in protest of the court’s 
handling of the matter while the court complained to the bar about the actions of the 
attorneys. (“Defense lawyers withdraw themselves from KCK case in Turkey”, Hurriyet, 
see: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=kck-defense-lawyers-withdraw-
themselves-from-the-case-2011-04-19, Access date: 11 October 2011).  
 
4 “KCK Davasında Avukatlar Salonu Terk Etti”,  Bağımsız İletişim Ağı, See: 
http://bianet.org/bianet/bianet/129382-kck-davasinda-avukatlar-salonu-terk-etti. “Dink’in 
Avukatları Salonu Terk Etti”, Bağımsız İletişim Ağı, See: 
http://bianet.org/bianet/toplum/132801-dinkin-avukatlari-salonu-terk-etti. Access date: 20 
October 2011. 
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At the same time, political scientists’ extensive interest in the executive and 
the legislature has not been matched with research on the judiciary. In fact, 
their interest in the law and the legal system can at best be called peripheral 
(Zemans 1983). Although in the last forty years, the “law and society” 
movement made advances in that regard with sociologists, political 
scientists, anthropologists and economists studying the law and the legal 
system as well as their actors, it flourished mostly in the U.S5. Outside, 
there have been fewer examples.  
 
In Turkey, political scientists’ and sociologists’ interest in the judiciary has 
been confined to the Constitutional Court, especially to party closure cases 
(Shambayati 2008; Shambayati & Kirdiş 2009; Belge 2006; Koğacıoğlu 
2004) or the handling of honor crimes (Koğacıoğlu 2007; Ayata Eryılmaz & 
Kalem 2011), replicating the exclusive orientation of American political 
scientists toward “law making” as the sole political role of the courts worthy 
of study (Zemans 1983). Luckily, this is slowly changing too.  Research on 
the mindsets of judges and prosecutors (Sancar &Atılgan 2009) and law 
professors (Erozan 2005) has been conducted as well as on judicial 
mechanisms such as criminal legal aid (Elveriş Jahic & Kalem 2007). Trust 
and confidence in courts have been measured (Kalem Jahic & Elveriş 
2008); as well as research on court users and uses (Elveriş Jahic & Kalem 
2009) have been recently conducted.  
                                                       
5 Depending on the location, the annual meetings of the Law and Society Association bring 
together over thousand scholars from over forty countries. See the website for numbers: 
www.lawandsociety.org. 
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The importance of the role of law in the Turkish modernization project and 
the media’s recent “discovery” of the judiciary notwithstanding, the legal 
profession or the bar is yet to be studied as an interest organization by 
political scientists. While there is literature concerning interest groups in 
general (Topçu 2006; Dülger 1999) and specifically labor unions (Bianchi 
1984); business associations such as TUSIAD and MUSIAD (Esmer 1991; 
Buğra 1998) or trade associations (Okur 2008; Topçu 2006; Dülger 1999), 
there is only Özman’s (Özman 1995) study specifically pertaining to the 
bar. Meanwhile some small scale “profession” studies on bars in Anatolia 
(Uzun 2000; Tan 1972) or lawyers (Cirhinlioğlu 1997; Cirhinlioğlu 1996; 
Türem 2001) have been mostly done by sociologists.  
 
In general, studying the service elites rather than the “productive forces” 
(McClelland 1991: 12) is new, not only in Turkey but also in Europe. It can 
be nevertheless considered timely, given the “shift from agricultural and 
industrial sectors to service” sectors in economies (McClelland 1991: 12). 
Given this picture, this thesis is about TBB as an interest group included 
among the ten professional organizations that has been given constitutional 
status. Their inclusion has been said to give the interest group model in 
Turkey its corporatist character (Parla 1989; 2009 and Compston 2002) as 
corporatist theory assumes that inclusion of an interest group in the 
corporatist structure would lead to corporatist policy making because the 
two seem to be fused or occur together (Cawson 1988; Lijphart 1999). 
However, we do not know how policy concertation actually works in 
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Turkey. The primary goal of this thesis will therefore be to explore the 
relations between TBB and the state institutions to understand whether and 
to what extent there is policy concertation. 
 
In theory, the corporatist interest group status endows TBB with easy access 
and direct communication opportunities with the government as well as 
other state institutions. However, the opening speeches at the beginning of 
each judicial year suggest otherwise. In these speeches, presidents of TBB 
deem it rightful to critically and publicly comment about secularism; 
separation of powers; the new Turkish foreign policy and the diplomatic 
procedures to be followed by foreign diplomats such as visiting Anıtkabir; 
Northern Iraq and terror; relations with the EU and global capitalism; forest 
fires and similar6 before the media and the public. Further, TBB sometimes 
convenes conferences on these issues, prints books7 and issues public 
statements, criticizing government plans and ideas. All this suggests that the 
relationship is not based on routine cooperation for implementation of 
policy as expected in a corporatist interest group system. It also shows that 
there may be no opportunities for mediation of conflicts between the parties. 
 
                                                       
6 For a glimpse of speeches by the past president of TBB see:  
http://eski.barobirlik.org.tr/tbb/baskan/konusmalar/index.aspx. 
 
7 See http://eski.barobirlik.org.tr/yayinlar/kitaplar/guncel.aspx for some of the books that 
concern Atatürk, the presidential system, democracy and the attack in Lebanon. 
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As will be shown in the coming chapters, TBB seems to not only disagree 
with the government about political issues but also about issues that concern 
“the profession” such as the cancellation of the bar exam to become an 
attorney; opening of new law schools; government reforms in the design of 
HSYK (High Council of Judges and Prosecutors) and the Constitutional 
Court; or the establishment of Intermediary Courts. All this suggests that 
TBB does not solely pursue economic and social interests of its members in 
partnership with the government but is also promoting certain values. While 
this thesis will primarily attempt to understand the true nature of the 
relationship between TBB and state institutions to see whether a corporatist 
interest structure indeed leads to corporatist policy making, it will further 
seek to understand what might explain the conflict in the relationship.  
 
The first chapter will provide the theoretical framework of the thesis by 
using interest group theory. Turkey’s dual (hybrid) interest representation 
model will be introduced with a focus on its corporatist side while the bar 
will be constructed as a protective interest group. This chapter will also pose 
the research question whether a corporatist interest group structure leads to 
policy concertation.  
 
The second chapter will introduce bar organizations from a comparative 
perspective. Before doing that, it will first make use of the 
professionalization literature and discuss the functions of bar organizations. 
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Then, by comparing the U.S., Germany and Turkey, it will be shown how 
the model adopted for the regulation of the legal profession and the different 
role of states shaped the bar organizations in these three countries. At the 
same time, it will be shown that globalization is driving regulation of the 
legal professions to convergence. 
 
The third chapter will describe the methodology and how I went about the 
empirical data collected. As corporatist processes by their very nature are 
confined to meetings behind closed doors, I based my data on in-depth 
interviews conducted with presidents of bar or TBB officials. I also made 
non-participant observations at various meetings of TBB and state officials 
in Ankara and Kars. Lastly, I conducted interviews with the representatives 
of bureaucracy as well as the legislature.  
 
In the fourth chapter I present the findings of my interviews in response to 
the research questions. In the fifth and final chapter, I discuss data obtained 
from interviews while also introducing other data sources such as the 
nonparticipant observations and the interviews conducted with Ministry of 
Justice officials to validate my findings.  
 
Data shows that in Turkey the corporatist policy structure does not lead to 
corporatist policy making given the monist state tradition that is accustomed 
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to rule from above and does not share any decision making power. As 
important, rapid and intense socio-economic change in Turkey seems to 
undermine TBB’s group homogeneity. This is because it imports various 
cleavages as exists in society into the interest group while breeding role 
confusion and causing it to swing between being a protective and a 
promotional interest group. However, when the interest group is divided 
among many cleavages, this makes it unable to play its part in corporatist 
policy making. In other words, for corporatist policy making to work not 
only the state must be willing to share power with interest groups but also 
the interest group itself must be designed as a protective group and able to 
represent a homogenous group that shares similar interests and outlook.  
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Chapter I: Theoretical Framework 
 
This thesis is about the Union of Turkish Bar Associations (Türkiye Barolar 
Birliği “TBB”) and its relationship with state institutions. The relationship 
will be reviewed in light of empirical data in order to find out whether there 
is political concertation in Turkey. It has been said that the interest group 
representation model in Turkey has a corporatist side to it given that TBB 
and other professional organizations have constitutional status. It is assumed 
that the corporatist structure would naturally involve policy concertation 
between corporatist partners. However, there has been no empirical research 
to find out whether the relationship between TBB and state institutions 
indeed amounts to policy concertation. Equally important, if the relationship 
is one of policy concertation, how does one explain the conflict between 
TBB and state institutions especially in view of the dictum of corporatist 
theory stating that relations between corporatist partners are consensual? 
 
The thesis addressed these questions by gathering data through in depth 
interviews that were conducted with presidents of local bars, administrators 
at TBB and state officials. In addition, non-participant observations were 
made in various settings. Data showed that despite the corporatist policy 
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structure, there was no policy concertation. In other words, in Turkey the 
corporatist interest representation model did not lead to corporatist policy 
making. 
 
There appear four main reasons for this. First, given the monist, strong state 
tradition in Turkey, state institutions are not inclined to share power or 
cooperate with interest groups to determine policy. Contacts remain ad hoc 
and involve mostly a deliberative or consultative process rather than a 
cooperative or concertative relationship. Second, social and economic 
change in the country is undermining traditional structure of the profession 
as well as the internal coherency of TBB by making it difficult for it to 
claim representing all interests in an increasingly heterogeneous profession. 
Third, fuelled by the heterogeneity, TBB swings between a protective and 
promotional interest group.  The latter, however, leads it to adopt 
challenging positions vis-à-vis the government(s). Fourth, the law’s and the 
profession’s historical engagement in Turkish politics further promotes their 
political involvement, making it difficult to sustain an apolitical (or 
consensual) relationship between TBB and state institutions. As a result, 
TBB cannot play the role expected from a protective interest group in 
corporatist theory. 
 
Given these findings, the thesis’ contribution to corporatist theory lies in the 
recognition that a corporatist representation model and policy concertation 
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do not necessarily fuse especially when the state tradition is monist. In 
addition, when the interest group homogeneity is undermined by socio-
economic change and traditional political involvement of the profession, the 
interest group is unable to play its part in a policy concertation role given 
the fact that it is ridden with internal strife concerning values and priorities.  
It nevertheless remains an empirical question whether this is a situation 
specific to Turkey or whether these conclusions are applicable across the 
board to other interest groups in the corporatist structure.  
  
This chapter will start with an analysis of the interest groups literature. First, 
I will look at the bar as a protective interest group and review how the 
relationship between interest groups and the state can be framed in a 
political system in general by introducing pluralism and corporatism. 
Second, I will introduce corporatism as policy concertation and the main 
ideas behind the concertation theory. Third, I will talk about the interest 
group representation model that reins in Turkey. Lastly, I will bring TBB 
into the picture as an interest group and pose my research questions. 
 
1. Interest groups and the Bar 
An interest group can be defined as a group or organization whose members 
perceive to share common interests and which aims to affect the political 
system without intending to become government (Turan 1986). In that 
sense, interest groups are autonomous from government and try to influence 
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public policy while providing the link between the government (or the state) 
and major sectors of society (Wilson 1990). Their defining characteristic is 
articulation of demands and needs of society and transmittance thereof into 
the political process. In that sense, many of their roles are similar to political 
parties or government: “socializing citizens, organizing consensus, making 
policy and implementing laws” (Berger 1981: 10). Today, their policy role 
is ever greater as states carry out many functions that need the expertise of 
interest groups in areas they know and care about.  
 
Viewed from that perspective, professional organizations such as the bar (or 
TBB as the peak organization), trade unions and employers’ organizations 
can be also described as interest groups. At the same time, they are 
protective interest groups that articulate “the material interests of their 
members” (Hague & Harrop 2004: 167). In that regard, they seek “selective 
benefits for their members and insider status with government” (op.cit.). 
This then translates into frequent consultation by the government and the 
potential to influence decisions at an early stage. Because of representing 
clear occupational interests, they are considered as “the most influential of 
all interest groups” (op. cit.). They have sanctions to achieve their goals 
such as refusing to comply with a policy they oppose.  
 
Promotional interest groups, on the other hand, “advocate ideas, identities, 
policies and values” such as environmental groups or ethnicity or gender 
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based groups (op. cit.). While they have been growing in number and 
significance, their outsider status means that they are not consulted by 
governments as often as insider groups. They therefore emphasize public 
opinion and the media. For protective groups, on the other hand, the media 
is the last resort, given their more specialized and secretive demands.  
 
It must be pointed out that interest groups raise more passion than other 
political institutions due to the fear that they are “asserting minority rights 
or points against those of the majority” (Wilson 1990: 2). In that sense, it 
has been alleged that they create ungovernability by placing too many 
demands into the political system, overloading or undermining government 
authority (Berger 1981). Equally it has been asked whether they wield 
“power without accountability” (Hague & Harrop 2004: 167). Madison 
notoriously referred to them as “mischiefs of faction”.  
 
Alexis De Tocqueville, on the other hand, was more hopeful about interest 
groups as he believed that they provide an alternative to the “tyranny of 
majority” (De Tocqueville qtd. in Wilson 1990: 3) by moving power away 
from the center. As he put it, “the science of association” is “the mother of 
science” (De Tocqueville 1998: 219) and it is through this science people 
participate in society. This sanguine view of interest groups reached its peak 
with the pluralist paradigm of democracy by Robert Dahl (Dahl 1961). In 
Who governs, he described how in a small town in Connecticut, power was 
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dispersed among many interests, all of which had an opportunity to 
influence policy.  
 
Dahl’s thesis, however, was later criticized as it was shown that some values 
and vested interests were systematically dominant in society while some 
interests never found representation in the political system (Bachrach & 
Baratz 1962). Put differently, the system was biased in representing (and 
mainstreaming) stronger groups’ views and opinions. It was therefore clear 
that interest group organization was about resources and power and some 
groups’ interests remained latent in the political system due to their inability 
to organize. Indeed, the social events at the end of sixties only proved to 
serve this point. 
 
While Madison describes states almost as helpless, passive receivers of 
interest group pressure and pluralists downplay dominant groups’ resources 
and power, in reality, states influence the interest group system in many 
ways. To do that, they have various means at their disposal. The first is “the 
constitutional and legal environment” in the country (Wilson 1990: 137). In 
that regard, political cultures that put a high value on freedom of association 
tend to regulate associations lightly to allow for spontaneous voluntary 
activity to form easily while those that are suspicious of it, do the opposite. 
Further, in centralized states with strong executives, “the ability of 
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policymakers to restrict access to few favored groups is high” (Wilson 
1990: 138).  
 
In addition, “governments can subsidize interest groups that conform to 
their expectations by tax concessions” (Wilson 1990: 139) or by providing 
“public resources and power” (Berger 1981: 15) to some interest groups. Of 
course, other factors such as the strong state tradition and the kind of 
stateness in the polity (Heper 1991a) also affect interest groups. For 
instance, in Germany “the executive branch is obliged by law to consult 
various big interest organizations before drafting legislation”8. The same 
goes for Switzerland in which interest organizations have a “constitutional 
right to be heard” (Armingeon 1997: 167). The last two examples suggest a 
more consensual tradition in the polity. 
 
Viewed from this perspective, bar organizations perform many functions 
attributed to interest groups. They accumulate and mediate the interests of 
attorneys who through legal education and professional socialization 
perceive common interests. Attorneys’ proximity to citizens (and business 
interests) given their representation of them and know-how as to their needs, 
creates valuable expertise concerning policies to be adopted in the legal 
arena. As professional organizations, bars also have knowledge about their 
members and their business practices that helps the state in developing 
                                                       
8 “Ex uno, plures”, The Economist, see: http://www.economist.com/node/233442, access 
date: 18 September 2011. 
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policy. They enforce laws that have been delegated to them such as 
discipline and licensing. They also seek material and other benefits for their 
members.  
 
While what was said so far seems to suggest the view that a bar organization 
or TBB may be just another interest group, there are also important 
differences. First, bars are not completely autonomous from government 
like a typical interest group. This is because their formation is often by state 
action (discussed in Chapter Two). To do that, the government passes a law 
(concerning the legal profession) and sets out the conditions as to how a bar 
is to be established and how to become an attorney. One of the conditions of 
the latter is mandatory membership in the bar in order to practice the 
profession. The law also provides that bars are institutions of self 
governance for the profession. Self governance means that attorneys are 
subject to the disciplinary control and professional regulation of bar 
associations and are independent from the government. This is more or less 
true for TBB which is regulated by the same law. 
 
In other words, the state not only creates and legitimizes bars but by 
transferring professional disciplinary and ethical rule making functions; and 
allowing it to charge members a yearly fee as well as for other services such 
as licenses, it also provides them with predictable income. This very much 
effects the dynamic of the relationship between the parties while blurring 
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the lines of whether bar associations are to be seen as a private association, 
as a state agency or as a professional union (Smith 1994).  
 
Determination of this status is important since if the bar is like a private 
association then its voluntary character should determine its relationship 
with the state. In that sense, it should be autonomous and free from 
government control (Schneyer 1983). But if the bar is like a state agency, 
then it should be accountable like a public institution. Indeed, in the U.S., 
some court decisions have justified (their own) intervention and supervision 
in the bar’s affairs as a matter of accountability given the fact that member 
dues were being collected through government coercion, therefore justifying 
the close watch of their expenditure (Schneyer 1983). For similar reasons, 
the Ministry of Justice in Turkey has monitoring powers over TBB and the 
bars. 
 
It was said that interest groups are uninterested in becoming government. 
However, in Turkey there appears a growing tendency for bar 
administrators to engage in politics “proper” as a member of parliament. I 
counted 43 bar presidents or former board member of bar associations (or 
TBB) among the 5625 previous parliamentarians who served between 1920-
1996 in the Turkish Grand National Assembly9. The number of former bar 
                                                       
9 Comparative figures from the U.S provide data as to lawyer politicians rather than bar 
administrators. For instance, Schlesinger reports that in the period from 1870-1950, among 
the 995 elected governors, 456 were practising lawyers (Schneyer 1957). Similarly, 
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administrators among the 2200 parliamentarians elected from 1996 until 
2007 was, however, 30. In other words, Turkish bar administrators seem to 
be getting increasingly interested in becoming “government”.  
 
Given all this, bars or more precisely their umbrella organization TBB 
appears to be a unique interest group. It is designed as a protective interest 
group that seeks benefits for its members but is established by state action. 
Therefore, any theoretical framework that seeks to explain the relationship 
between the bars and the government cannot solely look at bars as an 
interest group but must also take into consideration the interest 
representation model that provides bars their special status within the state. 
 
2. Interest representation models: pluralism and corporatism  
The interest group literature divides political systems as either pluralist or 
corporatist, according to the way interest groups interact with governments. 
In pluralist systems, voluntarily formed interest groups are multiple. Often 
they are in competition with each other to influence government policy 
through various means such as lobbying, campaigning and financially 
contributing to political parties while the government is of equal distance to 
all groups. These interest groups raise their own funds for activities they 
carry out. In other words, no group is privileged by the state by having been 
                                                                                                                                           
percentage of lawyers holding Public Office as presidents, vice-presidents, cabinet 
members, supreme court justices and speakers of the House between 1789-1952 was 75% 
(Cohen 1969). 
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given a special status in the state structure as well as being provided 
financial resources. There is also “no continuous and pervasive influence by 
any single or combined interests over time across all, or a significant 
majority, of policy areas” (Cox 1988: 303). For the purposes of this thesis, 
in a pluralist system “the affected interests remain essentially outside the 
policy process, as consultants or combatants on the issues involved, and the 
implementation takes place exclusively under the responsibility of public 
authorities” (Schmitter 1982: 263).  
 
In Lijphart’s famous dichotomy of consociational versus majoritarian 
democracy, this is usually the interest group representation model in 
majoritarian democracies such as Britain and the United States (Lijphart 
1999). Corporatist systems, on the other hand, “establish a limited number 
of authoritatively recognized groups that interact with the government in 
defined and regularized ways” (Malloy 1979: 4). These limited groups are 
established by governmental approval or action. Membership in them is 
involuntary. This “coordinated and compromise oriented” (Lijphart 1999: 
171) corporatism is typical of the consensus model of democracy. 
 
There is not much literature concerning the interest representation model 
prevalent in Turkey although commentators such as Parla and Compston 
describe it as corporatist (Parla 1989; 2009 and Compston 2002) . As far as 
I can see, no scholar seems to have described Turkey pluralist although 
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recently, the growth of civil society led to predictions of pluralism in the 
future. Meanwhile, stating that Turkey does not fit either to corporatism or  
pluralism, Bianchi said that associational life in Turkey is bifurcated to 
pluralist and corporatist bits (Bianchi 1984). In this case, voluntary 
associations form the former while mandatory occupational institutions such 
as TBB constitute the latter. Bianchi’s conceptualization is useful as it does 
not disregard the presence of the growing and increasingly visible voluntary 
associations by labeling Turkey simply as corporatist like Parla or 
Compston. I will therefore use his description. 
 
Semantically, corporatism comes from the Latin word “corpus”, meaning 
the body. Here, what is conceived as the body is society. Just like the body 
consists of organs that perform certain functions, the society is thought to 
consist of groups (and not individuals) that perform functions.  As the 
emphasis over groups rather than individuals implies, corporatism’s rise in 
the 19th or early 20th century may be seen, in a sense, a reactionary response 
to the fading away of the ancient regime by those “who lost out” when 
capitalism and liberalism flourished in the West (Williamson 1989: 25).  
 
Accompanying the response, there was opposition to “disruptive effects of 
industrialization and the political ideas of both liberalism and socialism” 
(Cox 1988: 295). Therefore, corporatism was an attempt to re-create a 
medieval society with a moral and hierarchical order (Williamson 1989). 
21 
 
While corporatism’s goal was to prevent the class conflict that arose with 
the emergence of capitalism, it should also be mentioned that corporatism 
was adopted by various schools of thought from social Christianity to 
socialism (Schmitter 1974) and not only by those who were reacting to 
capitalism.  
 
Schmitter has been the author of the often quoted description of corporatism 
(Schmitter 1974:  93-94):   
“Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation 
in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number 
of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered 
and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed 
(if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate 
representational monopoly within their respective categories in 
exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of their 
leader and articulation of demands and supports.”  
 
It was also Schmitter to admit that his definition represented an ideal type, 
elements of which cannot be perfectly reproduced in any system. 
Nevertheless, there are “two conceptually distinct meanings” (Lijphart 
1999: 171) about corporatism. The first is as an interest group system as 
explained above, referred by some as a political form (Cox 1988) or as 
elaborated by Schmitter himself as a structure of interest representation 
(Schmitter 1982).   
The second is the “incorporation of interest groups into the process of policy 
formation” (Lijphart 1999: 171). Referred as “concertation” it is  “a 
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distinctive mode for making and implementing public policy” (Schmitter 
1982: 262). While the interest group structure has been also referred as 
“corporatism 1” and policy concertation as “corporatism 2” (op. cit.), it is 
clear from the literature that the second meaning of corporatism is more 
controversial than the first. For instance, it was claimed that it was “a 
convenient label for any form of specialized bargaining between the state 
and societal interests” (Cox 1988: 295) and that it “offered no real 
distinction between advanced industrial and underdeveloped countries” 
(Cox 1988: 296). In Cox’s opinion this was why state and societal 
(authoritarian and liberal) forms of corporatism was later developed by 
Schmitter. In the former, the legitimacy and functioning of the state is 
primarily and exclusively dependent on the activity of singular, 
noncompetitive and hierarchically ordered representative corporations. In 
the latter, corporatist structures are “created by and kept as auxiliaries and 
dependent organs of the state which bases its legitimacy and functioning on 
other bases” (Schmitter 1979: 20).  
 
The distinction seems to be invented to provide a justification for the re-
emergence of corporatism in the West because after the Second World War, 
the advent of Keynesian policies required the state to be involved in 
managing the advanced capitalist economy. Thus, “trade unions and 
business organizations” have been integrated “in national economic 
planning and income policy bodies” (op.cit. ) while liberal political 
freedoms have been maintained along with corporatist structures.  The latter 
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point was emphasized because corporatism as practiced in the 1930s was 
discredited during the Second World War and the Nuremberg trials (Wiarda 
1974) after being favored by fascist political systems such as Italy, Germany 
and the Iberic-Latin world. While beyond those countries, “a great variety 
of corporatist agencies and institutions were created. These included wage 
and price agencies, labor relations boards and tribunals, councils of state, 
and functionally representative organs of various sorts….” (Wiarda 1974: 
5),  the fascist experience created a negative bias and pejorative meaning 
towards corporatism in general. 
 
To avoid negative associations with fascism, policy concertation was 
therefore called “neo-corporatism” (Lehmbruch 1979) or “quasi” or 
“liberal” (Panitch 1979: 121) corporatism. Cox claims that these labels 
added to corporatism created confusion (Cox 1988) and the concept has 
been characterized by “ambiguity, imprecision, and a liberal, rather 
undisciplined usage” (Molina & Rhodes 2002: 306).  
 
While seeking conceptual clarity is important, it should not steer one away 
from the fact that in which ever form (state, societal or neo-corporatism), 
the two meanings of corporatism as interest representation model and policy 
concertation tend to “occur together because” a corporatist interest 
representation model is necessary for concertation (Lijphart 1999: 171). In 
that sense, representation of interests and implementation of policy were 
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fused because “you cannot have a corporatist system of interest 
representation uncoupled from corporatist policy formation” (Cawson 1988: 
313).  
 
While the two “often blend into one another”, it has been recently argued 
(by comparing Ireland and Italy) that “structure and process may no longer 
be closely associated” (Baccaro 2003: 683) or that “a new view of nature 
and the role of social partners” was emerging (O’Donnell 2001: 313) given 
that Ireland and Holland do not show structural characteristics of 
corporatism but policy concertation. In other words, policy concertation did 
not necessarily require corporatist structures to come about.  
 
It should be mentioned that interest groups are involved in policy formation 
with the government usually at two levels of bargaining. The first is among 
corporatist groups and the second, between government and the corporatist 
groups (Lehmbruch 1979). To explain, organized labor and business (and 
less frequently agriculture) bargain among each other as “the most 
important interest groups included” (Lehmbruch 1979: 152) in the 
corporatist structure. They then bargain with the government. Once an 
agreement is reached among the so called “social partners”, all sides 
undertake to carry out the negotiated agreement.  
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In that regard, economic and income policies seem to be the core domain of 
corporatist polices or their “heartland” (Schmitter 1982: 262) although these 
are not the only areas. In fact, corporatist countries can be grouped as wide, 
medium and narrow concertation countries according to the policy areas 
covered by the corporatist structure. Further, they can be categorized as 
frequent or sporadic concertation “according to the intensity of the 
meetings” (Compston 2002: 313). Looked from this viewpoint, Austria 
seems to come ahead not only in terms of frequency of concertation but also 
“with regard to the width of policy areas covered” (op.cit.). These include 
the following: social policy, fiscal policy, monetary policy, investment 
policy, industrial policy, social welfare, labor law, job creation and training, 
employment and EU issues.  
 
On the other hand, today Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and Germany, 
Italy as well as Spain and France seem to be narrow concertation countries. 
However, in terms of frequency of concertation, Italy is sporadic (Compston 
2002: 313) ; Spain and France sporadic in employment law and social 
security issues while Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and Germany are 
frequent. There are of course various rankings by Schmitter, Lehmbruch and 
Schmidt (Williamson 1989: 150) but all three rank France and Italy as weak 
corporatist countries. 
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Whether a country adopts wide or narrow concertation in an area or 
sporadic or frequent concertation with the insider groups, the logic of state 
intervention through these structures is to partly supplement and replace the 
market. Accordingly, “the market is not  allowed to become a source of 
social conflict among conflicting interests” (Hernes & Selvik 1981: 104). 
For instance, corporatist structures can effect “free determination of prices” 
by establishing minimum prices or fees for services (op.cit.). Another 
example can be regulation or limitation of free access to the market “to 
prevent overcapacity or price wars” (op. cit.). In that way, free operation of 
the market is systematically modified by “incorporating into the public 
decision-making apparatus those groups that are affected by the 
unhampered operation of the market” (op. cit.). This is probably why in 
areas such as “agriculture, professional licensing, incomes and labor market 
policy” one sees a “propensity for being structured this way” than “say 
monetary policy, environmental protection or urban planning” (Schmitter 
1982: 265). 
 
The procedural principles of policy concertation may be defined “as 
informality, intimacy and introversion” (Gerlich 1992: 136). Informality 
refers to the social partnership being based on a “gentlemen’s agreement” 
(Gerlich 1992: 137) unlike the legal bureaucratic formality of the political 
system. To give an example from Austria, the Joint Committee in which all 
the negotiations take place has no official statute, building, minutes, etc. 
This creates an atmosphere of informality where meetings can be held in 
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convenient places such as recreational facilities and can be changed at 
partners’ will.  
 
Intimacy refers to the fact that “the public is kept in the dark” (op. cit.) as to 
the workings of the negotiations since there is no recording of negotiations 
like that of a parliamentary session. This defies the democratic requirement 
that public matters are kept public. And lastly, introversion refers to the fact 
that the social partners focus only on positions and alternatives that are 
“mutually acceptable” (op. cit.) to them, ignoring new developments in 
society and issues along the way.  
 
While recently the corporatist literature seems to have shifted to a structure-
process debate, before that the “to political economy” (Molina & Rhodes 
2002: 307) debate seems to have been important. In that regard, neo-
corporatism was viewed favorable for some time by pointing out to the 
better economic performance of corporatist countries. Neo-corporatism was 
believed to reduce the ungovernability of polities. In the 1990s, however, 
there were dissenting opinions, even in Austria (Gerlich 1992).  
 
One of the reasons for that was corporatism is undemocratic despite 
ensuring social peace. Indeed, Gerlich reports that in Austria the two heads 
of the most important bodies in the corporatist structure, the chamber of 
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business and the trade union federation, stayed in power for 25 years, 
outlasting many governments (Gerlich 1992). In Turkey too, “the average 
years in duty was 10,1 years for the president of a trade chamber” (Devlet 
Denetleme Kurulu 2009: 402).  
 
It was therefore alleged that “the corporatist state has been trapped in 
complex fiscal prebends, sectoral exemptions and entrenched privileges 
leading to a stalemated status quo” (Schmitter 1979: 39) and organizational 
hierarchy while suffocating members in organizations. Not surprisingly, in 
such a political system those who felt left out of the system voice protest 
such as the Freedom Party in Austria (Hague & Harrop 2004).  
 
Further, in the 1990s there has been growing recognition that economic 
globalization and market liberalization limited capacities of governments to 
handle corporatist models. This was because “to remain competitive in an 
increasingly global economy” (Hague & Harrop 2004: 180) continuous 
economic change was needed but change was inhibited by corporatist 
structures. The introversion of social partners only exacerbated this problem 
as they were tied to positions dictated by their status. Further, intimacy of 
these structures was seen by society with growing suspicion as people 
demanded greater accountability in all walks of life and were less likely to 
defer to authority, also challenging the informality of the structure.  
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The decline of corporatist structures may also be a manifestation of less 
interest in associational life,  since social change “is eroding the level of 
integration of individuals with interest organizations and political parties” 
(Armingeon 1997: 165).  In that sense, insisting on mandatory membership 
does not serve its intended purposes. In fact, these “social cohesion models 
has become a reason to defend the privileges and perks of the public 
sector”10 rather than to protect the interests of the members. In that regard, 
professions as a “community” were much less important to people than 
other communities such as kinship, ethnicity, religion or gender (Abel 
1997b: 127).  
 
Despite all that, corporatism seems to have its merits in terms of stability 
especially in terms of  “the élite behavior  acquired in a long term process of 
collective learning and the stabilizing effects of institutions” (Armingeon 
1997: 165). While arguably the efficacy of the corporatist structures and the 
frequency of their use may decrease, it cannot be argued that they will die 
out. Rather, far from disappearing, corporatism may expand into “new 
postindustrial issues (education, health care, welfare, the environment, 
others)” although it is fading in the industrial phase of tripartite 
relationships (Wiarda 1997:174 qtd. in Lijphart 1999). In other words, if due 
to globalization the market is “untouchable” by corporatist structures, then 
new corporatist areas may be sought after which are thought to be 
                                                       
10 “The Cruelty of Compassion”, The Economist 30 January 2010, 16. 
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independent of market mechanisms or where public sector has strong 
presence such as health and education. 
 
Schmitter also thinks that like all institutions, once established, corporatism 
will “stick” since this is what institutions do: “generate vested interests even 
when they are no longer needed” (Schmitter 1989: 61). Nevertheless, he 
believes that “the most likely pattern” for corporatism is “to come and go at 
fairly regular intervals” (Schmitter 1989: 67). Baccaro, on the other hand, 
argued that “while the policy-making process (concertation) is very much 
alive”, as an interest representation structure corporatism “may possibly be 
dead” (Baccaro 2003: 684). Arguably, as long as political exchange is 
possible, concertation would also be, if not in labor and economic issues, 
then in other matters because the “currency” of “political exchange did not 
disappear but rather changed” (Molina & Rhodes 2002: 320).  
 
Having now reviewed the corporatist literature and determined that its 
emphasis shifted to various themes at different times and “corporatism 2” or 
policy concertation has been at times a loaded and imprecise concept, we 
can nevertheless ascertain two things that is important for the purposes of 
this thesis. One, there is no doubt that corporatism is an interest 
representation model or structure. Two, corporatism also means policy 
concertation although the scope and policy areas can be different at different 
points in time even in the same country. Most importantly though, the two 
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corporatisms occur together.  Now is therefore time to move on to the 
interest group model in Turkey in more depth. At this point, it is interesting 
to note that the concept so much discussed in the literature, did not raise 
much passion let alone interest in Turkey. 
 
3. Interest group model in Turkey: bifurcation 
Talking about the interest group model in Turkey, Bianchi (Bianchi 1984) 
describes the associational life in the country as “bifurcated” into pluralist 
and corporatist sectors. He calls the first sector pluralist since there are 
associations and foundations that have been established voluntarily and are 
subject to the blanket provisions of the Law on Associations. Calling the 
second sector corporatist, he describes the various state sanctioned 
professional organizations that are established by law and have a 
constitutionally protected status. Given this duality, it makes sense to use 
his model because it reflects the reality more accurately than blanketly 
calling the interest group model only one thing. Continuing with Bianchi’s 
description, I will refer to the former as the pluralist sector and the latter as 
the corporatist sector.  
 
a.) The “pluralist” sector: 
It was explained that this sector consists of associations and foundations that 
are voluntarily established. However, the political culture and official 
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attitude in Turkey has not been particularly friendly towards interest 
representation. The first Ottoman constitution had no guarantee of 
associational life as there has always been a suspicion and an identification 
of associations “with foreign-based conspiratorial groups” (Bianchi 1984: 
109), finding its earliest form during the reign of Abdulhamit. Indeed, 
Abdulhamit’s paranoia of informants and spies forced many groups to 
disguise themselves and seek refuge in foreign countries (Bianchi 1984). 
When finally recognized, the freedom of association was acknowledged 
with many caveats subjecting it to various limitations.  
 
Things did not change much with the Republic despite the liberal provisions 
of the new Civil Code adopted in total from Switzerland. During this time 
not only political parties but also associations such as the Turkish Hearths 
were closed down while Masonry and Union of Turkish Women disbanded 
themselves (Alkan 1998). Bianchi also states that in this period 
associational life in the country was “virtually nonexistent” (Bianchi 1984: 
104). This sweeping statement must be corrected with a reminder that 
during this time Islamist networks continued to flourish underground.  
 
The first Act on Associations of 1909 has been in effect until 1938 
(Yücekök 1998). After 1946, associability increased intensively with the 
social change in the country. In the same year, the Act on Associations was 
amended to reflect this change. The 1946 act was a shift in the mindset of 
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political power that until then tried to keep society under continuous 
pressure (Yücekök 1998). This act has been in force until 1983 when it was 
replaced by a restrictive code, consistent with the military’s goals of less 
society in politics.  
 
In the last twenty years, however, voluntary associational life has been 
transformed in Turkey (Bikmen & Meydanoğlu 2006). Today voluntary 
organizations are increasingly visible in society and seen legitimate by the 
people, be they human rights advocacy or women’s groups or search and 
rescue teams that provide rescue services to the vulnerable. In that sense, 
these may be seen as signs of pluralism. Some groups in fact have been able 
to mobilize their resources to engage the government to affect change such 
as women’s groups during the drafting of the new Civil Code.  
 
Despite that, when it comes to issues such as Kurdish ethnicity and religion, 
the state seems to have approached civil society in the “state security 
paradigm” (Bikmen & Meydanoğlu 2006: 38), undermining its development 
in these areas. In her excellent analysis, Navaro-Yashin points out that the 
state of the 1990s demanded a realm of civil society in favor of itself. She 
therefore cautions against early celebrations of the so called “civil society” 
in Turkey as it is marked by many scenes that are “more statist than the 
state”, perfect example for which is the public farewell for soldiers that 
exalts, celebrates and reifies the state (Navaro-Yashin 2002: 119). Other 
34 
 
writers have also pointed out to the “dual” role played by the state at one 
time accommodating and at the other oppressing (Bikmen & Meydanoğlu 
2006: 37).  
 
Social capital and civic activism in Turkey is still scarce (Bikmen & 
Meydanoğlu 2006). The shortcomings and historically rooted problems 
notwithstanding, Turkish democracy today is more liberal (Çarkoğlu & 
Kalaycıoğlu 2009). The earthquakes in 1999 raised people’s “interest and 
trust towards civil society” (Bikmen & Meydanoğlu 2006: 38), suggesting 
therefore that civil society’s importance will grow in the future. While 
liberal legislative changes in the Act on Associations adopted in the EU 
process has been frustrated by the bureaucracy, the process nevertheless has 
been helping to the flourishing of the civil society scene, possibly leading  
to interest group pluralism and reducing the autonomy of the state from 
society.  
 
While the political culture in Turkey is slowly changing, civil society’s 
critical problems such as lack of financial and human resources remain. In 
that regard, the legal framework continues to create problems especially 
concerning financing by foreign donors or collaboration with international 
networks. Marginal groups such as gay and lesbian rights defenders are 
denied existence by prosecutorial attempts to close them on the grounds of 
immoral activities. All of these developments lets one to conclude that the 
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“plurality” of the pluralist side of the interest group model is subject to 
qualifications and Turkey may be still far away from accepting the pluralist 
model (Esmer 1991: 133).  
 
b.) The corporatist sector: 
In Turkey organic views of society have become prevalent with Ziya 
Gökalp. Gökalp in turn was influenced by Emile Durkheim (Parla 2009). 
Writing in the capitalist heydays that shattered all of the previous 
hierarchical values, norms and bonds in society, Durkheim was advocating a 
moralistic bond based on professions in order to hold the society together 
(Durkheim 2002). Gökalp failed to see that professions themselves were the 
by-product of capitalism (Öncü 1996) despite the fact that he was living in 
an agrarian society on the fringes of capitalism that barely had any 
professionals.  
 
Nevertheless, he took Durkheim’s idea of division of labor and argued that 
professionals needed each other. What was novel in his idea was that he 
“blended” Turkish nationalism (Bianchi 1984: 93) with the organic and 
hierarchical social organization of the Ottoman society. Hence, he argued 
that in order to further national solidarity, professional ethics had to be 
raised (Gökalp 1996). Divisions could be tolerated only if they were based 
on professional necessities.  
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In the later period, professional representation was adopted neither in the 
1921 nor 1924 constitution. Nevertheless, at the 1923 İzmir Economic 
Congress, occupational representation was preferred for the eight delegates 
that were to represent each city. The delegation consisted of one tradesman, 
one artisan, one laborer, three farmers and a representative from one 
company and one bank each (Ökçün 1997: 153) representing the “four 
major economic sectors-agriculture, trade, artisans and craftsmen and labor” 
(Bianchi 1984: 101). As Bianchi further points out, only two years after the 
Congress, “labor unions and nearly all other voluntary associations were 
closed down and the remaining economic sectors were organized around 
singular and compulsory corporatist structures whose purpose was to 
increase government regulation and control rather than promote 
associational consultation” (Bianchi 1984: 101-102). 
 
It was with the advent of multi party politics in Turkey that different (and 
conflicting) interests were “allowed” to openly diverge. Concomitantly, this 
was also the time when free professions started to develop independence 
from the state by establishing their umbrella organizations. The medical 
doctors did so in 1953, engineers and architects and veterinarians in 1954 
and pharmacists in 1956 (Öncü 1996). However, even the limited pluralism 
of the first ten years of multi party politics was too much for the military. It  
intervened in a coup in 1960.  
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In the transitional period from the time of the military coup until the 
formation of a new parliament, corporatist ideas finally found voice. A 
Constituent Assembly with legislative powers was established for that 
purpose. Its membership had to more or less represent the people as well as 
address concerns of the military. As such, it consisted of members of the 
Committee of National Unity (military side) and an Assembly of 
Representatives (civilian side) that according to the military “represented” 
the people.  
 
The civilian side consisted of representatives that were overwhelmingly 
affiliated with the CHP. In addition, there were those members chosen with 
“functional representation” (Bianchi 1984: 93). The latter consisted of the 
President of the Boards of the following professional organizations: Bars; 
Trade-Industry and Exchanges; Chambers of Agriculture; Chamber of 
Doctors; Chamber of Veterinarians; Chamber of Engineer and Architects; 
Labor Syndicates; Artisan Association, Union and Federations; Teacher 
Associations; Journalist Association and Syndicates; Credit Cooperatives 
for Artisans; Association and Union of Pharmacists (Doğru 1998). In the 
end, 54 of the 278 members of the Constituent Assembly were those coming 
from professional organizations (op. cit.). Bars had 6 members (all former 
presidents or board members of bars); media 12; old veterans 2; artisans 6; 
chambers 10; teachers 6 and agriculture 6 (op. cit.).  
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Reliance on professional organizations did not remain confined to the 
transitional period. Professional organizations were given constitutional 
status in the 1961 constitution as public but autonomous bodies. In fact, the 
constitution devised many “autonomous” institutions in addition to 
professional organizations such as universities, the Radio and TV 
Broadcasting Authority and similar. The military thus divided sovereignty 
among various institutions to make sure majoritarianism of governments 
would be balanced by them. Professional organizations retained their status 
also in the 1980 constitution.  
 
As both constitutions were drafted under the authority of the military, 
upgrading the status of professional organizations to a constitutional level 
may be seen as “ally creation” by the military given that most professions in 
Turkey owe their birth and prevalence to the republic. As a result, their 
presence in the constitutional structure serves to cool down the misgivings 
of the military towards parliamentary democracy and elections. Given this 
picture, Bianchi describes the period in Turkey between 1925-46 as one of 
“limited state corporatism”, the period between the two constitutions as 
“emerging societal corporatism” (Bianchi 1984: 142).  
 
On the other hand, Heper says that in the presence of the strong state 
tradition, “…state-interest group relations in Turkey continued to manifest 
unmistakable signs of monism” (Heper 1991b: 173) which he describes to 
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mean as “rule from above, autonomy, keeping civil society elements at bay” 
and the state not feeling “obliged to be responsive to civil society” (Heper 
1991a: 17). He further argues that the degree of stateness is high in Turkey 
allowing less ground for the development of pluralism or corporatism 
(Heper 1991a). It is true that the state tradition in Turkey is strong and state 
institutions are inclined to dominate than to build consensus. Further, 
Turkish political thought favors ideas that would serve to reduce conflict in 
society by resorting to a “public interest” as defined by the state. In fact, 
Atatürk denied that any conflicting interests existed in society.  
 
However, the economic, social and political change in the country since the 
1990s have been enormous. These changes very much challenged the state’s 
role as the sole modernizer. It also made clear that there is not one public 
interest but many different and conflicting interests. Also, failures of the 
state in big events such as the 1999 earthquake finished off the idea of an 
almighty state especially in light of dynamic NGOs. Therefore, one can 
argue that Heper’s argument holds less true today since social change turned 
Turkey into a country where the state is more open to cooperate with 
interest groups. Turam says that Heper’s conclusion is understandable if one 
looks back at the Republican history and state repression of social actors but 
according to her, this “oppression prophecy” has been challenged by the 
victory of AKP (Turam 2007: 7).  
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Nevertheless, the corporatist side of the interest representation model in 
Turkey still has various peculiarities. To begin with the first, there are ten 
professional organizations that have been afforded constitutional and public 
status. In the order of the highest number of members they consist of the 
following sectors: agriculture (4.8 million); small traders and artisans 
(almost 2 million); commerce and industry, maritime trade, trade exchanges 
(1.3 million); engineers and architects; medical doctors; attorneys; 
pharmacists; dentists; veterinarians and notary publics. Their continuing 
presence in corporatist processes since the Izmir Economic Congress 
notwithstanding, agriculture, artisans and traders are in fact occupations and 
not professions (discussed in Chapter Two). Among the “real” professions, 
engineers and architects have the highest number of members with almost 
350.000.  
 
Second peculiarity of the corporatist model is the absence of labor in the 
corporatist arrangements (Parla 2009: 138) just like Japan (Pempel & 
Tsunekawa 1979). Some scholars have argued, based on the examples of 
Japan and France both of which cannot be described corporatist, that this 
means that the system cannot be called corporatist. Others have said that 
this was not necessarily so (Wilson 1990). Because in both countries there is 
close partnership between the government and economic interests to 
promote economic growth. Both countries view interest groups with 
suspicion while favoring agricultural groups. Both have elite schools which 
groom best graduates for public service in the bureaucracy who thereupon 
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move to the top jobs at the private sector and continue to rely on the 
comradeship of their schoolmates in key positions in terms of credit and 
favorable policies. Given this elite school-bureaucracy-private sector job 
triangle, the partnership between the state and employers is as close as in a 
neo-corporatist country. Therefore, if one focuses “on the integration of the 
state and interest groups, the tendency will be to include France and Japan 
in the neo-corporatist group” (Wilson 1990: 132) despite the fact that there 
is no labor in the corporatist system. Schmitter, however, thinks that Japan 
is at best a case of “occasional corporatism” (Schmitter 1989: 60).  
 
If corporatism is “close involvement of organized interests with the public 
bureaucracy and ministers in the formulation of policy” (Williamson 1989: 
9), the close relationship between business and bureaucracy in the way 
described in France or Japan, exists also in Turkey, given the fact that 
TOBB served as a training ground for ministers responsible for business and 
trade or energy11. In that sense, after becoming minister, the former head of 
TOBB can be expected to keep close ties with his former organization. In 
that sense, he may form policy through informal means rather than in the 
corporatist sense of peak organization meetings and negotiating with the 
government as social partners. Therefore, just like in France and Japan, 
labor’s absence in Turkey should not per se disqualify Turkey’s interest 
group model from being called corporatist.  
                                                       
11 Necmettin Erbakan, Medeni Berk, Yalım Erez, Ali Coşkun, Ersin Faralyalı, Mehmet 
Yazar are some examples who have served first as head of TOBB and then as minister. 
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Third, and for the purposes of this thesis, the legal profession’s inclusion in 
the corporatist structure may be considered peculiar on its own. As Halliday 
suggests, a comparison of organizational prerequisites for neocorporatism 
among countries such as Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Norway, UK, US and Venezuela offers little evidence given 
the “extraordinary richness and diversity of lawyer and jurist associational 
forms” (Halliday 1989: 386). Not only that, a conflict as assumed between 
capital and labor to be included and mediated in a corporatist structure 
cannot be assumed in law and the legal system (Halliday 1989). As a result, 
TBB’s presence may be “justifiable” given the law’s pivotal role in the 
Turkish modernization. Indeed, their mere 70000 members –as compared 
with sectors such as agriculture or artisans- indicate not an economic but 
rather a political reason for their inclusion.  
 
At the same time, the increasing legitimacy of voluntary groups is 
undermining the status of corporatist organizations, a trend already 
prevalent in the business sector. While the involuntary TOBB is still strong, 
the voluntary TUSIAD and MUSIAD are becoming more and more 
prevalent. Maybe this is why “TOBB was the first association in the 
corporatist structure to claim that it constitutes the largest “civil society” 
organization in Turkey. Over time, this view spread to all professional 
organizations” (Devlet Denetleme Kurulu 2009: 250).  
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Arguably, corporatist groups may be trying to “brand” themselves as civil 
society in order to increase their legitimacy. As observed by the State 
Auditing Authority, professional organizations seem to be having “an 
identity and mission crisis due to their dubious legal status swinging 
between civil society and public status while forming part of 
administration” (Devlet Denetleme Kurulu 2009: 396). At the same time, 
customs brokers showed recently an interest in becoming a chamber12. 
 
More interestingly, professional organizations other than TBB also seem to 
be having troubled or strained relationships with the state whether it be the 
doctors13, veterinarians14 or the pharmacists15. This contradicts corporatist 
theory if these organizations are social partners of the government. 
However, not much is known about the actual workings of policy 
concertation in Turkey despite the presence of a constitutional structure that 
provides ten sectors the possibility of policy concertation. As described, 
                                                       
12 “Gümrük mişavirleri oda kurmak istiyor”, see: 
http://www.stargazete.com/ekonomi/gumruk-musavirleri-oda-kurmak-istiyor-haber-
376179.htm. , Star, Access date: 24 September 2011. 
 
13 Doctors have been protesting against the full day legislation and many changes 
introduced by the Ministry of Health. A review of the “news” in the website of their peak 
organization only confirms this point. See: http://www.ttb.org.tr/index.php/Haberler/hukuk-
2796.html. Access date: 16 October 2011. 
 
14 Veterinaries are against importing of meat. See: http://www.tvhb.org.tr/?p=1537. Access 
date: 16 October 2011. 
 
15 The pharmacists’ chamber decided to take action against the proposed changes by the 
government to make drugs cheaper and decided that all pharmacies close for one day in 
protest. This led the government to cancel the contract with the umbrella organization of 
pharmacists while causing it a loss in fees for all contracts each pharmacy made with the 
Ministry of Health. The drive behind all this seems to be to further competition and reduce 
the price of drugs (and thus health costs). “Eczaneler kepenk indirdi”, Hurriyet, See: 
http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/printnews.aspx?DocID=48564. Access date: 22 
October  2011. 
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even the important and much more visible TOBB’s role in policy formation 
is unclear. My goal is therefore to find out more about the corporatist side of 
the bifurcated interest representation system in Turkey, especially in terms 
of policy concertation while focusing on one of the organizations in the 
corporatist structure, TBB.   
 
I.4. TBB in the interest group structure 
In addition to the lack of interest in corporatist theory, there also seem to be 
not much interest about professional organizations that constitute the 
corporatist structure in Turkey. Where the subject of interest groups has 
been given thought, it has focused mostly on the behavior of labor and 
business/trade interests. Given their heavy weight in the economy and their 
frequent appearance in corporatist structures all over the world, this may not 
be surprising. Nevertheless, a total picture should “include an examination 
of the state in relation to a host of professional associations” (Pempel & 
Tsunekawa 1979: 242)  especially at a time when developed economies are 
increasingly moving from production to services.  
 
While it may lack the “grand aura or significance of business or labor” 
(Suleiman 1987: 263) the legal profession as a whole and the bar deserve 
attention for their far greater influence on government and bureaucracy than 
other professionals. In fact, lawyers’ have an advantage over other 
professionals “in their privileged access to the extraordinary resources of the 
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state, most notably its monopoly over legitimate coercion” (Streeck & 
Schmitter 1984 qtd. in Halliday 1989: 397) .  
 
Further, in many established democracies as well as in Turkey, lawyers 
form one of the most represented professions in the Parliament. Indeed, the 
election on 12 June 2011 produced a Parliament in which the highest 
represented profession was again (out of 550 MPs 107) lawyers16. As a 
result, combined with their closeness to state and government functions, 
lawyers are   
“a pivotal institution of civil society: mediating between citizens 
and state, workers and capital; allowing government to function 
(since it can act only through law); redressing civil wrongs; 
creating, dissolving, and managing families and their property; 
making the economy work (constituting its actors, defining their 
rights and obligations, facilitating transactions among them); and 
articulating essential concepts of justice and power. These roles 
are powerfully shaped by how many lawyers there are, who they 
are, how they practice, how they are paid, and how they regulate 
and govern themselves” (Abel 2003: XIII).  
 
Professional organizations have a significant role in determining the nature 
and incidence of how lawyers will respond to all this in a given country. 
These are in turn affected by their interaction with the state at a given time. 
As underlined by Rueschemeyer, the bar’s “special character derives from 
its specific relations to the state, in particular to the administration of justice, 
and to the private interests that are served by the legal order. Closer 
                                                       
16 “Yeni Meclis Hukukçu Ağırlıklı”, Radikal, 13 June 2011.  
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relations to one or the other of these poles have profound consequences for 
the profession” (Rueschemeyer 1986: 445).   
 
In Turkey, the law in general played an important role as supporter and 
carrier of modernization efforts in the country. The profession was granted 
autonomy as late as 1969 with the establishment of TBB. This was much 
later than other professional associations and, in any case, eight years after it 
was enshrined in the constitution. Despite that, today, the legal profession 
enjoys many privileges that many other professions do not which will be 
detailed below.  
 
Bars have been established to develop the profession; to provide honesty 
and trust in the relationship between the members of the profession and the 
clients; to protect the order, ethics, respectability of the profession as well as 
the rule of law; to defend and protect human rights; and to provide for 
mutual needs of attorneys17. By law, they are forbidden to act outside the 
mandates of their establishment.  
 
TBB has the following duties18: organize joint meetings regarding issues 
that concern bars; to reach general goals and develop the profession by 
                                                       
17 See art. 76 of the Act on Attorneys of 1969 numbered 1136. Official Gazette Date: 7 
April 1969, No: 13168. 
 
18 See art. 110 of the Act on Attorneys. 
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coordinating the work of bars; to protect the interests of the members of the 
bar and the order, ethics and traditions of the profession; to introduce 
members of the bar and bars to each other and strengthen their professional 
ties; to strive for the establishment of bars in every town and promote the 
use of attorneys by citizens; to prepare views, publications and where 
necessary drafts for the proper development of laws; to make its views 
known to the authorities in issues that concern bars; to write reports to the 
Ministry of Justice and courts when requested; to take every measure for the 
development of attorneys in the profession; to cooperate with the Ministry 
of Justice and courts for the collection and publishing of court decisions; to 
work for the full and ethical carrying out of functions of attorneys; to open 
libraries, publish journals, convene conferences, produce translated and 
original works to raise the professional  level of members; to convene 
meetings to discuss remedies and ideas to make the profession popular; to 
communicate with legal councils and institutions in the country; to join 
international meetings and communicate with international bars and legal 
institutions; to determine and recommend obligatory professional rules and 
to defend, protect and work for the materialization of rule of law and human 
rights.  
 
As can be seen from the above, TBB has mostly protective interest group 
functions. It is established with the joining together of all bars. Attorneys 
must be members of a bar to practice law and pay yearly membership fees 
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to that bar. In other words, it is local bars but not TBB that function as the 
involuntary membership institutions of the profession.  However, when 
becoming an attorney, the fees and taxes charged for the issuance of 
licenses is shared by TBB, the local bar and the state19. Further, a portion of 
fees charged by notaries to issue a power of attorney goes to TBB.  
 
There are additional financial protections afforded to the profession, bars 
and TBB by the state, showing the typical bias of corporatism that 
incorporates “producer interests to the exclusion of consumer interests” 
(Cawson 1988: 133). The primary example of this is the fact that in the 
name of public order, TBB determines a yearly minimum fee tariff that 
applies between clients and attorneys. By law, no attorney can ask for an 
amount less than in the tariff for his or her services20. In other words, unlike 
many other services in the country, the price of legal services is not 
determined by the market or the people. Through this, the state shields 
attorneys from competition by making it illegal to render services for 
cheaper fees to get clients. 
 
                                                       
19 As of 2011, fees and taxes collected by the state amounts to TL 454,4; by TBB to TL 330 
and by Istanbul Bar to TL 377,44. An applicant must pay the following charges: TL 390, 40 
dues; TL 300 license fees; TL 377,44 local bar; TL 30 identity card and TL64 stamp duty. 
See: 
http://www.istanbulbarosu.org.tr/Document.asp?DocumentIndex=/idariisler/stajsicil.htm. 
Access date: 16 October 2011.  
 
 
20 Art. 1 of the 2010-2011 Minimum Legal Fees Tariff (2010-2011 Avukatlık Asgari Ücret 
Tarifesi) Official Gazette: 3 December 2010, no: 27774.   
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Second, this minimum fee tariff is used by courts to also award the winning 
party attorneys fees21. Consequently, when a party looses a case in court, he 
or she is asked to also cover the other party’s attorney’s fees that are 
determined according to this tariff (in addition to his or her attorney’s fees). 
Thus, by law, the winning party’s attorney is guaranteed a dual income by 
the state in addition to the fees paid by his/her client, amounting to another 
government subsidy of the legal profession. Put differently, the state is 
making attorneys fees part of an enforceable item in the judgment, ready to 
use the coercive power of the state if the relevant party fails to collect it.  
 
The financial benefits conferred by the state to the profession are not limited 
to this. The provision of legal aid service in criminal22 and civil matters23 is 
also delegated to bar organizations. Put differently, bars provide free legal 
service to citizens. While citizens do not pay, attorneys that do the work are 
paid by funds that are set aside by the government for that purpose. Through 
this scheme, attorneys generate income, especially inexperienced, young 
and solo practitioners who constitute the bulk of the profession, while local 
bars and TBB obtain a percentage of income for running the scheme. It 
should be also mentioned that the state receives about 30% of those fees in 
taxes as VAT and withholding tax.  
                                                       
21 This is done pursuant to art. 164 of Act on Attorneys which provides that in cases 
pursued with attorneys, the court must decide on its own attorneys fees. Attorneys fees 
tariff art. 3 (1)sets how the amount to be awarded is to be determined. 
22 This is done by various articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ceza Muhakemesi 
Kanunu), Act no: 5271, Official Gazette: 4 December 2004, no: 25673.  
 
23 The regulation on civil legal aid (Adli Yardım Yönetmeliği), Official Gazette: 30 March 
2004, No: 25418. 
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The corporatist theory argues that corporatist relations aim to provide 
special access for some interest groups to reduce conflict in society. In this 
type of system, interest groups are inherently designed as protective groups. 
Put differently, the theory implies that once interest groups are taken into 
the state structure, it will bring out a harmonious relationship between the 
government and “insider” interest groups. When looked from this angle, 
TBB seems to be one and it looks like it benefits as an insider. 
 
However, as will be shown in Chapter Two, bars’ relationship with the 
governments seems to have been strained from the days of the establishment 
of the first bar in Istanbul. While this seemed more like an ideological battle 
than anything else, recently, the profession disagrees with the government 
on both political and economic issues. For instance, some bars started court 
action to stop opening of new law schools24, protested against lifting of the 
bar exam25 arguing that this was leading to crowding in the profession and 
reduced income for everyone while some bars boycotted late payment of 
fees for legal aid work by going on strike and organizing public rallies26. 
                                                       
24 “Yeni Hukuk Fakültelerine Karşı Baro Tarafından Dava”, see: 
http://www.turkhukuksitesi.com/showthread.php?t=8756. Access date: 18 October 2011. 
Interestingly, the Adana Bar got involved in the lawsuit protesting the Ankara Bar. 
 
25“Barolar Birliği: Avukatlık sınavı şart”, Radikal, see:  
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=205262. Access date: 18 October 2011. 
 
26 Bedavaya Çalışacak Avukat yok”, see: http://www.tumgazeteler.com/?a=5306879. 
Access date: 18 October 2011. 
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Presidents of TBB at every judicial opening year heavily criticized 
governments27.  
 
These boycotts, strikes and public rallies are manifestations of outsider 
behavior, not to be expected from a corporatist “partner”. It therefore 
suggests that despite the fact that TBB is in the corporatist structure, TBB 
and state institutions may actually not be engaged in policy concertation. It 
is therefore hypothesized that a corporatist interest group model may not 
necessarily lead to policy concertation and the two may not be “fused” as 
alleged by the theory. Whether the relationship between the parties amounts 
to policy concertation and what the reasons for the conflict are the two main 
research questions of this thesis that will be attempted to be answered in the 
next chapters. 
 
This chapter provided the theoretical framework of the thesis by setting out 
the interest group literature. It explained the two meanings of corporatism as 
an interest representation model and policy formation. It described the 
interest group system in Turkey as “bifurcated” and said it would 
concentrate on the corporatist side of it. It then posed the two research 
questions, first, whether a corporatist interest group model indeed leads to 
corporatist policy making. Second, why there was nonconsensual behavior 
between the so called corporatist partners.  
                                                       
27 For the text of the opening speeches, please refer to the website of TBB, 
www.barobirlik.org.tr. 
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To understand the true nature of the relationship between the parties, I will 
conduct interviews with bar administrators and state officials while making 
non-participant observations in various meetings. Before I do that, however, 
a better understanding of bar associations as professional organizations is 
necessary. This I will be doing in Chapter Two. 
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Chapter II: Comparative Background to Bars 
 
Chapter One set out the theoretical framework of the thesis by using the 
interest group literature. I set out to focus on the corporatist side of the 
interest group structure in Turkey and explore the actual nature of the 
relationship between TBB and state institutions in order to see the extent of 
policy concertation and understand the reasons of the conflictual 
relationship between the parties. Before proceeding further, however, in this 
chapter the focus will be on bars from a comparative perspective.  
 
I will compare three countries, the U.S, Germany and Turkey while making 
use of the professionalization literature. This will allow me to show 
similarities as well as different roles played by states with regard to the legal 
profession and how bars in three different countries came into existence. As 
we are to find out in this chapter, being organized around a professional 
organization like the bar is what makes a profession distinct from other 
occupations. Further, professional organizations determine roles imputed to 
a profession as well as produce and maintain privileges of the profession, 
making it necessary to understand their discourse. The comparison may also 
help to uncover “profession specific” issues while it allows one to get a full 
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grasp of the multi-layered and complex relationship between state 
institutions and TBB. 
 
It should be noted that the professionalization literature is heavily Anglo-
American and uses sociological terminology. Nevertheless, its contribution 
is significant for it shows that socio-economic change effecting countries is 
very similar, leading to a convergence in professional regulation. This may 
be one of the factors contributing to the conflict between TBB and state 
institutions. 
 
I will start this chapter with the concepts of profession and professional 
organization. I will then explore how bar organizations came about in the 
U.S and Germany and compare their experience with Turkey. I will then 
show the convergence of problems in the legal profession of three countries 
and introduce solutions adopted in the U.S and Germany. 
 
In Chapter One, when talking about corporatism, it was already observed 
that professions were the product of the Industrial Revolution which brought 
economic thinking with it: production for profit, growth of expertise and an 
increased division of labor (Kritzer 1999). “As producers become 
specialized, consumers necessarily become generalized and thus dependant 
on others” (Abel 1997b: 117). Further, the Industrial Revolution changed 
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where people lived. They moved to highly populated areas and urban 
settings. In such an environment, it was professionals who were needed to 
deliver the necessities of urban life.  
 
Sociologically, professions are defined as “exclusive occupational groups 
applying somewhat abstract knowledge to particular cases” (Abbott 1988, 
qtd. in Kritzer 1999: 717). This definition provides two important 
ingredients: exclusivity and abstract knowledge. As to the latter, 
professionals possess knowledge that is “acquired by education and trained 
expertise”, suggesting a selection based on merit, usually done by “similarly 
educated experts” (Kritzer 1999: 716) rather than the open market. It is 
those experts who in a sense “certify” the merits obtained by education. The 
exclusivity comes from the fact that selection to the profession is a privilege 
not afforded to everybody.  
 
In that sense, a professional organization has a gatekeeper function that it 
undertakes through its members who are the “certified experts”. Thus, the 
occupational organization becomes the means for members of the 
profession “to exercise a substantial degree of control over the market for 
their services” (Abel 1986a: 1). Indeed, the third ingredient of professions is 
they unite their members around a “professional organization” (Hughes 
1963, qtd. in Cirhinlioğlu 1996: 10). 
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In addition, professions claim to be in “pursuit of the learned art in the spirit 
of a public service” whereby “gaining livelihood is incidental”  (Pound 
1953: 5) rather than “the only purpose in the purely money-making 
callings” (Pound 1953: 6). As a result, professions frame themselves as a 
higher “calling” and “as a service to God and indirectly to mankind” which 
is “reflected” in the “language of professions” (McClelland 1991: 16). For 
instance, professionals offer a “public service” rather than “a product”. They 
receive “fees” in return rather than wages or “salaries” (McClelland 1991: 
16). Similarly lawyers “counsel” their clients or “give” but not “sell legal 
advice” (McClelland 1991: 17).  
 
Put differently, although there is an entrepreneurial side to professions that 
involves money making like in other occupations, their public character is 
more pronounced. Over time, professions acquired “regulatory autonomy 
through peer review processes, and autonomy vis-à-vis the service 
recipient” (Kritzer 1999: 717). While regulatory autonomy means that it is 
the professional organization that regulates the profession by internal rules 
and procedures especially in the disciplinary process, the latter autonomy is 
the professional’s autonomy vis a vis the client. Indeed, it is the 
combination of these factors that leads to the assertion of independence of 
professionals. 
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Given all this, professionalization “is a process and an ideology which 
serves profoundly political objectives” (Auerbach 1977: 11). In the last 
hundred years, “only a few occupations have succeeded in attaining the 
status of a profession” (Abel 1997a: 19). Indeed, many people of the 
working population are engaged in public services without the recognition 
of  “professional”. At the same time, not all professionals such as architects 
or engineers share the same prestigious status of law and medicine 
(McClelland 1991) since they did not benefit from “their historical 
association with aristocratic patrons”. For instance, teaching and social 
work do not due to “their association with low-status clients” (Abel 1989: 
27). Nevertheless, “professionalization was in part an attempt to escape this 
dependence by recourse to collegial standards” (Jarausch 1990: 13).  
 
When taken together, the functions of professional organizations are typical 
of a protective interest group that promotes the identity, values and material 
interests of its members under the cover of “independence”. Having thus far 
provided the theory of professions and its self-conceived difference from 
other occupations, I can now turn to the functions exercised by professional 
organizations. 
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II.1 Functions of professional organizations 
II.1.1 Regulation of production of producers 
The first thing professional organizations do is to regulate the production of 
producers. In other words, they control the market by controlling the 
“supply” (Abel 1986a). In that regard, supply refers to the number of 
members in the profession and provides professionals “status” as a member 
by requiring a long and expensive education as well as additional training 
that only a few can afford. Thanks to this control, a certain status is created 
and maintained for those that are “in”. Status then is enhanced as 
membership remains a privilege that few can have. For instance, a longer 
university education replacing a shorter apprentice requirement is one way 
of achieving status. As a result, regulation of supply limits the numbers in 
the profession.  
 
When these mechanisms were introduced in the U.S. around the turn of the 
twentieth century, “formal legal education rapidly displaced the 
apprenticeship system” (Abel 1986b: 8-9). Thereafter, law schools extended 
the periods of study required from one to two, then to three years. Finally, 
they started to require a pre-legal degree as a prerequisite for obtaining a 
law degree (Abel 1986b). In that sense, a law degree has been constantly 
made “elite” by increasing requirements to obtain it. Professional 
organizations played their part too. The American Bar Association refrained 
from accrediting part time evening schools, not surprisingly, leading to their 
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disappearance (Abel 1986b). At the same time, requiring a university degree 
in law helped the academia to play a gate keeper role along the bar. This 
made a difference because inherently the academia is more universalistic 
than bar associations. Thus, it contributed to the elimination of gender as an 
ascriptive barrier for becoming a lawyer (Abel 1986a).  
 
Another way to regulate supply and limit numbers in the profession is by 
introduction of a bar exam, failure in which translates for one not being able 
to practice the profession. This is why "bar exams became universal, written 
and difficult” over the years  (Abel 1986b: 9). Further, there are nationality 
and character requirements the presence of which are attested by fellow 
professionals.  “Typically, they have sought to limit entry to males, of 
certain age, with certain kind of education, from a certain social and ethnic 
background” (Burrage 1988: 227).  
 
Consequently, in the U.S. the profession was closed to African-Americans 
and women until the 1950s and 60s (Abel 1986b). They were only later 
admitted to elite positions “in return of their loyalty to dominant 
professional values” (Auerbach 1977: 6). Put differently, these barriers 
“serve certain political preferences” of elite lawyers “at a time when social 
change is threatening their status and values” (Auerbach 1977: 4). In the 
U.S, this was ethnicity and class when immigration and demographic 
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patterns affected the country and challenged the status of “white Anglo-
Saxon protestants within the legal profession” (Auerbach 1977: 5). 
 
By invoking these entry barriers in a successful fashion, the legal profession 
in the U.S managed to keep numbers of legal professionals pretty steady 
over decades. In fact, “the population to lawyer ratio was exactly the same 
in 1951 as it had been in 1900” (Abel 1986b: 9). Something similar goes for 
solicitors in the U.K who additionally suffered from the War but 
nevertheless, their number in 1948 was almost the same as in 1890 (Abel 
1986a).  
 
However, “supply control in a capitalist economy can never be more than 
temporary” (Abel 1986b: 10). Indeed, starting from the 1970s, each element 
of supply control has been eroded not only in the U.S or U.K but also in 
other countries. First, “the U.S Supreme Court struck down barriers against 
entry to the profession by non-citizens, out of state residents and those who 
deviated from sexual or political mainstream” (Abel 1986b: 11).  
 
Equally important was the increased demand to study law, driven by the 
attractiveness of incomes earned by lawyers (probably an outcome of the 
limited supply). At the same time, expansion of the rights discourse with 
“civil rights, women’s issues, consumer and environmentalist movements” 
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(Abel 1986b: 10) widened the scope of legal work. As a result, in the U.S, 
“the number of lawyers more than doubled between 1950 and 1980” and 
was “likely to do so again by 2000” (Abel 1986b: 7). The increase in lawyer 
numbers, the change in composition in terms of age and experience and the 
increase in women28 is not U.S specific but rather is “the norm in the 
Western industrialized world” (Lewis 1986: 79).  
 
II.1.2 Regulation of production by producers 
In addition to regulation of supply as described above, professional 
organizations also sought to control “production by producers” (Abel 1986a: 
15).  These rules typically involve how professionals must deliver their 
“product”. The first way to control production is by carving out a 
“monopoly against external competitors” (Abel 1986a: 16). In other words, 
the profession seeks limitation of practice to its members. For instance, only 
doctors can provide medical services (which can be widely defined in the 
medical context from measuring blood pressure; attending to a simple 
wound; to making operations). Similarly, only doctors can examine a patient 
and provide medical advice.  
 
                                                       
28 According to the American Bar Association, in 1980, 92% of attorneys were men and 8% 
were women, compared to 73% men and 27% women in 2000. When one looks at law 
student enrollments the gender ratio seems almost half-half. See: 
http://new.abanet.org/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/Lawyer_Demographics.pdf. 
Access date: 18 September 2011. 
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The second way of controlling production is the “establishment of 
restrictive practices limiting internal competition” (Abel 1986a: 16). One 
example of this is the determination of minimum fees for the services of the 
professional. Such minimum fees not only ensure certain life standards for 
members of the profession but also protect collegiality in the absence of 
which fellow professionals may engage in a price war to get clients, 
eventually leading to reduced fees for the profession as a whole. Of course, 
one of the assumptions of minimum fees is that every member or 
professional is “producing” the same quality service (Elveriş 2006). 
Therefore, the logic goes that there is no need for a different price.  
 
To limit internal competition in the profession further, members are banned 
to advertise their services or their special expertise, actions that have been 
interpreted as seeking publicity. Again, the logic is that because all 
members are producing the same quality service, it is unfair for some of 
them to try to get ahead of others by developing and “advertising” this 
specialization. An additional way to control producers is the application of 
disciplinary measures in case members do not act in conformity with these 
restrictive practices.  
 
Applying all of these control mechanisms to the legal profession, one can 
see that the monopoly in provision of legal services covers not only 
provision of legal representation in court, but also provision of legal advice 
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(out of court) or legal drafting. The monopoly is protected by law29. There 
are legal provisions in place which make it a punishable crime to engage in 
unauthorized practice of law by someone who is not registered in a bar 
association. Similarly, it is a crime to hold oneself out as an attorney30.  
 
Curiously, however, although it has been claimed that the monopoly is in 
the interest of clients for it makes sure that only those certified by experts 
provide the service, in the U.S, “all complaints about unauthorized practice 
have been found to come from lawyers and not from clients” (Abel 1989: 
114). This fact alone illustrates that the monopoly serves as a production 
control mechanism than anything else since the public is possibly unaware 
or unable to resort to these types of disciplinary measures. 
 
Bar associations also determine minimum fees that need to be charged by 
professionals. In the U.S., this was done only after they established 
themselves and their members felt “the effects of the Depression” (Burrage 
1988: 253; Abel 1989). Lawyer publicity has been also subject to blanket 
disciplinary proceedings despite the fact that it is a postwar phenomenon 
and result of the complexity of the legal knowledge. In fact, more and more 
lawyers describe themselves as specialists (Abel 1989). Today, there is not 
                                                       
29 It can be assumed that every state in the U.S would have such a provision. In Turkey, the 
same provision is in Art. 35 of the Act on Attorneys. 
 
30 Art. 63 of the Act on Attorneys. 
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only specialization as to the areas of law but also “task oriented 
specialization” such as litigation or consultancy; or “venue oriented 
specialization” such as appellate courts, administrative bodies (such as the 
Competition Authority) (Kritzer 1999: 735-6).  
 
It should be noted that the regulation of “production by producers” comes 
after “production of producers”, “when social closure in the profession is 
well advanced” (Abel 1989: 123). In that sense, first a status has to be 
created and maintained for the socially closed members. After making sure 
that they are adequately protected, the monopoly for the provision of 
services and similar bans can be introduced.   
 
In addition to the erosion of supply control, mechanisms of production of 
producers have been also eroded. This started in the 1970s, when the U.S. 
Supreme Court struck down minimum fee schedules and most restrictions 
on lawyer advertising.  While the decisions were based on legal principles 
such as freedom of speech (including commercial speech of an attorney), 
there appears to be various reasons that have paved the way for this. The 
first is the principles of market economy. Indeed, minimum fees and 
advertising restrictions were described as cartelized actions. In fact, setting 
minimum fees is nothing but price fixing (Abel 1989) and it was found that 
the “price for routine services varied inversely with the amount of 
advertising” (Abel 1989: 121).  In other words, another goal was to protect 
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consumers. Lately, the trend towards the abolition of these restrictions 
seems to have grown stronger with the wider availability of on-line legal 
information and pro bono provision of legal advice.  
 
In addition, self regulating disciplinary measures of bar associations seem to 
have been increasingly criticized since “formal expulsion or discipline of 
any sort has been rare” (Freidson 1984: 2). According to Abel, in U.K. only 
less than 1 percent of lawyers have been punished (Abel 1986a). This is at a 
time when the public demands more equality and participation and “has less 
tolerance for professional domination or even paternalistic benevolence” 
(Barber 1978: 604). As a result, in the U.K., disciplinary boards today 
consist of representatives of consumers as well.  
 
When traditional mechanisms of professional control over the production of 
and by producers were eroded, lawyers in many countries turned to 
stimulating the demand for legal services. In the U.K, one of the ways of 
doing this has been the introduction of legal aid especially after 1949. In 
general, after the Second World War, the internationalization of human 
rights and standards of fair trial especially in criminal cases contributed to 
an increased demand for legal services. The latter required states to take 
action to provide legal representation from the public purse if the criminal 
defendant was unable to afford counsel himself.  The rise in crime and 
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divorce rates in society also seems to have contributed to the perceived need 
(Abel 1986a) while legal aid in civil matters remained more controversial.  
 
As can be seen, professional organizations have been successful in 
regulating the supply by limiting the numbers in a profession and then 
regulating the product delivered by their members up to a point. However, 
requirements of the market economy seem to increasingly challenge their 
functions of gate keeping and regulation of production of services, 
sometimes leading to their disappearance. After this introduction as to the 
functions of professional organizations, now is the time to see how bar 
organizations came about as professional organizations in three different 
countries and exercised these functions. 
 
II.2. Bars’ establishment as professional organizations  
Bars’ establishment has not followed the same path in every country. 
Organizations have been shaped by different priorities, often “by their 
beginnings” (Pound 1953: 13). I will begin with the bar association 
movement in the U.S as it offers an interesting example of a parallel 
structure: of market based bar associations and state sponsored bar 
associations. As to the former, in some states of the U.S, there are voluntary 
bar associations in which membership is not mandatory to practice the 
profession. As to the latter, there are also those states in which membership 
67 
 
in a state bar association is mandatory for an attorney to be able to practice 
law.  
 
Another reason that makes the U.S model interesting and worth looking is 
that the U.S did not in the end opt for a state based model. This is contrary 
to the experience of many countries in which the state sponsored bar 
association model reigns. At the same time, the U.S. is also the country with 
serious debate concerning the viability and efficacy of the compulsory bar 
association model from the very start of the concept. The debate involved 
judicial orders, judgments from highest courts, referenda in some state bars 
as well as other political and judicial instruments.  
 
In addition to the uniqueness of its parallel structure, any comparison about 
bar organizations should include the U.S because the American legal 
profession is the largest in the world “in absolute numbers as well as in 
proportion to the population” (Rueschemeyer 1986: 418). The American 
Bar Association reports that as of 2008, there were 1.180.386 lawyers in the 
U.S. while each year, 140.000 students are enrolled in law schools31. Given 
these numbers, legal profession in the U.S. is also important for the trends it 
sets for the rest of the legal world. 
                                                       
31 See: http://new.abanet.org/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/Lawyer_Demographics.pdf. 
Access date: 18 September 2011. 
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While legal professionals flourished with the rise of capitalism and 
formation of modern states, it has been argued that the constitutional design 
in the U.S and the state’s role “creates very special conditions and vast 
opportunities for legal work” (Rueschemeyer 1986: 436), arguably 
contributing to the prevalence of the legal profession. Indeed, De 
Tocqueville was famous for asserting that "scarcely any political question 
arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial 
question." (De Tocqueville 1998: 110 Griffith (ed.))  
 
II.2.1 Bar associations in the U.S 
“The major wave of founding of modern bar associations seems to have 
begun in the 1870s” (Halliday, Powell & Granfors 1993: 518), “paralleling 
developments in other occupations” (Schneyer 1983: 7). Although it was the 
establishment of the American Bar Association in 1878 that gave impetus to 
the movement of bar associations, the era of modern bar associations must 
begin with the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Pound 
1953). What makes this event significant is not only that later scholars 
quoted by Pound and others (Burrage 1988) share his judgment but also in 
1870 of the 4000 lawyers in New York City, 235 voluntarily signed an 
agreement to form this private bar association (Pound 1953).  
 
In the words of its constitution, the Association of the Bar of the City of 
New York was “established to maintain the honor and dignity of the 
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profession, to cultivate social intercourse among its members, and to 
increase its usefulness in promoting the due administration of justice” 
(Martin 1997: 35). To further its goals, the association established four 
standing committees: on amendment of laws; on judiciary (charged with the 
duty of observing the working of the judicial system); “on grievances to 
hear complaints against the members of the association and complaints as to 
the administration of justice” (Pound 1953: 257); and on legal education to 
consider changes in the system of education and of admission to practice 
(Pound 1953).  
 
What seems to have led to the establishment of the Association appears to 
have been a scandalous litigation in 1868 and questionable ethical practices 
of the judiciary as well as the lawyers involved in it. The events surrounding 
the litigation seems to have caught the attention of the nation “on the 
methods of doing business in New York” (Martin 1997: 3). Hence, the 
emphasis in the constitution of the Association, on honor and dignity of the 
profession and due administration of justice.  
 
Given the prominence of its members, it is probably not surprising that in its 
first 18 months, “the Association housed itself, founded its library and more 
than doubled its membership” (Martin 1997: 43). These developments show 
that a voluntary professional organization, emerging at a time of crisis can 
provide for its members as well as “awaken lawyers generally to the need of 
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an effective professional organization” (Pound 1953: 259). Provision of 
social space and a library for its members notwithstanding, the association’s 
other goals involving the justice system reform seem to have been less 
successful.  
 
While the Association marks the start of an era, many voluntary associations 
that have been established afterwards were not as fortunate. Despite having 
high aspirations of regulating the market, disciplining members and similar, 
they had to  face the gap between their resources and aspirations. In fact, 
this gap led to failure: “between 1878-1902, eighteen state bar associations 
failed and were subsequently re-established” (Halliday, Powell & Granfors 
1993: 518).  
 
Given all this, in 1920 a new model was introduced which was called the 
“unified bar” (Burrage 1988; Halliday, Powell & Granfors 1993). The 
movement was led by Herbert Harley who as “the executive director of the 
American Judicature Society” was influenced by what he saw in Canada 
(Schneyer 1983: 9). Ontario lawyers had to belong to the Law Society of 
Upper Canada and this Law Society carried out many functions that are 
today served by self governing bars (Schneyer 1983). Thus, he advocated a 
state sponsored bar model in the U.S instead of a market dependent model. 
By the mid 1960s, unification had become the dominant form of state bar 
association in the U.S.  
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However, this model was not without its opponents. In fact, contrary to the 
assumptions of the early advocates of unification, opposition did not “cease 
once unified bar was established and became the norm” (Smith 1994: 39). It 
has been continuously argued that voluntary bars could equally do all what 
was being done by unified bars without coercing people into mandatory 
membership and fees. Voluntary bar membership depended on “selective 
incentives” (Schneyer 1983: 10) rather than attainment of common 
professional goals or socialization. These were usually tangible benefits like 
“help of services such as insurance broker and travel agency” (Burrage 
1988: 255); education programs; “meeting facilities; legislative bulletins, 
and the like (Schneyer 1983: 11). As these seemed to be the “critical factors 
in maintaining high membership rates” (Schneyer 1983: 12) went the 
argument, the use of these incentives could assist a voluntary association of 
people who were not even like minded, thereby preventing the need for a 
mandatory bar association.  
 
While the unified bar seemingly guaranteed that there was no sudden loss of 
membership like in voluntary associations, unified bars still had their 
“sources of instability” (Schneyer 1983: 13). For instance, when exit is not a 
possibility, “members will be more vocal and obstructive in resisting actions 
which displease them” (Schneyer 1983: 13). Therefore, it can be argued that 
the exit option is a safety valve. What is more, added resources in unified 
bars in monetary and human terms, do not necessarily translate into these 
bars doing more for their members. In fact, voluntary bar associations are 
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not only better in raising money (since they have no guarantee of income) 
but also are able to maintain high percentages of membership: in rates of 
70% or even 90% (Smith 1994). Further, “there is no evidence that financial 
resources or high member numbers mean added benefits for either the 
public or for the individual member” (Smith 1994: 61).  
 
The second point of opposition to unified bars was that they did not 
contribute to the emergence of a professional program. Although law reform 
and bettering professional standards seem to have been important goals in 
the establishment of voluntary professional organizations such as the Bar of 
the City of New York, voluntary bar associations have been said to lack the 
political clout of unified bars to effect any change. This was based on their 
low membership rates and has been used to portray them as 
“unrepresentative cliques” (Schneyer 1983: 26). However, unified bars 
cannot be assumed to have more legislative respect especially when 
membership is maintained by coercion and not every member participates 
“in developing and approving bar positions” (Schneyer 1983: 26). Further, 
“the percentage of members who are active in occupational associations” 
seem to be “quite low” (Schneyer 1983: 39). In fact, the later record of 
unified bars did not confirm the maintenance of a professional program 
despite some early improvements (Schneyer 1983).  
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In that regard, disciplinary procedures have a tendency to be used by private 
groups vested with governmental authority as a way to limit “competition or 
dissent” (Smith 1994: 63). In terms of the latter, elite lawyers were able to 
“ostracize dissidents who challenged their political and economic values” 
(Auerbach 1977: 7). Further, it appears that disciplinary bodies dismiss a 
vast majority of complaints as outside their jurisdiction or for being 
unfounded, punishing few and favoring “light” ways of punishment such as 
“reprimands and warnings over suspension or disbarments” (Abel 1989: 
156).  
 
The third point of opposition was that association was not good in itself. In 
other words, whether “society benefits” (Schneyer 1983: 38) when lawyers 
join together in an association is debatable because by being required to join 
an institution, a person does not become a voluntary participant. Further, the 
unified bar does not contribute to the fact that “the profession speaks with 
one voice” (Smith 1994: 65) but rather the contrary. Lumping people 
together solely on the basis of their profession, irrespective of the diversity 
of their other interests such as ethnicity, gender or class does not on its own 
create diversity or inclusion. Rather, it is voluntary bars that “reach out to” 
(Smith 1994: 68) people to include diverse groups as members. Lastly, the 
vision of the unified bar and the bar’s governance were questionable. 
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To sum up, in the U.S. the idea of a professional organization for lawyers 
seems to have started with voluntary efforts of a metropolitan bar 
association that was established by prominent members of the profession in 
reaction to the ethical scandals in the profession in late 19th century in New 
York City. It seems to have set the example for bar associations that were to 
be established at a later time in other parts of the country. However, due to 
the difficulties of sustaining membership and having insufficient financial 
resources to pursue their goals, the profession seems to have adopted a 
strategy to unify bars with the assistance of state coercion.  
 
At the same time, given the strong suspicion of state coercion and the value 
imputed to freedom of association in the U.S., this move seems to have been 
opposed by some from the beginning. Today, the debate continues in light 
of the continuing erosion of professional control mechanisms. More 
importantly, unlike in Turkey “the federal government has never designated 
the American Bar Association (“ABA”) (or any other body) as the official 
voice of the bar” (Schneyer 1989: 692) although the ABA has special ties 
with the government. I will now turn from the U.S. to Europe. 
 
II.2.2 Bar associations in Germany 
I have set out how bar organizations and universities played successful 
gatekeeper roles and over time controlled “production of producers” in the 
U.S. One can see that not much state action was involved in this picture. In 
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other words, it looks like it was the legal profession that has achieved its 
autonomy on its own. According to McClelland, however, a conflict has 
been running between the rising professional organizations and the modern 
bureaucratic state since mid nineteenth century and the autonomy of 
professions and noninterference by the state in the Anglo-Saxon world has 
been “partly myth” (McClelland 1991: 19). Indeed, as I showed above, state 
action was also used in the U.S. to unify bars at least at the state level if not 
at the federal level. Later, state action was used over the profession through 
courts somehow justifying McClelland’s conclusion.  
 
The closer examination of a continental country like Germany paints a little 
different picture than the Anglo American professionalization process. As a 
continental country, I could have chosen France but in the end, I opted for 
Germany because its rules and structures affect the legal system in Turkey 
very much. While something similar can be said of France that is rather true 
for the public law tradition whereas Germany affected both civil and public 
law concepts, traditions and laws in Turkey.  
 
While in western continental Europe, “the legal profession evolved from 
liberalism to conservatism to corporatism during the nineteenth century” 
(Jacobson 2009: 7), not only the legal profession but also the evolution of 
the German professions in general, appears to be a state-sponsored project, 
sometimes referred as “professionalization from above”(Siegriest 1988, qtd. 
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in Jarausch 1990: 12). This “refers to the eminent role of the state in the 
formation of the continental professions” (Siegrist 1990: 63). Because a 
bureaucratized state “creates the structural context of successful 
professionalization” (McClelland 1991: 20). Indeed, before a monopoly can 
be defended by lawyers, that monopoly “must be constructed and 
legitimated. That process requires investment in state politics” (Dezalay & 
Garth 2010: 252). Before I go into the differences of state action concerning 
professions, some reminders as to the distinctions between the systems of 
Germany and the U.S. are necessary.  
 
First, at the time the U.S existed as a political entity, Germany did not 
(McClelland 1991). It consisted of German states that had little coherence 
among them let alone over regulation of professions (McClelland 1991). 
When Germany unified and the German Empire came into existence in 
1871, “Prussia held the hegemony and the Prussian order of the profession 
strongly influenced the imperial regulations for lawyers” (Schultz 2005: 99). 
Prussia, however, has been suspicious of lawyers and limited their numbers 
by the numerus clausus principle. It also disciplined them as state officials 
(Ledford 1996). Therefore, Germany in the early nineteenth century did not 
experience vigorous growth of professional organizations. In addition, other 
German states were also hostile to lawyers. They were convinced that 
lawyers were “inherently a politically subversive group” (Ledford 1996: 
45), a point only confirmed by lawyers’ involvement in the revolutionary 
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movements of 1848-9, justifying in a sense the increase in “state scrutiny of 
the bar” (Ledford 1996: 46).  
 
Second, in Germany it was the states that controlled university education 
and what was taught in professional preparatory courses. States “also 
created and administered state examinations in most of the professional 
fields” (McClelland 1991: 21). Indeed, “Berlin and all the other universities 
became not so much hotbeds of intellectual freedom, but seedbeds of 
disciplined professional behavior” (McClelland 1991: 5). In other words, 
unlike in the U.S, it was the state that was dominant in the education 
system. However, this broad statement must be also qualified by the fact 
that academics had roles in professional organizations (McClelland 1991) as 
much as former legal practitioners became “high ranking bureaucrats” 
(Jarausch 1990: 12).  
 
Third, in Germany studying law was considered a distinguished academic 
discipline. Many sons of noble families and gentry studied it in preparation 
of public service that was at the time entrusted to nobility. In that sense, 
being near the state raised the status of the profession although it did not 
enjoy the autonomy and privileges as in the Anglo-Saxon world 
(McClelland 1991). While attorneys were regarded as servants of the state 
or subordinates of courts, they did not receive a salary or pension (Siegrist 
1990).  
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Even today, the legal profession in Germany remains state oriented and a 
law degree is “particularly advantageous” (Schultz 2005: 96) for a career in 
the public service. In fact, until well into seventies, a third of law graduates 
found employment in the public sector. This is the opposite of the U.S and 
justifies the conclusion that “the German legal culture is thoroughly judge-
centered” (Schultz 2005: 96). As part of the global expansion of the legal 
profession, the number of German attorneys also “doubled in the 20 years 
between 1950 and 1970, all but trebled in the 30 years between 1950 and 
1980 and will have increased tenfold in the 55 years from 1950 to 2005” 
(Schultz 2005: 94). However, its public character is still in place, 
constituting the third major difference between the U.S and Germany.  
 
Fourth, it was the state that “dominated the transformation of post medieval 
society and shaped the systems of legal professions according to its needs” 
(Rueschemeyer 1986: 437). As a result of this, the role the law plays in 
Germany is also different than the Anglo-Saxon tradition. In the latter, the 
law retains its autonomy from the state apparatus given the “capitalist 
development in the private sector” (Rueschemeyer 1986: 437) and weak 
bureaucratic rule. In Continental Europe, however, the “law is essentially an 
emanation of the state” (Rueschemeyer 1986: 437) and was integrated into 
the modern state apparatus. The contrast between “rule of law” in the 
Anglo-Saxon world and the German word “Rechtsstaat” (meaning “state 
based on laws”) perfectly captures the different understandings about the 
law (Rueschemeyer 1986).   
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Lastly, travel and communication remained expensive in Germany to allow 
for associational life to flourish (McClelland 1991). Nevertheless, in 1860 
the legal profession was able to formulate a sort of national forum in the 
form of the Congress of German Jurists (Deutscher Juristentag) but not by 
trying to represent the diverse interests of all lawyers (judges, attorneys, law 
professors) (McClelland 1991). Rather, by preparing the way for reform and 
codification of German law that a unified nation state would need. Not 
surprisingly, this endeavor was “heavily subsidized by the Prussian King” 
(McClelland 1991: 54).  
 
Given all this, the unification in 1871 “created radically new conditions for 
the German professions” (McClelland 1991: 73) as well as professional 
organizations in Germany. Now that unification was achieved, there was 
less suspicion and hostility to professional organizations. Thus, the 
Association of German Attorneys (Deutscher Anwaltsverein) was 
established on a voluntary basis in 1871, only weeks after the German 
unification (McClelland 1991). At this time, although not stimulating them, 
the government protected the right to create associations and in fact enacted 
an Attorneys Law.  
 
The legal profession also obtained a chamber to deal with intra-professional 
disputes, supported “by mandatory contributions from all licensed lawyers” 
(McClelland 1991: 77). In that sense, what seems to have contributed to the 
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redefinition and standardization of lawyers’ roles the most was the structure 
of the unified state itself: its national parliament, administrative system and 
supreme court as well as ventures like “codification of German law” 
(McClelland 1991: 87). By 1900, the Association of German Attorneys had 
branches in more than forty German cities and towns. 
 
In 1878 a separate law was passed to unify the legal profession. Thanks to 
it, “German attorneys have become the first and, for a long time, only 
learned profession to be anchored and defined in a national law specific to 
themselves” (McClelland 1991: 87). The law unified all legal functions of 
an attorney from representation to advice (Siegrist 1990). The law also 
“abolished limits on the number of members, introduced greater freedom of 
practice, diminished control by the state, and strengthened self-government 
and autonomous self-discipline” (Siegrist 1990: 46). A bar association 
(“lawyer chamber”) was created within the law, copied from the French 
although there were small local examples established in other parts of 
Germany (Siegrist 1990).  
 
Further, in 1879, a national attorneys’ fee regulation was passed which “set 
fees for various kinds of legal operations” (McClelland 1991: 88). Attorneys 
at provincial courts were forced to join bar associations in 1879. The state 
tried to obtain loyalty of the profession by giving “medals and titles such as 
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privy councilor of justice” (Siegrist 1990: 59) to the association’s board of 
directors.  
 
By the turn of the twentieth century, the Association of German Attorneys 
had about two thirds of Germany’s attorneys under it. Among all these 
organizations, the “scholarly Congress of German Jurists soon became 
popular and were soon superseded by more practically oriented Association 
of German Attorneys” (Jarausch 1990: 12). However, the chambers, the 
Association of German Attorneys and Congress of German Jurists all 
cooperated with each other as there was “overlap in leadership” 
(McClelland 1991: 89). By the First World War, “four fifths of lawyers” in 
Germany were organized (Jarausch 1990: 12). 
 
Before the First World War, legal and institutional improvements of the 
profession led to increased social esteem of the profession as well as support 
of liberal ideas (Siegrist 1990). However, the crisis of the war led to an 
emphasis of “closure strategies and sought permanent assistance from the 
state, thereby challenging the traditional liberal vision that had been shaped 
during the nineteenth century” (Siegrist 1990: 62). Indeed, in the Weimar 
Republic, “professions turned into interest groups (emphasis supplied) to 
cope with economic problems like hyperinflation and governmental 
instability” (Jarausch 1990: 15). Between “1918-33, Germany lacked stable 
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and effective governments” and the state was “constantly distracted by 
crises” (McClelland 1991: 175).  
 
In that regard, the state’s failure to simply function led professional 
organizations to regulate market behavior (advertising bans), a reaction very 
similar to the U.S that established a minimum fee tariff during the 
Depression. Afterwards, the Nazis took advantage of the economic 
problems and brought “authoritarian solutions” while “suppressing the 
independence of the profession” (Siegrist 1990: 62). Professions offered 
little resistance, if any, to the Nazi regime during which state control 
became stricter and Jews and women were barred from the profession.  
 
As can be seen from the above, in Germany at least until the Second World 
War, the functions of the bar in terms of controlling the production of 
producers was exercised by the state by limiting the number of lawyers or 
later by playing a significant role in admitting attorneys to practice. 
Attorneys nevertheless had their own law passed by the Parliament. It was 
also the state that conducted examinations and ran schools that provided 
legal education. As a result, the universalistic role played by the academia in 
the U.S did not materialize in Germany. Further, in terms of production by 
producers, the state again played its role but only after unification of 
Germany, introducing minimum fees and making membership mandatory.  
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“After the war, it took until 1959 for new federal regulations for lawyers to 
be passed” (Schultz 2005: 100). Regaining a new kind of “neo-
professionalism that restored attorneys’ socioeconomic health, democratized 
their politics and recovered their prior competence” (Jarausch 1990: 15) was 
successful only later. According to Schultz, in the 1970s it became clear that 
the rules concerning the production by producers as set out in the 1959 law, 
“suit the German internal legal market” but “did not fit those of the 
emerging Europeanized and internationalized legal market” (Schultz 2005: 
103). As in the U.S., in the eighties controversies over lawyer advertisement 
or rules about establishment of offices found their way to the federal, 
constitutional courts and even the European Court of Justice.  
 
When Germany re-unified in 1990, this opened a large new market and 
lawyers’ enthusiasm of the East finally culminated in 1994 in new 
legislation. The legislation can be seen as adjusting to the demands of the 
market such as territorial limits on lawyer practice being abolished; hourly 
fees being permitted; advertising and cross-regional partnerships being 
allowed (Schultz 2005).  In other words, with Europeanization and 
globalization in full speed in late nineties, the profession realized that 
defending territories did no longer help. In other words, “the market had 
finally caught up with the legal profession. One after the other its sacred 
bulwarks fell” (Schultz 2005: 109).  Put in the professionalization jargon, 
production by producers was being eroded in Germany as well. 
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Another interesting “adjustment” was with regard to legal education. It was 
shortened “in order to meet the criticism that German lawyers were at a 
disadvantage compared to colleagues in other countries who started in the 
profession several years earlier” (Schultz 2005: 110). The orientation of 
legal education to civil service and judicial functions was another long 
criticized subject despite the fact that 75% of the graduates ended up in 
private legal practice but this was only slightly modified. Compulsory 
membership in the bar remained intact but seems to be threatened by 
European legislation and court decisions, leading Schultz to conclude that 
“the process of liberalization and deregulation of the profession will 
continue” (Schultz 2005: 111). 
 
The brief comparison of two countries allows one to observe common 
characteristics such as educational requirements and the notion of public 
service in the profession but not autonomy given the state’s hold on 
education in Germany(McClelland 1991). Indeed, talking about bars in the 
case of Germany seems to involve their apparent absence. Functions served 
in the U.S. by bars is filled in Germany by the state. The fact that a law 
degree is still crucial to become a civil servant justifies state involvement in 
the molding of a reliable and uniform elite by regulating legal education 
(Blankenburg & Schultz 1995). As a result, in Germany the state and not the 
bars admit attorneys to practice.  
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In terms of production by producers, while bars handle disciplinary affairs, 
compulsory membership seems to be under threat not to mention the erosion 
of other mechanisms such as minimum fees and advertisement bans. In sum, 
in the U.S as well as in Germany, market economy and social change seems 
to have undermined the traditional regulatory mechanisms afforded to bars, 
bringing with it many questions about the future of professional 
organization. It is now time to turn to Turkey. 
 
II.2.3 Bar associations in Turkey 
Until the 19th century, there was no such thing as an attorney in Ottoman 
(Shariah) courts which sat with one judge (kadı) and the parties. There also 
was no appeal or defense (İnanıcı 2000). At the same time, there were 
persons who specialized in drafting petitions and letters (arzuhalci) 
especially at the footsteps of the state (devlet kapısı) (İnanıcı 2000) but they 
did not appear in court.  
 
As a result of modernization efforts in the nineteenth century, however, 
Western style courts were established in Turkey which functioned alongside 
shariah courts. Simultaneously, there were consulate courts, established as a 
result of trade relations with the West and handled foreigners’ disputes 
(Yılmaz 1995) before which foreign lawyers started to appear. It was these 
foreigners who established the first bar organization in Istanbul in 1870 
(Battal & Erdem 1985) roughly about the same time as in the U.S.  
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With the adoption of Western styled law and courts, a need appeared for 
people to be defended before them (İnanıcı 2000). Until then, this function 
was exercised before Shariah courts by the so called legal representatives 
(dava vekili) who were not necessarily lawyers. Rather, they were notorious 
(münzevi, kağıt kavafı) for abusing people’s ignorance to make money 
(Öncü 1996). These representatives established the first Ottoman Bar 
Association (Dersaadet Dava Vekilleri Cemiyeti) in 1878 in Istanbul with 
62 members (Battal & Erdem 1985) a huge proportion of which included 
foreign attorneys, given the fact that Ottoman nationality was not required 
to become a member (Öncü 1996).  
 
In its centennial celebrations, this date was taken by the Istanbul Bar as 
landmark although the regulation of the association did not mention the 
word bar or attorney in it (op. cit.). The goals of the association was the 
application of its fee tariff for legal services rendered; monitoring the work 
of attorneys before courts; making membership mandatory to practice; 
obtaining a license to practice from the Ministry of Justice and having 
disciplinary powers (op. cit.). These have been the typical goals of 
professional organizations ever since.  
 
In those days, the profession was confined to certain cities in the Empire. As 
such, in 1878 the Ottoman state enacted the regulation concerning attorneys 
in Istanbul (Dersaadet Dava Vekilleri Nizamnamesi) in order to supervise 
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the profession and to require that representatives “register with the Ministry 
of Justice and be graduate of law schools” (Özman 1995: 54). It apparently 
took fifty years for the full actualization of these unrealistic goals (Öncü 
1996) since at the time, there was no law school in the Empire. During the 
revolution of 1908, a draft law was prepared to that effect and sent to the 
Ottoman Parliament but failed to become law. At the same time, one little 
victory for the profession seems to have been won in 1916 when the 
profession was reserved for Turks only (Battal & Erdem 1985).  
 
The moment seems to have come for the profession with the establishment 
of the Republic (Özkent 1948). In 1926, the Law on Attorneys (Mahamat 
Kanunu) was passed, making it a profession in Turkey for the first time 
(Yılmaz 1995). This was a direct result of the abolishment of Shariah law 
and adoption of laws from Western countries in many areas of life. 
Accordingly, the new laws needed new professionals to apply them.  
 
In 1925, a new law school was established in Ankara. Another goal of this 
school, however, was to inculcate the ideas of the Republic into the 
profession which is apparent in the speeches of the then Justice Minister 
Mahmut Esat Bozkurt as well as Atatürk. Thus, the teaching staff of the 
Ankara Law School consisted mostly of  “members of parliament who were 
enlightened and young jurists educated mostly in Europe”. They shared the 
law courses according to the curriculum of the Istanbul University School of 
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Law (Akzambak 2005: 185). However, this was to be done “with the 
mentality of Ankara” (Dölen 2010b: 71). 
 
The Republic then turned its attention to the Law School in Istanbul which 
maintained its traditional line and showed an indifference to the newly 
established regime (Özman 2000) while Ankara School of Law, under the 
tight grip of the Ministry of Justice, was developing as an “alternative” 
(Özman 2000: 171). However, the government soon gave up hopes of 
reform. In 1933, Darülfünun was closed down and re-opened as the 
University of Istanbul. 14 of the law school teachers were retired (Dölen 
2010a). In other words, the state exercised direct control in the education of 
the legal professionals just like in Germany. Arguably, this practice 
continues today through the Higher Education Institute (YÖK).  
 
In order to further inculcate the ideas of the Republic in the profession, a 
purification was sought by the regime which purged 374 out of 805 
members of the Istanbul Bar (Özman 2000: 173) while İnanıcı gives the 
number as 473 out of 960 (İnanıcı 2000: 138). Considering that the total 
number of attorneys in Turkey in 1939 was 1631, one can appreciate the 
size of the purge. According to Özman, these purges constitute the 
“beginning point” (Özman 2000: 173) of the disputed tutelary powers of the 
Ministry of Justice over bar associations as well as the creation of a new 
identity for attorneys that was compatible with the new regime. Indeed, at 
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that time, praise was poured on judges and prosecutors by the Minister 
Mahmut Esat while attorneys remained suspect (Özman 2000).  
 
In 1938, by invitation of bar representatives to the Ministry of Justice, a new 
act on attorneys was prepared. The Justice Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu 
explained that the act was prepared with international practices in mind 
(Güner 2003).  He put it in the Parliament as follows: “We tried to support 
our law with deep steps of republican, nationalist, secular, statist and realist 
sentiments, with one word the Kemalist regime” (Özman 2000: 17). While 
the Minister makes clear what is expected from the profession, the 
discussions in the Parliament also show that there have been disputes 
between two understandings about the profession: being a free profession 
while at the same time having a public service side to it (Özman 2000).  
 
In the 1950s, thanks to the relative pluralism following the one party era, 
professionals started to discuss the need for autonomy and end the tutelage 
of the Ministry of Justice (Özman 1995). In the period after the coup, 
associational life and interest group activity increased thanks to the social 
rights in the new constitution. At this time, bar associations transformed 
“narrow professional issues” into “broader political ones” (Özman 1995: 
163) and started to see “themselves as the indispensible elements and 
guardians of democracy in Turkey” (Özman 1995: 164). At the same time, 
despite the corporatist structure of the constitution, it took until 1969 for the 
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profession to have its peak organization established with a new act on 
attorneys.  
 
With this act, many of the most important functions previously exercised by 
the Ministry of Justice was transferred to TBB (Sav 1996), the most 
important of which was the issuance of licenses to become an attorney. 
However, many other functions exercised by TBB still required the 
approval of the Ministry to be effective. In a sense, the act was “a 
reenactment of the former code under a liberal cover” (Özman 1995: 152). 
According to other scholars, the persistence of controls over the profession 
did not change the fact that it was now the profession that handled its own 
major affairs (Öncü 1983).  
 
The biggest criticism of the act was concerning the prevention of bars from 
engaging in politics. This was seen as pacification of the profession or the 
prevention of the emerging of an effective interest group that could 
challenge policies of the state (Özman 1995). However, some people 
viewed the formation of politically neutral bar associations was an 
impossible dream given attorneys’ closeness to social and political issues in 
practicing their profession and their “increased political role especially 
during 1950s” (Özman 1995: 155).  
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Between the two military coups, legal professionals seem to have assumed 
“an important public duty which is the consolidation of political liberalism, 
rule of law and democracy in general” (Türem 2001: 38). This was 
necessary for the fact that state security courts were established in the 
country leading to great criticism for the rules and practices they employed. 
This period coincides with the time when bar associations started to employ 
their fully organized protests and marches to draw attention to violations of 
law and legal guarantees in the country (Özman 1995). While this 
oppositional stance is consistent with the experiences of bar organizations in 
Spain and Brazil and other Latin American countries during military 
regimes, it is nevertheless ironic in the sense that professions “use 
legitimacy derived from the state to delegitimate it” (Halliday 1989: 405). 
 
At the same time, the overtly political role of bars of the time may be 
attributed by the “full closure” of the profession. Indeed, bars had no 
problem in keeping the number of attorneys limited. Until the establishment 
of the Dokuz Eylül University School of Law in 1978, Istanbul and Ankara 
Schools of Law remained the only law schools in the country.  This meant 
that nearly for half a century there were only two law schools (and not 
enough number of legal professionals in the country) despite the huge 
population growth. As a result, in such a small community, ensuring control 
over production by producers was probably not much of a problem. Hence, 
already fulfilling their pure professional roles and functions, their attention 
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could turn to politics. Such role was also consistent with the vanguard role 
they played during the modernization process.  
 
During the military rule between 1980-1983, however, bar associations 
seem to have been tolerant of human rights violations in the belief that these 
were temporary to save the country (Özman 1995). They, gradually seem to 
have become bothered by these policies especially when it came to torture 
and the preparation of the new constitution. Although they convened 
meetings, drafted a constitution and “considered themselves as the primary 
group whose views must be seriously taken into consideration” (Özman 
1995: 197), they were ignored. Further, in this period, previous legislative 
gains that have been criticized for not going enough in terms of professional 
autonomy, have been reversed.  
 
The 1982 constitution brought a new approach to professional organizations 
(Ekşioğlu 1996). It demonstrated a distrust towards the pluralist model of 
politics and sought to sever ties of any organization other than a political 
party with politics by introducing new provisions such as the prohibition to 
engage in politics or cooperation between political parties and labor unions 
or associations. Many of the prohibitions applied equally to bars as well as 
TBB.  
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In addition, the Ministry of Justice was given the authority to remove the 
boards of bars that engaged in this type of activity. In addition, public 
professional organizations were subjected to the administrative and financial 
supervision by the state (exercised by the Ministry of Justice). The tutelary 
powers of the Ministry included granting permission to TBB to attend 
international meetings. Further, attorneys employed in the public 
bureaucracy were no longer required to become members of the bar, 
bringing a parallel track in professional regulation similar to the one in the 
U.S.  
 
The new regulations were not only restrictive in terms of professional 
autonomy but also concerning the right to defense. For instance, if an 
attorney was investigated under crimes committed against the state, he or 
she had to sever ties with the case(s) he or she handled. If the disciplinary 
board of the Bar refrained from rendering a decision to that effect, the 
Ministry could directly do so. Thanks to these provisions, not only attorneys 
who represented defendants in the Turkish Peace Association case were 
themselves prosecuted (Türkiye Barış Derneği Davası 1986) but also the 
president of the Istanbul Bar was arrested, removed from his position by the 
Ministry of Justice in 1983 and died one day after being granted permission 
to leave the country for his medical treatment in 1986.   
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While politically, the profession was under pressure and felt ignored, 
economically, the adoption of market economy in the 1980s meant 
increased business for lawyers. Indeed, “whenever the state subjects new 
areas of social life to legal regulation, the demand for lawyers  increases” 
(Abel 1989: 29; Rueschemeyer 1986).  Far greater commercial activity in 
the country meant the rise of a middle class and increased homeownership 
(Abel 1989) and globalization of human rights issues all of which meant an 
increase in the need for attorneys (Akbaş 2011). This is also confirmed by 
the number of attorneys. Their total number grew from 18149 in 1981 (Sav 
1996) to 70332 as of 31 December 2010. Similarly, in 1948, there were only 
33 bar organizations in the country (Özkent 1948) today there are 78.  
 
According to Rueschemeyer, a much more plausible explanation for the 
growth in lawyer numbers lies in the expansion of higher education 
(Rueschemeyer 1986). Clearly, this is also the case in Turkey not only in 
terms of student numbers32 but also in terms of the number of universities33.  
 
The growth of attorney numbers was helped by the growth in law school 
numbers. While Marmara University School of Law and Dicle University 
                                                       
32 According to the Council of Higher Education, in the period between 1994-2005, student 
numbers multiplied in undergraduate studies by 1,7. See: Türkiye’nin Yükseköğretim 
Stratejisi 2007: 88. 
 
33 According to the Council of Higher Education, in 1982, there were 27 universities in 
Turkey while in 2006, the number was 93. See: Türkiye’nin Yükseköğretim Stratejisi 2007: 
44-49. 
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School of Law were established in 1982, the growth of law schools was not 
confined to state universities. Starting in mid-nineties, private universities 
also opened law schools as law became a lucrative career sought after which 
contributed to the perception of law as a prestigious area of study. Today 
there are about 60 law schools in Turkey a big majority of which were 
established in the last 15 years (Akbaş 2011). However, after the 
apprenticeship period, the admission process is almost automatic as there is 
yet no bar exam, eroding bars’ role in supply control. One can therefore 
argue that today the gatekeeper role is exercised jointly by bars and law 
schools in Turkey, just like in the U.S.  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, significant changes were adopted in the Act 
on Attorneys in 2001 by which bars and TBB were given the task of 
“defending and protecting the supremacy of the law and human rights”. 
Further, bars and TBB have become more independent by the removal of 
the approval of the Ministry of Justice concerning decisions taken by bars or 
TBB in twenty different subjects (Güner 2003). Lastly, the regulatory 
powers of TBB was expanded.  
 
Given all this, the development of the profession in Turkey can be divided 
to three separate periods. The first is the period between 1926 and 1938 
when the first act on attorneys was enacted making it a profession for the 
first time. At this time, bars were established by state action and the 
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profession was under the strict control of the state in terms of education and 
admission. Put differently, the establishment period of the profession and 
consolidation of the republican regime coincide. The second period starts 
with the enactment of the second act on attorneys in 1938 and lasts until 
1969. This period is significant for adoption of the principle that the 
profession is one of public service (Güner 2003). This is also the time when 
demands for professional autonomy start to be heard especially during the 
relative pluralism of the post 1950s.  
 
The third phase is the enactment of the 1969 act to bring constitutional 
changes of 1961 concerning professional associations in conformity with 
the regulation of the profession. By establishing TBB as a national peak 
organization, the goal seems to have been to end the dominance of local 
bars in the profession. The act remains in force to date, although until 2003, 
it has been amended twelve times (Güner 2003). According to Güner, the 
2001 amendments can be seen as the fourth period  in the profession’s 
history as well as an attempt to raise the standing of the profession while 
catching up with some market economy necessities such as allowing 
attorneys to form partnerships (Güner 2003) .   
 
The above goes on to show that although the three countries had different 
histories in terms of regulation of the profession, the dual forces of 
globalization and free market drove them to convergence. Germany and 
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Turkey seem similar for the state’s initial distrust towards lawyers. In both 
countries, the state seems to have exercised tight control and successful 
mobilization of the profession for its own purposes at least up until a certain 
point. The professional autonomy battle seems to have lasted longer in 
Turkey while the 2001 changes may be seen as a step forward in that regard. 
On the other hand, just like in Germany and the U.S., the number of lawyers 
in Turkey quadrupled in thirty years. This also means that the profession 
became younger34.  
 
Sensing loss of market control, bars in Turkey express concern -in an 
increasingly alarmist tone- about governments’ policy of opening new law 
schools. They have been also arguing for the introduction of a bar exam, to 
no avail. Bars nevertheless push for new ways of preventing the growth of 
lawyer numbers, such as filing lawsuits to stop opening of new law schools. 
Put differently, just like in other countries, the profession in Turkey seems 
to have lost the battle of market control, despite the continuing prevalence 
of citizenship, character and other entry barriers35 still being in place and are 
sometimes used to limit political dissent.  
 
                                                       
34 The Istanbul Bar says that as of 28 October 2010, of its 25994 members, 14000 are 
between the ages of 25-40, See: “İstanbul Barosu Üyelerine Ait Sayısal Veriler Baronet’te 
Sürekli Güncelleniyor”, 
http://www.istanbulbarosu.org.tr/detail.asp?CatID=1&SubCatID=1&ID=5247,  
Access date: 10 October 2011.  
 
35 Until 1969, one of these was not to be older than 23 years of age (Battal & Erdem 1985). 
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In terms of production by producers,  practices such as minimum fee tariffs 
and advertising bans persist. The regulation36 (Reklam Yasağı Yönetmeliği) 
tightly controls even the size of signboards attorneys can hang outside the 
buildings of their offices. As a result, when one travels to Anatolian towns, 
one can see office signs of attorneys in the same color, font and shape, 
although such regulations are impossible to enforce in Istanbul. Further, the 
bar is still not very fond of specialist titles. Given the continuing influx of 
new members, however, other mechanisms of control of production by 
producers may also not last long given the difficulty of policing an ever 
increasing number of attorneys. It may therefore be only a matter of time 
that changes long adopted in the U.S. and Germany relaxing rules of 
production by producers such as advertisement restrictions and minimum 
fee tariffs become discussion topics in Turkey. 
 
Lastly, it has been argued that attorneys have become “laborer like” (Akbaş 
2011: 137) by starting to work in law firms in return for a salary. Findings 
of Akbaş conducted with members of Istanbul Bar show that in every one of 
two law firms there is a salaried lawyer (Akbaş 2011). Abel confirms the 
phenomenon of the “growth of public and private employment and the 
expansion in size of law firms” (Abel 1986b: 7-8) as opposed to engaging in 
solo-private practice.  
                                                       
36 Regulation on the Prohibiton of Advertisement, Official Gazette: 21 November 2003, 
No: 25296.  
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This can be read as replication of the global trend of “tier formation” in the 
profession “between corporate attorneys who work for businesses and are 
graduates of elite schools while the other tier consists of attorneys from 
ethnic or religious minorities and are graduates of local schools of law and 
serve less prestigious individual clients” (Akbaş 2011: 191). In that regard, 
the Istanbul Bar figures confirm this explanation. The bar says that 4964 
(among 25000) attorneys take cases from (the low paid) criminal legal aid 
on a regular basis and this number steadily grows. However, criminal legal 
aid is unpopular among the graduates of private universities37.  
 
In conclusion, not only in the U.S but also in other countries including 
Turkey “the experience of the last two decades strongly suggests that we are 
witnessing the decline of the professional configuration, if not yet its 
demise” (Abel 1986b: 16). This decline covers “increasing commercialism 
and competition and decreasing civility and collegiality” and creates 
anonymity that “diminished the force of informal reputational sanctions” 
(Rhode 2000: 8). Indeed, a pessimistic argument may be that the 
professional project is in danger while a more optimistic argument may be 
the profession is merely affected by social and political change requiring a 
different strategy and adoption by professional organizations. 
 
                                                       
37 See: “İstanbul Barosu Üyelerine Ait Sayısal Veriler Baronet’te Sürekli Güncelleniyor”, 
http://www.istanbulbarosu.org.tr/detail.asp?CatID=1&SubCatID=1&ID=5247,  
Access date: 10 October 2011.  
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What seems important in terms of bar associations is the recognition that the 
described changes have serious implications for the self governance of the 
profession as the growing numbers and diversity makes it very difficult for 
any association to speak on attorneys’ behalf (Abel 1986b). More 
importantly, the expansion of the profession means that a new breed of 
lawyers with different values and traditions are entering the legal 
profession, whose core values were formed until the 1990s by either Ankara 
or Istanbul law schools. At the same time, given the fact that TBB is part of 
the corporatist framework in the country, the professional demise of lawyers 
and the apparent indifference of governments to it has consequences for the 
relationship between TBB and state institutions. 
 
In this chapter I compared the regulation of the legal profession in three 
different countries by making use of the professionalization literature. To do 
that, I have first set out the basic tenets of professions. What distinguished 
professions from other occupations was the existence of a professional 
organization that ensured control of “production of producers” and 
“production by producers”. I then looked at the first bar association 
established in the U.S. and the parallel structure concerning regulation of 
the legal profession that prevails until today. While this structure implies a 
limited involvement of the state, there nevertheless is a lively debate about 
state coercion and mandatory membership to bar associations in the U.S.  
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I then focused on Germany which was politically unified at a much later 
stage than the U.S. and where a different state tradition reigned. This 
tradition in fact viewed the legal profession with suspicion. As a result, for a 
while the regulation of the profession was tightly controlled and the 
professional organization gained autonomy much later than the U.S. Despite 
that, German state was heavily involved in the regulation of the legal 
education as well admission of attorneys which holds true even today. In 
both countries though, the requirements of the market economy and 
globalization forced change on the profession in terms of relaxation of some 
of the supply control and production by producer rules. 
 
Lastly, I looked at Turkey, where similar to Germany, a suspicious stand 
was taken by the government towards the legal profession. While the 
profession gained autonomy, this took place as late as 1969. The last phase 
of the independence battle was completed with 2001 amendments. Further, 
the homogeneity in the profession lasted longer than the U.S and Germany, 
well until the 1990s because unlike those countries, the number of law 
schools and attorneys remained lower.  
 
In the post 1980s, with the adoption of market economy and globalization, 
Turkey inched closer to Germany and the U.S. in the growth and 
diversification of the profession. At the same time, erosion of supply control 
has not been matched with the relaxation of production by producer 
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mechanism although they became increasingly difficult to police in a 
crowded profession especially in big towns. Nevertheless, one can conclude 
that in all countries, socio economic change eroded traditional mechanisms 
of professional control and led to a convergence despite the difference in 
state traditions. It is now time to find out how data to confirm this was 
collected.
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Chapter III: Methodology 
 
In the previous chapters, I reviewed the interest group and 
professionalization literatures. The former allowed me to determine the 
interest group model in Turkey and pose my research question of whether 
there was policy concertation between state institutions and TBB since the 
literature says that a corporatist structure is fused with corporatist policy 
making.  The latter literature, on the other hand, allowed a comparison of 
three different country experiences to see divergences as well as 
convergences in the regulation of the legal profession. Such focus was 
helpful to understand the complex relationship between state institutions 
and TBB since another goal of the thesis is to find out about the reasons of 
conflict between the parties. It is now time to talk about the methodology of 
the thesis.  
 
III.1. Interviews 
The primary goal of this thesis was to understand the nature of the 
relationship between the peak organization of the legal profession and the 
state institutions (especially the three branches) in order to understand the 
extent of policy concertation, if any. Further, the thesis seeks to explore the 
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reasons for conflict between TBB and state institutions.  Given the intimate 
and informal nature of policy concertation structures, limited information 
was available through public channels.  
 
Not only that, even in the legislature, the most public of the three branches, 
the meetings of the Justice Committee, the usual premise where TBB is 
expected to play an expert role, is not open to public. Or meetings of bar 
associations to determine common issues or discuss problems among bar 
presidents and TBB takes place behind closed doors. Similarly, other 
professional organizations (other social partners) and TBB hold talks in 
private meetings and expose to the media only as much as they want to.  
 
In view of this, seeking information as to what transpires in private 
meetings or conversations between TBB and all these state and non-state 
actors was sought through interviews as they give “access to the 
observations of others” (Weiss 1995: 1). Further, there was a need for 
description in terms of relations, roles and identities. Therefore, interviews 
were the best means to obtain this information. The interviewees were 
former or current bar presidents or members of the executive board of the 
bar. They were selected for their first-hand experience in their local area 
with the running of a bar organization as well as state institutions. Some 
also served as board members in TBB.  
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The thesis is “describing what all interviewees have in common as they 
experience a phenomenon” which phenomenon is the experience of 
interacting with TBB and other state institutions as president of bar. While 
this allows me to call the study a phenomenological one (Creswell 2007: 
58), my goal in designing it is to determine what the experience was for the 
persons who describe the phenomenon which will then allow me to draw the 
structure of that experience (Moustakas 1994). 
 
While these interviews constitute the main source of data, data collection 
took place “in the field at the site where participants experience the issue or 
problem under study” (Creswell 2007: 37). Taken together, these two points 
make this phenomenological study a qualitative one. A qualitative study 
seems appropriate for the endeavor undertaken here also because the subject 
of this thesis needs to be explored in a bottom up fashion and need detailed 
understanding of the issue (Creswell 2007). 
 
Given all this, thirty former bar presidents or board members have been 
interviewed in total as the main source of data of this thesis. In addition, the 
views of the members of three branches were sought. Accordingly, six 
interviews were made with Ministry of Justice officials, two with the 
judiciary and two with members of the Parliament. However, the data from 
these lesser number second interviews were not analyzed. They were rather 
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thought as a reference point for the thirty interviews as they contradict or 
confirm points made there.   
 
III. 2. Pilot study 
In exploring the relationship between TBB and the state, I decided to first 
conduct a pilot study before heading out to the field. The institution that I 
could first start with was the executive: the Ministry of Justice. Through my 
work at the School of Law and the Human Rights Center at the University, I 
personally knew many mid to high level bureaucrats at the Ministry of 
Justice that worked in various divisions. I not only met them at scholarly 
meetings, work committees convened in Ankara or at Bilgi involving 
various projects, over time our acquaintance involved doing favors for each 
other by providing information or experience sharing. For instance, I 
sometimes introduced them to new methods that they made use afterwards; 
let them know about conferences that they might be interested in; arranged 
for their invitation to international conferences in judicial policy. They 
returned the favors by providing information to me as Ministry insiders. I 
therefore decided to conduct pilot interviews in Ankara with some of these 
Ministry of Justice bureaucrats. 
 
I developed my questionnaire with open ended questions to elicit 
information from my participants. I selected junior level bureaucrats as a 
matter of convenience sampling, as used in exploratory research where the 
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researcher is interested in getting an inexpensive approximation of the truth. 
As the name implies, the sample was selected because they are convenient. 
In addition to easy access, I also felt that if I had to change my questionnaire 
after the pilot interviews, I could still call up junior bureaucrats and ask 
additional questions, something I cannot do with higher ranking 
bureaucrats.  
 
There was an additional reason why I preferred to start with my 
acquaintances at the Ministry of Justice. Most of the bureaucrats that serve 
at the Ministry are judges (or prosecutors) who used to serve at the bench. 
They have been promoted to service in Ankara at early career (after 5-7 
years of bench service) given their success, ambition, political connection or 
language skills. Although they no longer perform a judicial function, they 
still use their professional titles of “judge” or “prosecutor”. Even when they 
pick up the phone and order tea for me in their office they refer to 
themselves as “judge Ali” or “prosecutor Ahmet”. In other words, despite 
no longer serving at the bench, the forceful authority of a judge or 
prosecutor that I have observed in other research is still part of their 
character, as is the suspicious and distrustful stance towards strangers. 
Given this, it made sense to start with these men who would not show that 
kind of attitude to me.  
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In October 2010, I contacted five bureaucrats at the Ministry of Justice from 
the following general directorates: Penal Affairs; Civil Affairs; Prison and 
Detention Houses; Laws; and the Department of Strategic Development. My 
contact at the General Directorate of Laws declined to be interviewed on the 
grounds of being too busy. The bureaucrat at the Penal Affairs was hesitant 
whether or not to ask for permission of his General Director when I told him 
what my research subject was about. He also said he was no longer involved 
with “attorney” issues and suggested that someone from that unit join us for 
the interview although he later agreed that we speak alone.  
 
My contact at the Department of Strategic Development, wanted to see the 
questions and would not want to give a definite date for the interview.  He 
also was curious whether he had to answer the questions in writing. I 
explained that I was coming to Ankara to talk face to face. Couple of days 
later, he emailed me saying that he looked at the questions, and given his 
lack of experience at the Ministry, it would be better for me to speak with 
his boss.  
 
My contact at the Civil Affairs agreed to see me right away while my 
contact at the Prison and Detention Houses turned out to be in the United 
States to improve his English. He nevertheless told me to contact another 
bureaucrat we both knew. Since I already arranged for three appointments 
for one and half days of visit, I decided to stick with what I have. At this 
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time, however, I thought that even the permission process was proving 
much harder than I thought. If I was getting this hesitant attitude, I 
wondered what outsiders could do with the Ministry of Justice bureaucrats.  
 
My first contact and I met in one of the Ministry of Justice’s newer 
buildings in Ankara. After learning that the interview could last one hour, he 
wanted to be first “seen” by his superior in order to prove him that he was 
actually at work. During the interview, I sensed that because he knew me 
and my ideas about certain issues from our previous interactions, he was 
almost too careful to describe the relationship between TBB and the 
Ministry in a positive way. I felt that knowing a bureaucrat was good in the 
sense that it gets one through the door but when s(he) knows what you 
think, the advantage may turn into disadvantage. When we were finished, he 
asked me who else I was going to speak with at the Ministry. I replied that I 
could not tell him. He added: “do not mention my name either”. I assured 
him once again about confidentiality.  
 
The next day at another building of the Ministry, I was greeted by my 
interviewee in the corridor. He was sharing his office with someone who 
used to work at the General Directorate of Laws. He stressed the importance 
of me talking to people in that directorate too. This was because this 
directorate was involved in drafting legislation and this usually meant 
working in committees in which TBB also participated. Before we started, I 
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gave him the questionnaire. A couple of times during the interview he 
turned to his roommate and asked for confirmation about the things he was 
saying. My next interviewee at the Penal Affairs was located in the same 
building and after a short hesitation, allowed me to record the interview. My 
sense of this interview was better than the other two, possibly because this 
contact was the one I knew the least.  
 
My general feeling about the three pilot interviews I made was that it was 
hard to interview people I knew. Because we worked together before in 
other projects, they were familiar with some of my ideas as I was with 
theirs. I sometimes finished their sentences or summarized things for them, 
something one should refrain from doing as a researcher. Sometimes I also 
knew the subject that they were talking about, inside out, like legal aid or 
disciplinary processes concerning attorneys. This made it hard for me to 
listen to what they were saying as a neutral third party. It also showed me 
that bureaucrats were difficult to interview given their tendency for secrecy 
and suspicion.  
 
Nevertheless, the interviews provided valuable insight as they offered 
alternative perspectives to explore the issues between TBB and the state. 
For instance, my pilot questions were designed to understand how policy 
concertation worked in practice. Thus, questions focused over meetings of 
bar and Ministry of Justice officials. The pilot study showed, however, that I 
111 
 
perceived the relationship as something confined to formal meetings. This 
apparently was not the case. Bureaucrats referred to routine contacts given 
the oversight of the Ministry over TBB as well as sporadic ones involving 
discussion of various administrative problems and issues as they arose. 
Most importantly, they mentioned committee meetings at the Parliament 
where laws were being drafted, ringing the bell for me that the relationship 
between the state institutions and TBB had to include the legislature and the 
judiciary. Although concertation takes place between government and 
various interests, as bureaucrats pointed out, TBB was involved on various 
levels with state institutions. I therefore changed my questionnaire to reflect 
that.  
 
Having experienced the limitations of my questionnaire with bureaucrats, I 
felt a similar exploratory pilot round was needed with presidents of bar 
since those interviews were to form the basis of my research. I made my 
first pilot appointment with someone who served at the TBB whom I met 
through an EU project involving the Ministry of Justice and TBB. In 
addition, my list (discussed below in III.3) included a former MP and bar 
president who was residing close to where we decided to meet. To kill two 
birds with one stone, I decided I should also contact him for an 
appointment.  
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My first contact was still practicing law and invited me to a restaurant after 
his court hearing outside of Istanbul. Although I felt that a restaurant was 
not the best place for the task, I could see he was trying to be kind by taking 
me out to lunch. Our acquaintance was not confined to working in an EU 
project together, it included he sending me articles about the legal 
profession that I sometimes commented on. He also called me “hocam” 
despite the fact that age wise he could be my father.  
 
Given all that, I agreed to the location. It turned out that not the cutlery in 
the background of our conversation and food service interrupting us was the 
difficult part but rather the small talk we made. While I wanted to converse 
with him, the conversation distracted us from my role as researcher as he 
showed interest in my career as an attorney. When we were finished, we 
came to contemporary legal problems in the country and I again felt that it 
was difficult to keep distance. I tried to not make many comments but was 
worried that I could come across as cold. I was therefore happy when he 
called me the next day to say that he wanted to make addition to what he 
said the day before, suggesting that he considered the exercise valuable 
enough to think it over and make an additional effort of calling me to say 
more.  
 
What was interesting about this pilot interview was to find out that he used 
to serve as an MP in addition to being president of bar. Despite that, he did 
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not appear in my list. The reason for that was he apparently served as an MP 
first and then as a president of bar. In other words, my assumption of bar 
work leading to politics was reversed in his case. This point was also 
confirmed by my second interviewee who has become a member of a 
political party as soon as he turned 18, long before he was elected president 
of bar. Their intense political involvement notwithstanding, they still 
criticized those who used the bar for their political ends, suggesting a theme 
that I initially did not think of when exploring TBB and state institution 
relations. Not only that, lasting longer these two pilot interviews with the 
former bar administrator/MPs provided much detailed information than my 
interviews with the Ministry of Justice officials and justified my decision to 
rely on bar administrators as main source of data in the research. After these 
two interviews, my questionnaire was almost final. 
 
III. 3. Developing my sample  
In order to determine who to interview, I compiled a list (hereinafter 
referred as “the list”) of MPs who served as administrators or presidents at 
local bars and at TBB before getting elected to the Parliament. To be able to 
cover a period of at least twenty years, the list started from the 18th term 
MPs (elected after the elections in 1987) and ended with those elected in the 
general election of 2007. Interviewing them could provide me two 
perspectives: first, of a bar administrator and second, of a legislature.  
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In addition, I thought that I should see what bar presidents who did not 
become MPs were thinking, to understand whether there were any 
differences between those bar administrators who used bar work as a way 
for political recruitment and those who did not. As a result, I drove to a 
town close to Istanbul and interviewed two bar presidents. 
 
I also took advantage of being in Istanbul and interviewed two former 
presidents of Istanbul Bar. Living in Istanbul was also helpful when 
travelling to destinations that were an air ride away. I paid attention to 
include towns in the sample when my list contained more than one MP from 
that town. After these initial ten interviews, the weakness of my list and the 
geographical convenience sample I was pursuing became evident. Everyone 
I spoke was either an MP from CHP or sympathized with CHP.  
 
I therefore started to ask my interviewees whether they could give me 
names of those bar presidents who had different political color. Thankfully, 
they could since the “bar world” is small and everyone knows everybody. 
Sometimes, my interviewees called me within days with the names and 
telephone numbers of people after having done an “investigation” on my 
behalf. This was how I was informed of bar presidents who served as a 
minister in previous governments and of bar presidents who were supporters 
of different political parties. 
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In my next round of interviews, I decided to focus on those alternative 
opinions. I also started to contact non-CHP MPs in the list. Among the 
towns in my list which sent a disproportionate number of bar administrators 
as an MP to the Parliament, there appeared a former bar administrator from 
an Eastern Anatolian town. I went to Ankara and interviewed him. I then 
went to the Parliament and interviewed an MP from MHP. I also contacted 
four MPs of AKP in the 23rd term that represented four different towns. I 
was able to interview one.  
 
To talk to people who had a different perspective than CHP helped me to 
learn about the internal struggles within TBB. I realized that some bar 
presidents played an active role in bringing about “regime change” within 
TBB when the former president of TBB died. This point was already hinted 
to me in the pilot interviews but at the time, I could not understand what 
exactly they were talking about. I therefore decided to interview the 
organizers of the “revolt” in Central Anatolia.  
 
Former or current presidents of five largest bar associations that also 
happened to be the oldest bar associations in the country were included in 
my sample: Istanbul, Ankara, İzmir, Bursa and Antalya. Except one, I was 
able to interview people in these towns. The reason for not including one of 
them was our failure to find a suitable date after cancellation of one 
interview due to weather conditions.  
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Nevertheless, it was important to include Istanbul, Ankara and İzmir in the 
sample because in these three towns, bar elections take place between 
groups that distinguish themselves according to political color. In other 
words, the candidate presidents determine their “team” who will form the 
board of directors and carefully select people of homogenous political 
leanings. As a result, the winner of the election comes to the bar 
administration as a unified and homogenous block. This then affects the 
elections at TBB given the fact that the election system is based on delegate 
numbers. The larger the bar association, the more delegates it has.  
 
In smaller towns, on the other hand, candidate presidents must be careful to 
include members of various political leanings into their list to get elected. 
At the same time, elections at three big towns not only effect the 
relationship of the bar with TBB but also with the government as big bars 
feel free to circumvent TBB and directly engage state institutions to address 
their problems. In view of all this, a full picture of the relationship between 
TBB and state institutions required a separate focus than my list.  
 
During my interviews, it also emerged that “Kurdish bars” as well as 
“conservative bars in Anatolia” as they were referred by some interviewees 
have been important players in the “revolt” against the old administration. I 
therefore decided to include them in the sample. I went to South Eastern 
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Turkey and interviewed the presidents of two bar associations. I then 
interviewed TBB officials in Ankara. Lastly, when I attended the regional 
meeting of Eastern and Southeastern bars in Kars, I was also able to 
interview two additional presidents of bars.  
 
Table 1 below shows the towns of my interviewees and the size of the bar in 
terms of member numbers. As can be seen, bars that have between 100-250 
members and with less than 100 members constitute the largest group of 
bars in Turkey. Nine out of thirty interviews were held with those. Then 
comes the group where the number of members are between 501-999 and 
251-500. In that group, I interviewed ten bar presidents from six different 
towns, four of which were from the same town. Lastly, I interviewed three 
bar presidents from bars with more than 1000 members and eight bar 
presidents with more than 5000 members, reaching a total of thirty. It will 
be noted that other than Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, towns were given 
dummy names to protect the anonymity of the respondent. Table 2 shows 
the geographical distribution of bar associations that I interviewed. 
 
Table 1, Size of bars in Turkey in terms of member numbers and the bars in 
the sample. 
Number of 
attorneys 
How many 
bars in TR 
How many 
interviews Name of bar in the sample      
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>5000 3 8 Ankara (5), İstanbul (2), İzmir   
>1000 5 3 Böğürtlenkent, Nektarinkent, Kavunkent   
Betw. 501-999  12 5 Elmakent (2), Muzkent, Armutkent (2)  
Betw. 251-500  11 5 Üzümkent (2), Mangokent (2), Şeftalikent  
Betw. 100-250  27 6 
Erikkent, Çağlakent, Ananaskent, Mandalinakent, 
Portakalkent, Çilekkent 
<100  20 3 Karpuzkent, Humuskent, Narkent   
Total 78 30      
 
Table 2, geographical distribution of bar associations in the sample. 
Region of bar Number of interviews 
Aegean 2 
Black Sea 1 
Eastern Anatolia 1 
Marmara 9 
Mediterranean 5 
Central Anatolia 7 
Southeastern Anatolia 5 
Total 30 
 
After finishing the interviews with former presidents of bar as my main 
source of data, I then focused on the second group of interviews. As 
discussed earlier, these interviews were not made for the purposes of 
analysis but to give the perspective of the other two branches as to the 
relationship. As I already had pilot interviews initially conducted with the 
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Ministry of Justice officials, I interviewed few more people (reaching a total 
of ten) some of which were MPs from the opposition serving in the Justice 
Committee; additional high bureaucrats from the Ministry of Justice and 
two persons from the higher judiciary.  
 
III.4. Non-participant observations 
In order to increase the validity of data from the interviews, and consistent 
with qualitative research principles (Creswell 2007), I decided to use 
another source of information: non-participant observations made in 
different occasions involving TBB and various state institutions. Thus, the 
first non participant observation was made in a meeting I attended on 25 
December 2010 in Ankara. It was convened by TBB and attended by the 
representatives of local bar organizations that worked on legal aid issues. 
The full day event was attended by more than 58 bars of the total 78. It was 
held to understand the specific positions of the local bars concerning legal 
aid so that TBB could develop a position on the issue to be then discussed at 
the Bar Presidents meeting.  
 
Another reason for TBB to convene the meeting was to use the views of the 
local bars as a basis for later discussions with the Ministry of Justice 
officials who were thinking of changing the law on legal aid. Because legal 
aid is something I was already working on at Bilgi, many of the issues the 
participants were discussing were things I was familiar with. This was 
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helpful since understanding the substantive issues allowed me to 
concentrate on the form of the meeting which was a bottom up policy 
formulation effort by TBB. The meeting also was a good starting point for 
me to understand the value of triangulation. 
 
The second non-participant observation was a committee meeting that took 
place on 27 December 2010 in Ankara between the members of TBB and 
the mid level bureaucrats of the Ministry of Justice. The committee was 
established by the order of the Minister of Justice for the solution of the 
problems of the legal profession. As some of my interviewees already told 
me about the event that led to the establishment of this committee, it made 
perfect sense to attend it. TBB officials who were hosting the meeting 
informed me about it. Nevertheless, I had to ask the most senior bureaucrat 
in attendance for their permission as well. Fortunately, three mid-level 
bureaucrats who were in attendance turned out to be previous acquaintances 
of mine.  
 
This meeting allowed me to see first-hand what issues the parties were 
discussing and most importantly how they were discussing. In particular, I 
could observe how collegial the Ministry bureaucrats and TBB officials 
were to each other. This was a half a day event attended by ten persons, two 
of which were from TBB, one from civil society, one from the Ministry of 
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Finance and the remaining six from different directorates of the Ministry of 
Justice. 
 
I made my third non-participant observation also in Ankara at the bar 
president’s meeting on 22 January 2011. This was a significant meeting 
because it was the first that the presidents of bar were having with the new 
president of TBB some of whom seemed to have played a big role in getting 
him elected. I was curious to observe the dynamics of this. The meeting was 
attended by a large number of bar presidents -some of whom I already 
interviewed- and lasted the longest among my non-participant observations. 
It started around 10 AM and except the lunch break and a ceremony, went 
until after 10 PM. I could no longer wait for the speeches of the remaining 
two speakers in the end also because I knew the event was being tape 
recorded to be later published.  
 
The meeting was like a huge plenary and its tone became at times very 
accusatory. It involved discussion of controversial issues and allowed me to 
observe the dynamics between and among bars and TBB. During the 
meeting, one of my interviewees who happened to be my class mate from 
Law School, said that there was academic interest in TBB, hinting at my 
research. Although I was embarrassed by this gesture, thanks to this, I was 
introduced to some bar presidents that I was going to later interview.  
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Lastly, on 19 February 2011, I attended the regional meeting of the bar 
presidents of Eastern and South Eastern Anatolian Bars in Kars. This was a 
regular event of the bar presidents of the region who were meeting bi-
monthly in a different city to discuss regional issues as well as events in the 
country. The agenda of the meeting consisted of the new constitution; the 
abolishment of courts with special jurisdiction; the mass graves that were 
found in Mutki; right to defense in mother tongue and development of a 
common attitude in mass trials (such as KCK).  
 
Notwithstanding these issues, the meeting was interesting for the fact that 
despite being a regional event, it was attended by many local bar presidents 
or board members from outside the region such as of Bursa, Artvin, Ankara, 
Aydın, Afyon, Kütahya, Ankara, Mersin and Tekirdağ (notice that except 
for Afyon, the political tendencies of these bars are pro-CHP). In addition, 
there was a social program for the attendees that allowed me to spend social 
time with bar presidents, make observations  and even interview two 
additional bar presidents in a suit/private premise in the hotel. 
 
III. 5. My role as researcher 
As a lawyer, my experience and knowledge of the field both in terms of the 
structure of the judiciary and the legal profession was crucial in researching 
the subject. It also made it easy to deal with the professional “codes” of 
lawyers. Working at Bilgi was also helpful as it ensured accessibility to a 
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difficult group such as the bureaucrats. At the same time, I was aware that 
being a lawyer could mean some prejudices on my behalf. While I made 
every effort to be objective, I might have still brought biases and values 
given my personal background. Since qualitative research is interpretive 
(Creswell 2007), I know that these are important variables in interpreting 
social reality. In fact, they may shape the way I view and understand the 
data and the way I interpret it.  
 
My perception about bar organizations has been shaped by my personal 
experiences as an attorney. My first admission to a bar was to the State of 
New York in 1998, couple of months ahead of my membership of the 
Istanbul Bar in the same year. I worked in a law firm in New York for two 
years where I actively practiced law. When I returned home in 2002, I 
started to work in a law firm. During this time, I did not have to think about 
bars any more than in mere membership terms. The bar was arranging for 
my social security, contributions of which were being paid by my employer. 
My yearly membership fee was also covered by the firm and that was it. 
 
In 2003, I quit legal practice and started to work at Bilgi. While teaching 
legal clinics which allowed law students to provide free legal information to 
public, I worked on issues of access to justice, poverty and legal aid. 
Through my work I concluded that the way the profession was regulated (by 
the bar) was hindering access to justice for the poor. I wrote articles to that 
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effect and defended that view. Meanwhile, I established a pro bono network, 
organizing big law firms in Istanbul to provide free legal advice to NGOs 
and people of low income. I knew from international experiences, that legal 
clinic or pro bono networks were not much liked by bars. In fact, some bars 
tried to block or stop provision of any free legal information.  
 
Meanwhile, my work at the university also meant engaging in research 
about courts and the legal aid system. Indeed, after releasing our research 
about the criminal legal aid system in Istanbul courts, I was invited by bars 
to conferences in Istanbul, Ankara and Adana as speaker. I provided 
training to attorneys as an expert in an EU project in Antalya, Eskişehir, 
Trabzon, Nevşehir, Gaziantep, Bursa, Tekirdağ, Ankara and Manisa in legal 
aid as well as in mediation. In other words, I was working with bars and 
responding to their criticism and questions about our research and seeing 
their defensive positions. Bars were viewing legal aid mostly from a money 
making perspective for their members rather than a public service for the 
poor. Nevertheless, we worked in a courteous and collegial manner. 
 
Further, since 2008, my students have been teaching in various prisons of 
Istanbul. In this capacity, I have come in contact with many prisoners and 
the failures of the criminal legal aid system because I monitor the work of 
my students in prison. Usually inmates complain that they see their 
attorneys only during the hearing and that these attorneys often do not visit 
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them in jail to prepare a defense. For instance, when asked whether they 
have an attorney, many inmates answer by referring to their legal aid 
attorney as “the Bar’s attorney”. In other words, they do not see legal aid 
lawyers as “their” attorney.  
 
Given all this, my perception of legal practice has been very different than 
the bar administrators I have interviewed. When I practiced law, I was 
purely a commercial lawyer specializing in shipping and transportation law 
and later on corporate law. I was frustrated with using my skill and 
knowledge to generate more income for wealthy people. However, many 
bar presidents I interviewed were criminal lawyers and contrary to my 
purely technical legal practice, they were involved in social and political 
issues of their town or of the country. In other words, my experience of 
legal practice is from a “free market” background while their practice seems 
criminal law and other social legal issues, thereby justifying a more self 
righteous view of the profession on their part.   
 
Having now disclosed my personal beliefs, background and differences, I 
should mention the challenge of being a young woman in the field. Most of 
my interviewees were male and much older than me. Thus, in a hierarchical 
society like Turkey, being an attorney was advantageous especially in the 
beginning when I was less confident of my role as a researcher. It somehow 
compensated my lack of experience as a social scientist.  
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At the same time, collegiality helped me to build rapport with the 
interviewees because I often knew where they were coming from. For 
instance, when they referred to art. 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
which limits the time period for detention and led to the release of Hizbullah 
members among others, I knew the article by heart. Or sometimes my being 
a lawyer signaled to them that they could speak with me in “legalese” if 
they needed to. Indeed, after confirming that I was a lawyer, they gave me 
more specific examples from codes involving legal intricacies that would be 
hard to digest for non-lawyers. For instance, one interviewee explained a 
provision in the Code of Civil Procedure by saying something like: “since 
you are a lawyer, you will understand why it is such a harsh penalty when a 
party in a lawsuit is deemed to have his or her right waived if he or she fails 
to file a petition”.  
 
At the same time, relying on collegiality had its disadvantages. Given the 
fact that collegiality creates equality and is a very strong value in the legal 
profession for this older generation of bar presidents, I observed that it 
created curiosity about me, a fellow attorney disguised as a political 
scientist, interviewing another attorney. It sometimes distracted us from 
what we were doing, as they wanted to know about me, why I was doing 
this, what I thought about the subject I was researching about, etc. Over 
time, I therefore started to down play my lawyer side and kept silent when 
they explained to me what the law was, even if I knew it. However, there 
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came moments when I felt I should not make things more difficult for them 
by remaining quiet especially when they were referring to technicalities 
about the law. At those times, I tried to signal that I knew about the subject 
by using a legal term or referring to a specific legal amendment without 
sounding like I was putting the words in their mouth.  
 
Towards the later stages of the study, as I learned more about the issues 
involving bar organizations and read through their lines as to events that 
other interviewees already described, I started to feel more and more 
comfortable in the field as a researcher. This confidence meant that I no 
longer had to strengthen my position vis a vis my interviewees by 
“empowering” myself with the law. In fact, when my last interviewee said 
to me “you know better than I do that social events have more than one 
cause”, I felt victorious for having been viewed by him as a social scientist. 
In the similar vein, when one bar president from Southeastern Turkey asked 
me whether it was true that Mahmut Esat Bozkurt said that non Turks could 
be only servants in Turkey, I felt pride because he was clearly trusting my 
knowledge in politics and not in law.  
 
Being identified as a political scientist also had its disadvantages because it 
showed an interest in politics. Thus, after we were finished, some of my 
interviewees (politicians) wanted to chat with me about the political 
situation in the country and even learn my political views. Some were also 
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interested in the conceptional framework of the thesis and when I described 
it in more detail, they gave me their take on corporatism. I tried to keep my 
political opinion to myself but they were insistent. So I had to tell one of 
them whom I voted for in the last election.  
 
One interviewee put me in an ethical dilemma. He was helpful to inform me 
about a meeting where I ended up making my first non-participant 
observation. Thereafter, however, he called and asked for my views of the 
meeting. To return his favor of letting me know about the meeting, I gave 
him my comments on the phone. Liking my observations, and commenting 
“we cannot see these things”, he asked me whether I could write a report for 
him. This put me in an awkward position. I told him that there might be 
some ethical concerns in doing this that I wanted to think about. I then 
refused saying that I introduced myself to the participants at the meeting as 
a researcher and not as a spy. If I then wrote a report for someone at TBB, it 
would be inappropriate. 
 
It should be said that as a group of people to be researched, bar presidents 
wield enormous authority. This is probably to be expected since they are 
used to dealing with power and state institutions as well as taking a stand 
and where necessary, confront authority in general. They usually know well 
what they would like to say in a formal and polite way. Given the fact that 
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bar presidency is an elected office, maybe this powerful authority is not 
something to be surprised about.  
Further, they consider themselves “enlightened people of society with a 
mission”. Indeed, when I was informing them (by reading from the 
interview protocol) things like the interview being conducted for scientific 
purposes and everything we spoke would be confidential, I could see that it 
sounded like a “reminder of rights” to them. In fact, one of them said “you 
do not have to remind us all that, we know it”. Many did not care about their 
name being kept confidential and made comments such as the following: 
“you can write my name, I say these things everywhere” or “I write articles 
about this subject, everyone knows I think like this” or “I say all this at 
TBB, I say it to their faces”. 
 
Nevertheless, understanding my role as a social scientist, many listened to 
this part with a smile on their faces. At some point, I decided I should also 
smile and say something like “now that I have reminded you of your rights, 
we can begin”. This helped to relax the atmosphere because it served as an 
acknowledgment on my part of their role as a defense attorney (most of 
them were). In this capacity, they hear the police, the prosecutor or the 
judge reminding their clients their rights to silence and an attorney. I often 
felt that all these reminders were designed for powerless subjects of 
research whereas all of my participants were very powerful. In fact, two of 
them were confident to the point of arrogance and questioned the 
terminology in the interview protocol in a hostile fashion.  
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One of them (also a professor of law) truly scolded me and said “You are 
referring to the state all the time, what do you mean by that, do you refer to 
the institutions of the state? There is no such thing as the state, it is the 
people who bring about the state. If I was in your jury, I would ask you 
that”. Similarly, one participant could not really understand the formulation 
in the interview protocol which referred to my thesis “exploring the 
relationship of TBB and state institutions”. In a true lawyerly fashion, he got 
stuck on the word “relation”. He went on: “what do you mean by relation; 
you cannot make me say those things; I do not understand what is in your 
head; your analogy is wrong”. He was the only person among the thirty bar 
presidents and administrators who did not allow tape recording. His 
aggressive behavior almost made me cry. Later mellowed down and said 
that it sometimes took people time to break the ice. In the end, he 
recommended me to be more provocative. Since I knew that as a researcher 
I should never take control (Weiss 1995), I let both of them rant about it all 
although it has been very difficult for me to handle these two situations.  
 
Two persons in the second interviewee group also did not allow for tape 
recording. I explain this by the fact that we were not alone in their offices. 
Another explanation is that one of them was a prosecutor. I observed in 
other research that given their suspicious nature by profession, prosecutors 
are less likely to allow tape recording than judges. Meanwhile, one person 
in this group allowed for tape recording but did not sign the consent form 
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saying that he was talking to me and “that should be enough”. Meanwhile 
one interviewee from the higher judiciary when signing the form said, “you 
cannot make anyone at the Court of Cassation sign such a form”.  
 
In terms of collaboration with my interviewees, I believe that I have been 
able to establish good rapport with them. I am saying this not only because 
they have been kind to me behavior wise such as assigning their 
administrative staff to take me to the toilet or drive me to the bus terminal or 
fetch my luggage from the bus station (to give me a ride); ordering food 
(because “I must have been hungry just off the bus”) and recommending me 
bus companies since I am coming “all the way from Istanbul”. But there 
have been also instances of giving me the benefit of the doubt: “because I 
did not know how long an interview would last, I allocated my whole 
afternoon for you” or showing appreciation: “I have been a bar president for 
five years, no one asked me these questions.” 
 
Some volunteered to make phone calls to arrange appointments with the 
persons they suggested that I interview (which I refused). Two phoned me 
to make additions to the interviews we made or to give me names and phone 
numbers. On their own initiative, some personally called future interviewees 
they recommended, to say I was going to call them, giving the prospective 
interviewee a head-up. Or they let me know of upcoming meetings that 
could be of interest for my thesis. They made their personal assistant send 
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me minutes of meetings in the Parliament or copied important archival 
documents for me.  
 
One of them -an administrator at TBB- asked the hotel of TBB to give me 
his room due to his early departure. In that weekend, TBB hotel was full 
with people who came for the bar presidents meeting. Similarly, many 
asked me at the end of our interview, whether they have been helpful for my 
study. Some personal connections at the higher judiciary were also very 
considerate. After failing to arrange a time for us to meet in Ankara, one of 
them suggested that he meet me in the VIP room of the Atatürk airport 
when he was on his way back to Ankara. He left my name with the Security 
at the entrance so that I was allowed to the VIP room where we ended up 
conducting the interview while he was on personal leave with his sick 
daughter on his side that he brought to Istanbul for treatment. 
 
Consistent with the principles of qualitative research, I went to my 
participants’ natural surroundings to observe them. Thus, doing the research 
involved a lot of travelling within the country to places in Central Anatolia; 
Eastern Anatolia or South Eastern Turkey that I have never been before. In 
those places it was obvious that I was not from the town given my looks and 
the fact that as a woman I was carrying a lap top on my shoulder.  
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Meanwhile, Although I have been to Ankara many times, I never made it to 
the Parliament. When I went there for the first time to make interviews with 
MPs, I was a total stranger to the cultural codes of the place. The day I went 
to the Parliament turned out to be in fact reserved for the people to visit 
their representatives. As a result, apparently knowing the procedures, people 
arrived in droves to make requests from MPs while I discovered information 
desks and the roles of consultants in accessing MPs. It was also interesting 
to see buildings that I watched in news that were full of MPs who discussed 
issues with each other and journalists.  
 
Despite the fact that I made appointments with all the MPs I was going to 
see, I often had to wait because they had unannounced visitors from the 
MPs’ home town. In that sense, I observed politics as patronage in action. In 
fact, one person did not hesitate to make his request of transfer to Ankara in 
my presence to which the MP responded that he cannot arrange a place at an 
independent institution reminding the visitor that his request should be a 
realistic one. When one of the MPs I was interviewing said that “in Turkey 
many people were participating in politics but not because of a political 
interest in terms of how can we live in a better country in five years but 
because of an economic interest”, I knew exactly what he was talking about.  
 
It later became clear that this type of request making was not limited to 
MPs. The offices of the Ak Party town representative who also happened to 
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be the president of bar of the town also functioned like a request bureau. 
Before we started the interview, a visually handicapped man came in with a 
young girl in his arm who was serving as his walking aide, demanding that 
my interviewee pay his electricity bill. Another interviewee at TBB also 
complained that acquaintances wanted privileged treatment in their 
disciplinary files, showing the prevalence of the same phenomenon at three 
different sites. 
 
Interviewing MPs of AKP proved tricky sometimes. They often corrected 
me by referring to the name of their party as “Ak” which I tried to adopt 
during the interview but then it slipped out of my tongue as AKP again. 
This sounded almost deliberate and raising questions about my stance 
towards Ak since opponents of Ak put a special emphasis on referring to the 
party as AKP while the party leader emphasizes Ak. One incident is 
remarkable in that regard. After the interview, one of my Ak interviewees 
gave me a ride to the airport. I told him that I was initially worried about 
missing my flight but thanks to the ride this was no longer the case. He said 
our interview would have lasted longer if I were the typical electorate of Ak, 
implying that he would talk more to influence me rather than just make an 
interview. 
 
Culturally, I often felt like a stranger in my travels. For instance, when I was 
interviewing one of the presidents of the Ankara bar, there was a noise 
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outside. My interviewee paused and asked me whether I knew what that 
was. I replied that it sounded like the closing of the trunk of a car. It turned 
out to be canon fire from the Çankaya Palace in honor of Mrs. Kirchner, the 
Argentinean President who was visiting Ankara. We laughed at my 
interpretation but it only shows my cultural inaptitude. Indeed, the 
officialdom in Ankara is truly alienating for someone who works at a work 
place where even the president of the university queues to get lunch.  
 
Indeed, I received calls from secretaries in Ankara stating that they were 
calling from “The Offices of Honorary Mr. so and so”. In the same vein, 
instead of putting me through, they said they were “presenting me to Mr. so 
and so” which made me almost feel like I was going to soon talk to the 
President of the Republic. Similarly, when phoning my participants one day 
in advance to confirm the interview, one of my obviously religious 
participants said “inşallah”. This worried me as it sounded almost like an 
uncertainty about tomorrow’s meeting in my secular understanding of the 
word. When we met the next day without any problems, I understood what 
he meant was: “greater than me there is god, if god allows it”.  
 
Speaking to people who had strong Anatolian accents or whose mother 
tongue was not Turkish also turned out to be a challenge. After asking them 
to repeat what they have said a couple of times or requesting clarification 
for what they had said, two of them said “this is as much as I can explain it 
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with my Turkish”. At that point, I felt terrible by my overzealousness. I 
realized that making sure I understood everything correctly,  I inadvertently 
made them feel uncomfortable. 
 
Visiting Southeastern Turkey helped me to put many things my 
interviewees were saying into perspective. For instance, when travelling 
from one town to another, the road ran parallel to the Syrian border and 
makes one realize how far these places are from the “center” or 
“mainstream” of the country. This point was emphasized when presidents of 
bar said that while the practice of law is hard in Turkey in general, it is even 
harder in the region because rules and regulations that apply in other parts 
of the country do not apply there. This point was even confirmed by the 
reception of the mobile phone that switched sometimes to the Syrian 
network.   
 
When I went to the Court House in one of the Southeastern towns with a 
private taxi because there were no yellow taxis, I was curious about the type 
of hearings held in the criminal court to understand the local context. I 
looked at the hearing list from the previous day that was still hanging at the 
door. Sure enough, cases concerned smuggling (I was at a border town), 
public unrest (most of the residents were actively engaged in street protest 
with the police) and intentional bodily harm. More surprisingly, a notice 
hanged on the door of the hearing room: “please do not enter into the 
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hearing room with a gun”. These were little hints for me, the researcher, to 
understand the reality my interviewee was describing about practicing law 
in the region and how legal authorities who were not from the region were 
viewing the local people. It also helped me to understand why he fought 
hard to bring about change at TBB to make TBB more sensitive about 
“their” reality.  
 
Going to the site was also helpful to see my interviewees’ offices. For 
instance, it occurred to me that unlike the business offices of my other 
participants, the offices of two presidents’ of bar in the Southeast did not 
have a portrait of Atatürk behind their desk or anywhere nearby I could see. 
Of course, I did not look specially for Atatürk portraits in the offices of my 
participants, but in these two cases, I noticed their absence. I found this in 
conformity with the points they were making such as their “rejection of the 
monist stance imposed on them by the Kemalist project”.  
 
Among the non-participant observations, the one in Kars was the most 
intense experience as I spent the whole weekend in the same hotel with 
presidents of bar. I thought about staying at another hotel to be able to keep 
my distance as a researcher but then was concerned that this could make me 
look like a snob from Istanbul that refrained from spending social time with 
them during tea breaks, lunches, dinners or in the bus while visiting touristic 
sights in the region. Also, I felt staying in another hotel could deprive me 
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from the opportunity to make observations and hear anecdotes about my 
research subject.  
 
The social program was organized by the local bar who greeted every 
attendee upon arrival at the airport by mobilizing all the attorneys in the 
city. For instance, when I asked the attorney who was driving me to the 
hotel about Cemal Kırbayır whose 103 year old mother met prime minister 
Erdoğan to discuss his whereabouts and other disappearances that have 
happened in the 80s, he voluntarily took me to where he disappeared from.  
 
Indeed, politics was everywhere in this snow covered city. In a 
neighborhood of Turkey with clear conservative tendencies, people proudly 
told me about the city’s tolerant attitude as opposed to Erzurum. When we 
were visiting Ani, politics was again in full sight: we were at the border, 
looking right across Armenia which country we do not have a border 
crossing with. Then, we were shown the place where MHP MPs prayed 
together at the first mosque in Anatolia to commemorate the arrival of Turks 
in Anatolia. We were taken to Sarıkamış where Ottoman soldiers froze to 
death and visited the sculpture that was later removed by the order of the 
Prime Minister because it was a “monster”. 
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As a result of this loaded atmosphere, it was impossible to avoid politics and 
the Kurdish issue. Although I preferred to listen and not reveal too much 
about my own views in order to keep a neutral social scientist stance, some 
personal stories told, made it very difficult. I was talking to presidents of bar 
who were scared when somebody merely sneezed behind them when 
walking down the street; whose cars were stopped and searched in dark-
lonely nights by the same civilian police twice in response to their referral 
to the immunities of defense counsel concerning searches and were then 
condescendingly told “see, how we can search you” or who were held at 
gun point on the floor but were only saved in the last minute.  
 
I feel that my attitude to bars have changed thanks to this research. What the 
interviewees described helped me to separate my own experience with the 
bar and to view it as a research subject to be understood. Over time, the 
struggles within TBB and among the local bars, the values, processes and 
what they stood for as well as their relationship with the state institutions be 
they the Ministry of Justice or the judiciary have become very interesting 
for me. I started to read them as small manifestations of a large picture: 
change effecting the judicial branch including the bars, leading to current 
tumultuous climate one observes in almost all institutions of the judiciary. 
As a result, I came to naturalize the events and stances of bars. 
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Having now described the method and the atmosphere of the interviews as 
well as non-participant observations made in trying to understand the 
relationship between TBB and state institutions, I can now turn to the 
findings.
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Chapter Four: Findings 
 
 
The main goal of this thesis was to empirically test the interest group 
literature’s assumption that a corporatist interest group structure leads to 
policy concertation.  To find out whether the relationship between TBB and 
state institutions could be described as such, interviews were conducted 
with presidents of local bars, administrators at TBB and state officials. In 
addition, non-participant observations were made. I found that there was no 
policy concertation between the parties given the monist state tradition in 
Turkey, making state institutions disinclined to cooperate with interest 
groups or share power. 
 
Equally important, the thesis tried to understand the reasons for conflict 
between TBB and state institutions especially in view of the dictum of 
corporatist theory that relations between corporatist partners are consensual. 
In that regard, I found that social and economic change undermined TBB’s 
group homogeneity. Consequently, TBB swings between a protective and 
promotional interest group and strays from playing a policy partner role. 
When the profession’s historical engagement in politics is added to this, 
sustaining an apolitical relationship between TBB and state institutions 
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becomes all but impossible, thereby contributing to a conflictual 
relationship between the parties.  It can be argued from the above that in 
Turkey interest group heterogeneity is an equally important factor as the 
monist state tradition to undermine corporatist policy making. 
 
Before I get into the findings, I should explain my work after data 
collection. While a time-consuming and arduous task, I undertook 
transcription of data. This allowed me to read the interviews many times 
and “hear” the interviewees to get a general sense of what they were saying. 
Thereafter, I coded the data under subthemes using a qualitative research 
software called Max QDA. The software produced coded segments that fell 
under themes and various subthemes that I determined. This then allowed 
me to write the findings. 
 
Turning now to findings, I will first give some demographic data as to the 
respondents. Table 1 below shows a breakdown of the demographics of 
respondents. 
Interview 
Number 
Birth 
year 
Party 
membership Gender 
Years as 
local 
bar 
admin 
TBB 
post 
Length 
of 
interview 
(min) 
       
Int. 28 1965 Yes M 2 No 60 
Int. 30 1965 Yes M 10 No 50 
Int. 29 1931 Yes M 7 Yes 120 
Int. 27 1970 No M 6 No 75 
Int. 26 1947 Yes M 24 Yes 120 
143 
 
Int. 25 1965 Yes M 12 No 60 
Int. 24 1968 Yes F 6 Yes 40 
Int. 22 1950 Yes M 5 No 45 
Int. 21 1952 Yes M 19 Yes 80 
Int. 23 1953 Yes M 9 Yes 50 
Int. 20 1955 Yes M 15 No 45 
Int. 19 1974 Yes M 3 Yes 60 
Int. 18 1946 No M 12 Yes 80 
Int.17 1945 Yes M 11 Yes 65 
Int. 16 1947 Yes M 11 No 70 
Int. 15 1957 Yes M 21 No 100 
Int. 14 1975 Yes M 4 No 30 
Int. 13 1952 Yes M 17 Yes 90 
Int. 12 1968 Yes M 11 No 100 
Int. 11 1972 Yes M 2 No 80 
Int. 10 1944 Yes M 6 Yes 70 
Int. 9 1957 Yes F 1 No 50 
Int. 8 1963 Yes M 20 Yes 40 
Int. 7 1965 Yes M 7 No 40 
Int. 6 1965 Yes F 7 No 45 
Int. 5 1940 Yes M 6 Yes 120 
Int. 4 1949 Yes M 8 Yes 45 
Int.3 1939 ? M 10 ? 40 
Int. 2 1950 Yes M 16 Yes 50 
Int. 1 1951 Yes M 4 Yes 65 
       
Table 1, the demographics of each respondent. 
To sum up the demographics of respondents: 
Gender: 3 female, 27 male. 
Party affiliation: 27 said yes (only 7 were in my original MP list); 2 said no, 
1 missing data.  
Average age: 55 years. 
Average length of bar work: 9,7 years. 
TBB post: 15 yes, 14 no, 1 missing data.   
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Average length of interviews: 66 minutes. 
 
As can be seen, the respondents were overwhelmingly male and politically 
engaged: 27 of the 30 have been a member of a political party. With 55, 
their age is much above the average age in the country. Further, the average 
length of their local bar work was almost 10 years, suggesting long 
involvement with the profession as an administrator. Half of the respondents 
held a TBB position, which in addition to the time served at the local bar 
can be quite a long commitment to professional organization. In that sense, 
as suggested by the professionalization literature, age and gender wise, 
participants seem to belong to an older generation whose values and ideas of 
the profession do not necessarily reflect the currently expanding profession. 
Lastly, the average length of interviews being over an hour suggests that 
respondents were eager to talk about the subject.  
 
IV.1 : The relationship between TBB and state institutions 
In attempting to clarify the relations of TBB with state institutions, my first 
question to the respondents was about the activities of TBB. While 
respondents gave many different answers, for ease of reference, I arranged 
the activities mentioned into categories as to what interest groups usually do 
such as implementation of laws; making policy and the like. 
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a- Implementing laws: check the documents in the file of candidate 
attorneys38; preparation and signing of licenses to practice law39; ensure the 
profession’s functioning in an honest, trustful way and in accordance with 
ethical rules40; serve as an appellate body concerning disciplinary decisions 
of local bar organizations41; respond to questions and requests from courts 
and other branches42; prepare professional ethics rules43; determine each 
year minimum fee tariff for legal services and opine on the criminal legal 
aid fee tariff44; approve decisions of local bars that are subject to review45. 
b- Material benefits: unify the apprenticeship practices of bar organizations46; 
work on the social security of attorneys47 including elderly and health 
care48; build and operate educational, social and accommodation facilities49; 
provide financial assistance to local bars in the training of apprentices50; 
                                                       
38 Interviews 1, 10, 15. 
 
39 Interviews 1, 2, 10, 11, 15, 17, 20, 30. 
 
40 Interviews 1, 10.  
 
41 Interviews 10, 11, 17, 18, 20, 30. 
 
42 Interview 5. 
 
43 Interviews 2, 17. 
 
44 Interview 6, 17, 18. 
 
45 Interview 10. 
 
46 Interview 1. 
 
47 Interviews 2, 6, 10, 15, 29. 
 
48 Interview 17, 19. 
 
49 Interviews 2, 14, 19. 
 
50 Interviews 6, 8. 
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engage in continuing legal education of attorneys51; defend legal changes 
concerning health coverage of legal apprentices; lobby for payment of 
reduced fees concerning gun licenses or green passports for attorneys52. 
c- Making policy: contribute to the drafting of the 1982 constitution when 
asked by the Council and on its own53; initiate court action to strike down 
unlawful regulations54; draft constitution55, act on attorneys56 or other laws; 
provide opinion and recommendations concerning draft legislation57; issue 
reports on legal subjects such as detention58 rule of law and the judiciary59; 
publish journals, books and minutes of meetings60; 
d- Organizing consensus: convene or co-host symposia, panels, meetings and 
conferences concerning legal subjects (such as new laws coming into force; 
violations of rights concerning a trial or issue in the country; professional 
issues; legal education)61; convene bar presidents meeting62; ask for the 
                                                       
51 Interview 10, 18. 
 
52 Interview 15. 
 
53 Interview 29. 
 
54 Interview 10. 
 
55 Interviews 1, 5, 14, 18, 29. 
 
56 Interviews 1, 2, 5, 6, 10, 16, 27. 
 
57 Interview 10 
 
58 Interviews 1, 2. 
 
59 Interviews 14, 17. 
 
60 Interviews 1, 8, 18. 
 
61 Interviews 1, 5, 8, 11, 18, 19, 30. 
 
62 Interview 1, 13, 18. 
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opinions of the local bars concerning draft laws or amendments in order to 
find a consensus among bar organizations (such as victim-offender 
mediation)63; invite MPs in the Justice Committee to bar presidents 
meeting64; liaise with local bars to solve their problems65. 
e- Advocate policies: defend increase of attorneys fees tariff in legal aid 
payments (and if that fails engage in protest activity)66; prepare media 
declarations concerning various legal subjects such as criminal legal aid 
payments67; hold an official opening speech at the start of the judicial 
calendar68; fight for acceptance of TBB issued IDs as a formal ID69; fight 
for the rightful place of bar presidents in the protocol70; lobby for a bar 
exam71; engage in politics72; attend various Committee meetings at the 
Parliament73; contact MPs and engage political parties and Ministers in the 
legislative process through written and oral submissions74. 
                                                       
63 Interview 22. 
 
64 Interview 13. 
 
65 Interview 2. 
 
66 Interview 18. 
 
67 Interview 14. 
 
68 Interview 1. 
 
69 Interview 15. 
 
70 Interview 15. 
 
71 Interview 1. 
 
72 Interviews 4, 5. 
 
73 Interviews 4, 11. 
 
74 Interview 4. 
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f- Advocate values: protect the rule of law and defend supremacy of the law75; 
defend human rights and attacks against it and criticize practices during 
military rule such as extensive search of attorneys in prisons76; provide legal 
representation before military courts for members77. 
g- Other: engage in international relations with other countries’ bars78; 
participate in EU projects79.  
As can be observed, most of the activities mentioned by respondents allows 
one to classify TBB as a protective interest group.  
 
Meanwhile, it should be noted that to undertake these activities, TBB must 
be contacting the three branches as well as other state institutions, the media 
and the public. To find out, I did not ask respondents directly what the 
relationship between TBB and the judicial or any other branch was. Rather, 
I formulated the question in a generic fashion and asked “which state 
institutions TBB was engaged with” when conducting its activities. I also 
wanted to see whom they mentioned first and the most as well. 
Interestingly, I sometimes had to clarify what I meant by the question. 
                                                       
75 Interviews 1, 17, 18, 20. 
 
76 Interview 29. 
 
77 Interview 29. 
 
78 Interviews 2, 17, 18. 
 
79 Interview 5. 
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Similarly, when respondents did not mention one of the three branches, I 
had to specifically ask about the branch they were omitting.  
 
I will start the findings with the relationship of TBB and the judicial branch. 
I will then move on to the relationship between TBB and the Ministry of 
Justice and to the relationship with the Legislature. Then, I will look at the 
relationship between TBB and state institutions in general including the 
government. Lastly, I will briefly review the relationship between TBB and 
other professional organizations. 
 
IV.1.1 : The relationship between TBB and the judicial branch 
I wanted to start with TBB’s relationship with the judiciary because when 
analyzing the data, it was obvious that respondents -all attorneys- were 
talking about two different layers in this relationship. First, they were 
referring to the relationship of an attorney vis-à-vis a judge or a prosecutor. 
Second, they made reference to the institutional relationship of the bar or 
TBB with that of the judiciary, be it the local courts, high courts or the High 
Council of Judges and Prosecutors. Most importantly, it seemed that the 
perspective and discourse of the first defined the nature of the second 
relationship. Given that, I am starting below with the first layer as it 
manifests the institutional attitude of the judiciary –defined in Turkey to 
include the court as well as the prosecution- towards attorneys.   
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IV. 1. 1. a: Attorneys versus judges and prosecutors 
Respondents said that despite graduating the same school, judges and 
prosecutors saw attorneys as outsiders and stayed away from them80. They 
used analogies that described themselves as the step child81 and bride (of the 
court house)82 or referred to themselves as “the other”83 vis-à-vis judges and 
prosecutors. As a result, even in the offices of the bar that was located inside 
the court house, one felt like in a shelter84.  
 
Respondents described many anecdotal instances demonstrating their 
“otherness”. For instance, when the president of a High Court recently 
traveled to a central Anatolian town, he visited the Head Prosecutor85 of the 
town; President of the Justice Committee86 but not the local bar. When 
asked whether he wasn’t going to, he replied that “their tradition did not 
                                                       
80 Interviews 1, 9, 28. 
 
81 Interviews 4, 15, 21. 
 
82 Interview 4.  
 
83 Interview 9. 
 
84 Interview 20. 
 
85 In Turkey, the job description of a Head Prosecutor involves a lot of administrative 
responsibilities including running the logistics of court houses.  
 
86 Justice Committee is an administrative unit established in each jurisdiction where there is 
a felony court (ağır ceza mahkemesi). It determines discipline, transfer, promotion and 
similar issues of personnel including judges and prosecutors in the geographical boundaries 
where the felony court is established. The Head Prosecutor and the Justice Committee are 
considered the most important judicial institutions in a district. 
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include visiting the bar”. In the respondent’s opinion, there was nothing left 
to say after this comment from the president of one of the High Courts87.  
 
Similarly, one respondent learned that a new prosecutor was appointed to a 
district in his Aegean town. As president of the bar, he decided to pay a visit 
to the prosecutor to say “welcome”. He noted that he was in the district for 
other business and had he heard about the appointment before, and knew he 
would not be able to make a welcome visit in a timely fashion, he would 
also send flowers. Nevertheless, he knocked on the door; buttoned up his 
jacket as a sign of respect for the prosecutor’s post; introduced himself and 
said why he came. Unfortunately, the newly appointed young prosecutor 
would shake his hand without even standing up from his chair despite the 
fact that agewise the respondent could be his father88.  
 
Another respondent described how in the court house of the Mediterranean 
town, he invited a law books publisher to exhibit law books in the corridor 
of the bar’s floor. There was a genuine need for this because there was no 
bookstore in the town that sold law books. However, the Head Prosecutor 
came in and wanted the books to be removed because it was creating visual 
pollution. The president of the bar replied “how so?” since judges and 
prosecutors as well as attorneys were buying the books that were exhibited 
                                                       
87 Interview 4. 
 
88 Interview 15. 
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only once a month. After all, it was not a stand in the street that sold 
socks89. However, the Head Prosecutor was adamant. When the respondent 
finally gave up, the Head Prosecutor said that they could open the stand for 
the books once a month but he was going to pretend that he did not know 
about it90. 
 
In a Southeastern town, the Head Prosecutor wanted the respondent to 
evacuate the offices of the bar that was located in the court house for the 
simple reason that the bar was making tea in office rooms. As tea service in 
the court house was already tendered, this was unacceptable. The 
respondent explained that the bar was not selling tea to third parties for 
income but was providing it to its members free of charge and that this was 
none of the business of the Head Prosecutor 91. Similarly, the Tax Office 
started action to collect funds from the bar for unjustified occupation92 
because the bar was taking photo copies in its offices. The respondent 
explained that the bar had to start court action to have this cancelled93.  
 
                                                       
89 The respondent said in Turkish: “işportada bir çorap satmıyoruz”. 
 
90 Interview 20. 
 
91 Interview 25. 
 
92 The speaker used the Turkish word “ecrimisil” which is compensation paid for unlawful 
occupation of a property.  
 
93 Interview 25.  
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This respondent had more anecdotes. When the court house was undergoing 
repair work, the Head Prosecutor wanted to take the conference room from 
the bar. As a result, the bar was asked to remove its furniture because the 
room was also going to be re-furbished. The respondent wrote to the 
Ministry of Justice with a threat of staging a protest in the court house by 
tying himself to the seats in the conference room, upon which the Ministry 
made the Head Prosecutor to reverse himself by saying the room belonged 
to the bar while asking the bar to keep this incident confidential and not 
share with the public94.  
 
Lastly, the same respondent explained that in official correspondence when 
the prosecution writes to the bar, they make a “request”95. Thus, the bar 
equally writes that it “requests” the prosecution to do something. For a 
while there is no problem corresponding like this. One day, however, the 
prosecution reminds the bar of the regulation on the proper official 
correspondence and says that superiors may “make requests” while 
hierarchical lowers “submit”96  their requests.  When the bar says that they 
are in the same hierarchical level and if the prosecution “submits”, they will 
equally “submit” their requests, the prosecution’s reply is that they are one 
                                                       
94 Interview 25. 
 
95 In Turkish: rica ederim. 
 
96 In Turkish: “Arz ederim”. 
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step ahead of the bar. Hence, the prosecution will make a request to the bar 
while the bar will submit a request97.  
 
When prompted whether the respondent believed this was an attitude 
prevalent for bars in the Southeastern region, he said that it was done to all 
bars in Turkey. He relayed the problem to TBB asking for the adoption of a 
uniform attitude. The respondent said that he was day in-day out busy with 
these petty matters and each time he adopted an attitude vis-à-vis the Head 
Prosecutor, the latter would instruct the policemen at the entry of the court 
house to cause him trouble with a different arbitrary practice98.  
 
In similar vein, another respondent explained how it was a problem for 
attorneys to review court files without a power of attorney despite the fact 
that the Act on Attorneys clearly said so. He then described an incident in a 
Central Anatolian town that happened to his colleague. The colleague 
wanted to review a file but the prosecutor refused to allow him on the basis 
of the regulation on court clerks which stated that an attorney could review 
a court file only if (s)he had a power of attorney. When the colleague 
challenged this practice by referring to the provisions in the Act on 
                                                       
97 Interview 25. 
 
98 Interview 25. 
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Attorneys, the prosecutor replied: “that is your code”99 suggesting that he 
was not bound by it.   
 
The incident shows a clash between two legal provisions. Legally, a 
regulation cannot violate a law. But if this is still the case, the act should 
prevail but as shown in the incident, it does not. As a result, attorneys have 
for years complained that prosecutors would not let them review files 
without a power of attorney. The matter is professionally important because 
an attorney would want to first review a court file before deciding to take 
the case or not. 
 
Respondents pointed out that the professional socialization of judges and 
prosecutors emphasized that they kept themselves apart from attorneys. 
Respondents heard that at the Justice Academy (where judges and 
prosecutors are trained for the job), candidate judges and prosecutors were 
being told that they now represented the state and should forget about their 
friends100. This discourse not only created a closed caste of judges and 
prosecutors but also meant separation from social environment101 that led to 
“professional bigotry”102 and amounted to the violation of the right to fair 
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trial because judges and prosecutors lived not only apart from attorneys but 
also from society.  
 
As part of this attitude, prosecutors and judges would not attend panels or 
conferences organized by the bar or TBB103. Since they did not share life 
with attorneys, they also did not share the law104. As a result, personal 
distance translated into professional distance by leaving less time for the 
defense in criminal proceedings. A manifestation of this attitude was 
described by one respondent as follows: In the last hearing of a criminal 
case before the final judgment is announced, the floor must be given to the 
defense attorney for the final words and arguments of the defense. As the 
attorney starts speaking, however, (s)he sees the judge giving a USB stick to 
the clerk. Then, as the attorney continues with the defense, the judgment -
apparently written before the final defense- appears on the computer screen 
(designed for showing the hearing record) in front of the attorney105.  
 
It was also indicated that especially in criminal proceedings, the prosecutor 
and the attorney were not in the same footing, against the equality of arms 
principle106. Likewise, when the court recessed for deliberation before 
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rendering the final judgment, some prosecutors would not leave the hearing 
room, attending the discussion among judges. One respondent emphasized 
that the court room architecture which sat prosecutors next to the judge (in 
an elevated fashion) and the criminal defendant (below) in the middle and 
the defense attorney on the right, lead to role-confusion for citizens while it 
also kept the defendant far away from the defense attorney and unable to 
talk to him/her during the hearing107. 
 
Attorneys were a part of the trivet that assisted in reaching justice but judges 
and prosecutors did not view it that way108 and wanted to exclude the 
defense109. This was why when the 2001 amendments were made to the Act 
on Attorneys, it was specifically stated that attorneys were an integral part 
of the judiciary in order to discourage a mentality that believed that the 
criminal process can function in the absence of attorneys110. However, the 
esprit of the amendments was not internalized by judges111 because they did 
not view attorneys as equals112. Similarly, attorneys were viewed merely as 
a free profession despite the fact that they represented citizens and their 
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right to seek legal remedies113. Or they were viewed as a useless profession 
that allowed one to make a lot of money in short time114.  
 
Meanwhile in the South East of Turkey, judges and prosecutors did not see 
attorneys as colleagues because attorneys hailed from the region115. The 
attitude was also prevalent in the law enforcement personnel: they saw 
attorneys as savors of the guilty that they had caught116. Respondents 
pointed out that the job of the judiciary was to protect the citizens vis-à-vis 
the state. However, under the influence of a “sacred state” mentality in 
Turkey, the judiciary has become a mechanism protecting the state against 
citizens117. 
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As can be seen, the occasionally condescending and disrespectful attitude of 
judges and prosecutors as described by respondents vis-à-vis attorneys 
seems to be uniform around the country. It is all the more noteworthy that 
respondents experienced this attitude as presidents of bar. This suggests that 
the attitude towards younger and inexperienced attorneys may be even 
worse, especially considering the fact that their number keeps growing. The 
prevalence of such a uniform attitude indeed indicates a deep socialization 
problem on the part of judges and prosecutors. Worryingly, in the criminal 
law context, this attitude seems to affect the right to fair trial by limiting the 
rights of defense. 
 
IV.1.1. b: TBB-Judicial branch relationship 
The nature of the relationship among the colleagues as described above was 
no different when it came to the institutional relationship between TBB and 
the judiciary. It was described as a “one sided love affair”118 or “a necessity 
due to the protocol but was otherwise limited”119. The bureaucratic structure 
of the judiciary prevented TBB to establish a natural relationship120 but with 
the constitutional changes to the HSYK this could maybe change121.  
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In bureaucratic judicial systems like Turkey, independent institutions like 
HSYK are designed to ensure that the executive does not interfere in 
judicial appointments. Accordingly, the HSYK’s function is to make the 
promotions, transfers, discipline and other administrative matters of judges 
and prosecutors. However, only one respondent said that TBB’s most 
institutional and intense relationship was with HSYK122. At the same time, 
the HSYK was considered important because of its role in the general 
professional system. Frequently, reference was made to constitutional 
amendments that were ratified with the referendum in September 2010 
involving the HSYK. According to one respondent, attorneys long defended 
the view that the HSYK should become more pluralist but high courts have 
been against this. “Because judges do not want us in those structures”123. 
They wanted to keep attorneys away124 consistent with the above described 
judge-prosecutor block vis-à-vis attorneys.  
 
Meanwhile, the constitutional changes adopted after the referendum seems 
to have led to two arguments. The first group defended the view that in 
appearance the HSYK consisted today of 22 persons but in actuality, it 
consisted of only one and that was the Minister of Justice. Naturally, this 
situation was undermining judicial independence125. Similar view was 
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defended by one respondent who stated that Division One of the HSYK 
consisted of people who used to serve at the Ministry of Justice. Further, the 
Minister, as the President of the HSYK determined the agenda of the 
HSYK126.  
 
In similar vein, the procedures adopted after the 2010 referendum for 
election of attorneys to the HSYK (as well as to the Constitutional Court) 
were improper127 because they bypassed established structures in TBB. One 
respondent described in length, why he believed so. His first reason was that 
the election process was to be organized by the Presidency of TBB but the 
Presidency had no right to vote. Second, the electorate consisted of 
presidents of bars. While this appeared democratic, it created inequality 
under the appearance of equality because some presidents of bar represented 
25000 attorneys while some represented only 40 attorneys. In addition, 
“presidents of bars” was not an officially recognized organ of TBB to 
constitute an electorate128. Instead, the Plenary of TBB could have 
determined a candidate129. As a result, the attorneys elected to these posts by 
such procedure did not and could not represent the profession130. Both of the 
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elected attorneys were pro-government to the extent of militancy131. In fact, 
the adoption of this procedure was the outcome of a calculation that an 
election by presidents of bar would result in someone favoring the 
government’s world view132.  
 
The second view did not get into the election procedure at the HSYK. It 
considered the constitutional changes as an important and positive 
development because by including an attorney in the HSYK, it signaled the 
importance and value attributed to the defense133. Further, attorneys’ 
contacts with all segments of society in different roles such as debtor-
creditor or guilty-innocent and their involvement with citizens’ problems, 
gave voice to citizens and the profession in the judiciary. Judicial 
bureaucracy was used to looking at things from one perspective but thanks 
to attorneys, the HSYK as well as the Constitutional Court, could now look 
at things from a different perspective134. This one sidedness was put as the 
“blindness of the bench135”. One respondent referred to a judge who said 
that he benefitted from attorneys because by always interacting with judges 
and prosecutors, one failed to notice his/her mistakes136. In fact, it was 
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argued that even the presence of two attorneys (another being an attorney of 
the Treasury) at the HSYK changed the perspective of judges and 
prosecutors137. 
 
In that regard, three respondents mentioned meetings titled “status analysis 
at the judiciary” arranged by the HSYK after the constitutional 
amendments138. Presidents of bars were also invited to these meetings. To 
their surprise, this turned out not an invitation to satisfy the protocol 
requirements.  Actual contribution was sought from presidents of bar 
while139 members of HSYK complimented presidents of bars and said that 
bars were an inseparable part of the judiciary140. According to one 
respondent, hearing these words at the meeting, changed attitudes at the 
local level. For instance, the head prosecutor who would not let law books 
to be sold in the corridor a year ago, now allowed a caricature exhibition at 
the court house. In the opinion of this respondent, the meeting upset “the 
factory settings of some people” and “let the demon out of the bottle”141. 
Although presidents of bar did not have much opportunity to say much in 
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the meetings, the fact that they shared the same space and problems with 
judges and prosecutors -as colleagues- was important on its own142. 
 
Another institutional issue showing the relationship between the judiciary 
and TBB was the practice of the speech of the President of TBB at the start 
of the judicial year. The practice started when TBB was established143.  In 
the 1990s, however, TBB made alternative judicial year opening ceremonies 
in protest of the request of the then President of the Court of Cassation to 
view the speech to be made by the President of TBB in advance144. The 
respondent said that this was viewed as an attack against the freedom of 
defense. He had no such right. The practice continued for 3-4 years until 
this person retired.  
 
Two respondents said that the judicial year opening speeches were 
important because they were being made before a high profile of listeners 
(high officials of the state). Its contents stated the judiciary’s problems and 
the vision of the judiciary for the future145. However, one respondent said 
that the relationship between the parties was limited to this speech146 while 
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one respondent did not understand why the judicial year opening speech 
was considered so important147.  
 
On the other hand, some respondents believed that TBB was engaged 
intensely with the higher judiciary148. One referred to the relations of TBB 
with the Court of Cassation or Council of State in which TBB played a 
mediator role. TBB was talking to both courts concerning the quarrel 
between the courts and the government over the release of detainees whose 
detention period exceeded ten years, reminding the courts that impartiality 
was important149. In that regard, TBB was not taking a side in the fight 
between the parties but felt that it had to intervene if local bars demanded it 
or to protect the interests of attorneys150. Sometimes TBB drafted reports 
concerning legislative subjects or consulted with the higher judiciary151.  
 
According to one respondent, TBB and the high courts visited each other, 
including YARSAV(Union of Judges and Prosecutors) and tried to act 
together in legal matters and the issues on the agenda of the country152. One 
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respondent said before the current administration, the relationship of TBB 
with high courts and the Constitutional Court’s Kemalist circles was very 
intense, and this fact was also relayed to the public153. In the opinion of this 
respondent, this was a political relationship and at some point, the three high 
courts and TBB were doing the opposition that the CHP could not do154.  
 
When viewed like this, the institutional relationship between TBB and the 
state institutions does not seem to be better than the relationship between 
attorneys and judges and prosecutors. What is more important, given the 
judge-prosecutor block vis-à-vis attorneys, no institute of the judiciary 
seems to be viewing the bar as equals. To the contrary, as the anecdotes 
show, there is a willingness to assert a hierarchy over the bar or take 
unilateral decisions that affect them without any consultation. This shows 
that the monist tendency of the state is also shared by the judiciary. As a 
result, no institution of the judiciary stands out as a partner to form judicial 
policy together with TBB. Rather, they are willing to dictate policy or 
practices although some respondents expressed hope that the new design of 
the HSYK could change things by encouraging sharing of space and 
information among the three actors.  
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IV.1. 2.: The relationship between TBB and the Ministry of Justice 
About half the respondents said that the primary or the most intense 
relationship of TBB was with the Ministry of Justice155. The nature of this 
relationship was an organic one and involved routine matters such as 
licensing issues of attorneys, attorney registration to the bar and handling 
disciplinary files of attorneys156. Some respondents mentioned that the 
relationship was based on professional problems of attorneys and financial 
issues157. At the same time, no division at the Ministry was responsible for 
solving the problems of attorneys158. 
 
The Ministry served as a conduit for civil legal aid payments made by TBB 
to local bars159. It was similarly involved in the payment of criminal legal 
aid160. One respondent pointed out that the payment of criminal legal aid 
moneys was one of the main problems of the profession when he was in 
office but despite meetings with the Minister of Justice of the time, no 
positive outcome was achieved161. Another respondent confirmed that 
professional problems were brought to the attention of the Minister and his 
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bureaucrats but there has not been much progress despite the fact that the 
Minister himself was an attorney162. As these meetings and requests did not 
lead to anything, one could say that TBB did not have much clout with the 
Ministry or the government163. 
 
This unresponsiveness was attributed to the attitude of the staff of the 
Ministry of Justice that consisted of judges and prosecutors who were 
coming from the bench164.There were no bureaucrats at the Ministry that 
practiced as an attorney before becoming a civil servant165. Given judges’ 
and prosecutors’ above described propensity to view attorneys as rivals 
rather than colleagues, the problems between TBB and the Ministry of 
Justice were exacerbated166. This was the main factor that prevented mutual 
trust and cooperation between the Ministry and TBB167. These bureaucrats 
lived in housing given by the government, disconnected from society and 
viewed things from the perspective of the bench168. They neither knew the 
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laws of attorney practice nor the problems of attorneys and were in any case 
prejudiced against attorneys169.  
 
As to the relationship between the parties, some respondents mentioned the 
tutelary powers170 of the Ministry of Justice over TBB. These powers 
included the administrative and the financial control of TBB by the Ministry 
of Justice investigators; the ability to question the decisions of TBB 
concerning licenses171; approval of some regulations and disciplinary 
decisions172; the right to request the dissolution of a bar organization for 
engaging in activities outside its goals. According to one respondent, the 
fact that the latter action was not undertaken thus far, did not mean the 
Ministry was never going to. These provisions had to be removed from the 
act173.  
 
Some respondents emphasized that before the 2001 amendments, the Act on 
Attorneys put the burden of resorting to legal action on TBB, if it did not 
agree with the decisions of the Ministry of Justice. Today the burden was 
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reversed174. While the Ministry could still send back decisions for 
reconsideration, if TBB resolved the same decision with a two third 
majority, the decision of TBB became final. Then, it was the Ministry that 
had to go to court175. However, one respondent said that even this was 
unacceptable176. In a sense, before the amendments, TBB was like a state 
institution, its elections took place under the monitoring of the Ministry. It 
was now made independent177. Therefore, the relationship between the 
parties today was less of a tutelary relationship178.  
 
The relationship between TBB and the Ministry of Justice was not based on 
mutual consultation or on a routine schedule such as weekly or monthly 
meetings179. Some respondents talked about the bureaucracy’s role in 
drafting laws and pointed out that government’s legal proposals came from 
the Ministry of Justice bureaucrats180. As such, parties came together during 
legislative work in committees or joint projects181 especially when the draft 
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laws involved those that concerned the legal system such as the Act on 
Attorneys, the Civil Procedure Act and the Act on Obligations182. 
 
Some respondents pointed out to a new era in the relationship between the 
parties, beginning of which was marked by the election of the new President 
at TBB183. His election was the outcome of a process that started in 2008 at 
the bar presidents meeting held in Ankara184. The ritual of bar presidents 
meeting was that a final declaration was prepared, contents of which were 
then declared to the public. The way to go about this was by electing three 
presidents of bar from Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. Although the three 
pretended to draft it, the declaration was almost always prepared in advance. 
Further, it would not be read out loud. Bar presidents would learn the 
contents on their way home when it was declared to the public that it was 
signed by seventy bar associations185.  
 
At the said meeting in 2008, the respondent relaying the story realized that a 
declaration was about to come out the usual way that criticized the 
Ergenekon186 investigation.  Taking the floor and protesting the process of 
                                                       
182 Interview 10. 
 
183 Interview 15.  
 
184 Interview 12. 
 
185 Interview 12. 
 
186 The Ergenekon case started with the finding of 27 hand grenades in a house in Ümraniye 
district of Istanbul in June 2007. The investigation then expanded with various “waves” to 
172 
 
the drafting of declarations, the respondent let it known that if such a 
declaration came out, he would make a counter declaration187. When the 
meeting broke for lunch, bar presidents from the South East and Eastern 
regions and “Anatolian bars” –as he put it- came together, reaching a 
number of 30-40. This showed that although their delegate numbers were 
low, the number of bars that agreed with his position was high. It was clear 
that if a counter declaration was issued, those bars would sign it188.   
 
At the time, TBB elections were looming in one year. Therefore, it was a 
delicate situation for TBB. Thus, upon the respondent’s proposal, a 
declaration was prepared by electing five presidents who actually went and 
wrote a declaration. As the respondent put it, “it was the most democratic 
declaration in the history of TBB”. When prompted whether this was a 
concerted action against TBB by 30-40 presidents of bar, the respondent 
said that although the parties knew each other from previous bar presidents 
meetings, there was mere collegiality among them. This event, however, 
                                                                                                                                           
hunt an “Ergenekon terror organization” allegedly connected with the deep state in Turkey. 
The goal of Ergenekon was allegedly to prepare a turbulent atmosphere by assassinations 
and bombing to pave the way for a military coup. More than 100 people were taken into 
custody including journalists and retired commanders. Some observers say that wide spread 
use of pre trial detention and flimsy evidence and delays have turned the operation into a 
witch hunt against opponents of the government, (“What is the Ergenekon operation?”, 
Hurriyet, see: 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/10165767.asp?gid=244&sz=22787, Access 
date: 11 October 2011).  
 
187 Interview 12. 
 
188 Interview 12. 
 
173 
 
showed that they shared the same view and sow the seeds of future 
cooperation189. 
 
Indeed, in TBB election of 2009, Southeastern-Eastern bars and “Anatolian 
bars” decided to work together to produce a credible candidate against the 
then president. To do that, “Anatolian bars” met in Anatolia, Southeastern-
Eastern bars met in the Southeast. Then, both groups made a joint meeting 
with five bars attending from each group. The joint group determined a 
candidate but at the last stage, this candidate backed down. Undeterred, the 
joint group decided to nominate someone they had initially eliminated but 
now had to defer to for lack of other option. In the end, their candidate was 
not elected190 but he still got 147 votes while the winning candidate got 
220191.  
 
When the former president of TBB died of cancer in April 2010, the idea 
was one more time to work together with “Anatolian bars” to produce a 
candidate. Again “Anatolian bars” and Southeastern bars met on the same 
day in separate towns. This time, they wanted their candidate to win. 
Therefore, they wanted to support a serious candidate who could also get 
votes of the other side (the “Kemalist” side as they were referred to). They 
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were aware that a candidate could not win solely with the cooperation of 
both groups192. They were further aware that the cooperation between the 
two groups was disturbing some people. In order to shield their candidate 
from possible accusations such as getting the support of those that were pro-
“religion”, pro-“Kurd”, pro-“separatist”193, both groups decided that they 
should refrain from declaring their support publicly. This would also lessen 
pressure on “pro-CHP” bars that could vote for their candidate. Sure 
enough, thanks to the support of some that defected from the “pro-CHP” 
camp of the three large bars194, the election was won by their candidate. One 
respondent put it as “41-42 Anatolian bars coming together and ending the 
rule of Istanbul-Ankara and Izmir bars at TBB”195.  
 
Before this “new era”, some respondents tried using their contacts to reach 
the Ministry of Justice for resolution of professional problems. For instance, 
one described that after becoming president of the bar, he took an initiative 
to relay the problems of the profession to the government. As an AKP 
member, it was easy for him to request an appointment from the Minister of 
Justice196 and ask his participation at a meeting to be organized for that 
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purpose. The meeting was hosted by Kayseri Bar and took place in 
Nevşehir’s Kozaklı district in December 2009.  
 
Attended by 58 bar presidents, the meeting lasted until 3 AM in the morning 
whereby the Minister and almost all his high level staff197 listened to the 
problems of the profession and the judiciary198. One of the demands 
included a civil constitution while the other was a proposal to change the 
Regulation on Court Clerks199. As a result of the meeting, a working group 
was established that concentrated on the solution of professional problems 
of attorneys200. In that working group, various directorates of the Ministry 
were represented such as Laws; Strategic Development; Penal Affairs; Civil 
Affairs; Personnel; IT and Prisons. The working group decided which 
problems required legislative change for resolution but according to one 
respondent, the only thing yet achieved was the change in the Regulation on 
Court Clerks201. Some respondents were more positive saying that although 
the TBB and the Ministry were of different political colors they still solved 
the matter202. By working together, bureaucrats and TBB produced 
something203. 
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In the past, the parties were engaged in a battle of words but today serious 
steps were being taken204. For instance, some changes adopted in the 
legislative sack (Act no 6111)205 were the outcome of discussions at the 
HSYK meetings. The Ministry reversed itself in terms of the number of 
intermediary appellate courts to be established, raising their number from 9 
to 19 as demanded by the profession206. This respondent was hopeful that 
criminal legal aid payments were also going to be raised and a legal 
insurance was going to be introduced. The Ministry was also working on 
changing judges’ and prosecutors’ perception concerning attorneys. 
 
Now, they could reach the Minister any time they wanted and the distance 
between the parties was being bridged207. It used to be that the Minister 
would not attend TBB’s meetings. Today, he would come or attend 
breakfasts. It was a different question whether he could get something done 
by sidelining his bureaucrats208. Nevertheless, the relationship was probably 
undergoing the best of its times. According to this respondent, 
incompetence was no longer hidden under the disguise of opposition 209. 
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Today, they were given a carte blanche in terms of the drafting of the Act on 
Attorneys210.  
 
In addition to their relations with the Ministry, respondents thought there 
were other novelties in the “new era”. The new administration did not try to 
create bars that looked alike by intervening into their activities211. It 
undertook new activities such as trial monitoring in the KCK case212 in 
Diyarbakır or the Ergenekon case in Silivri213. According to one respondent, 
TBB has become more active and its tone moved from “we would not give 
our draft act on attorneys to this government” to “I put my draft in front of 
the government”214. 
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Respondents said that the current administration put its political views 
behind and served the law, the profession and the rule of law215. Before, 
political views were more important but this led to a deteriorated 
relationship with the legislature and the executive216. It caused an 
undeserved decline in the prestige of the profession and a failure to take 
advantage of the existing provisions that were advantageous for the 
profession217. This was why bars that were supportive of the current 
government voted for the current president of TBB: to bridge the distance 
between the parties218.  
 
According to some, the relationship with the current government including 
the Minister of Justice and Prime Minister has indeed improved219. Despite 
the difference in political views, today the Ministry did not mind TBB 
because TBB did not react with political reflexes220. This allowed for the 
solution of the problems of the profession221, one example of which was the 
amendment of the Regulation on the Court Clerks222. The personality and 
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personal qualities (background, education, academic interest) of the new 
president contributed to the new era223.  
 
On the other hand, one respondent thought that the public relations of TBB 
could be improved as people now perceived the current TBB administration 
as pro-government despite statements and declarations that criticized it. This 
probably also had to do with the unaggressive spirit and non-accusatory 
tone adopted by the president which helped to warm the relationship 
between the government and TBB224. 
 
Some respondents said that the Ministry could indirectly support TBB for 
instance by distributing research carried out by TBB through its network225 
or by owning what TBB does226. It was looking at TBB from a distance but 
it could really make use of its know how: TBB had many knowledgeable 
members, this could prevent mistakes from being made when drafting 
laws227.  
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However, not everybody was happy with the “new era”. According to one 
respondent, TBB was silent despite the existence of controversial issues in 
the judicial agenda such as the coming into force of the new maximum 
period of detention or the new structure of the High Council of Judges and 
Prosecutors 228. Its silence was unhealthy. The previous administration 
raised its voice in a serious manner despite the fact that some of his views 
did not suit CHP but at least its statements would appear in newspapers and 
catch headlines229. Another respondent said that he was concerned whether 
TBB could keep its contemporary stance230.  
 
It was pointed out that most of the communication between the parties was 
written. But given the coldness of writing, TBB did not leave it there231. In 
addition to the routine and issue based meetings between the parties, it was 
emphasized that it did not leave a good image when people visited each 
other only when they needed something232. Thus, the parties were also 
engaged in visits of courtesy233. 
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In view of all this, it appears that the relationship between the Ministry of 
Justice and TBB is formal. Also, it is not routine but runs on ad-hoc or 
problem oriented basis. Contact seems to involve mostly issues that concern 
the tutelary powers of the Ministry over TBB or ad hoc legislative 
encounters for the drafting of certain laws while there are also courtesy 
visits. Further, at times, the relationship seems to have deteriorated due to 
the political engagement of TBB to the extent that the profession felt it was 
necessary to change this equation by bringing about a desired change at the 
administration of TBB.  
 
The relationship does not seem to have been helped by the fact that the staff 
of the Ministry are former judges and prosecutors whose attitudes towards 
attorneys have been already described above. In the end, whether it is 
because of the political stance of TBB or the attitudes of staff of the 
Ministry or whether arguments over the tutelary powers of the Ministry, it 
does not look like that there is policy concertation or any partnership 
between the parties. 
 
IV.1.3: The relationship between TBB and the legislative branch 
Bar presidents who have served at the Parliament234 were quick to describe 
instances from the legislative process that involved TBB. The committees 
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that TBB was the most engaged with was the Justice Committee, the 
Constitutional Committee and the Planning and Budget Committee. The 
latter especially for the fact that “80% of everything that came to the 
Parliament was handled there”235.  
 
It was the Justice Committee that dealt with subjects that traditionally 
affected the legal system. Recently these consisted of the acts on civil 
procedure, commerce, obligations236 and service237. Past examples were the 
code on criminal procedure, penal code and the code of corrections. In these 
cases, TBB representatives were invited to the Committee 238. As one 
respondent who used to serve at the Justice Committee said where he felt 
that the subject was of concern to TBB, such as an amendment to the Act on 
Attorneys, he would contact TBB239. In fact, all members of the Justice 
Committee in his party would ask for the opinion and support of TBB and 
acted in concert with it240.  
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According to one respondent, TBB’s presence in the Justice Committee was 
merely as a provider of opinion241 and remained a formality. For instance, in 
the first draft of the Code on Civil Procedure, there was mandatory legal 
representation to file a case in court. If adopted, such provision could have 
helped to reduce the workload of courts if accompanied by a proper legal 
aid system. This provision was removed from the draft but TBB did not 
even utter a word about this. In his opinion, the enactment of such a 
provision was much more important for attorneys in economic terms than 
TBB’s comments on secularism242. One respondent, however, described 
intensively how in the Lower Committee this provision was discussed, 
agreed upon but was later removed by the Office of the Prime Ministry for 
fear of being accused with attorney protection243. 
 
Some respondents felt that the malaises of Turkish party politics was also 
visible in the relationship between TBB and the legislature. For instance, 
when he went to the Justice Committee to oppose the removal of the 
requirement to take a bar exam, the participant was informed by his friend 
in the Committee that he should not bother because the Prime Minister 
personally called the Committee for the said change244. This event showed 
that the relationship with the Parliament depended on the development of 
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democracy245. According to one participant, law making in Turkey has 
become a fait accompli246.   
 
Another respondent said that if MPs in the Committees did review draft 
laws that came from the government in a proper manner, it could be 
possible to change them but usually the government would not let its 
proposals be touched. Most of the time, the government MPs in the 
Committee, either because they trust the government or do not wish to 
appear to be making it difficult for the government, would not say much. 
They would speak and vote for the draft law. At the Committee, they would 
look at the eyes of the Minister. In the General Assembly there was a 
similar situation. A government MP would not vote for a proposal not 
accepted by the government if he or she did not want to risk his or her 
political future247.  
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“(…) The right thing to do is to sit 
quietly and not cause any trouble. The 
government knows the best. The 
Minister knows. And how does he 
know? The bureaucrats told him so.”  
Interview 16. 
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Participants who did not serve in the Parliament also commented on the 
intensity or importance of the relationship between the parties248. Some felt 
that there was not much relationship to talk about249 or that it was not as it 
should be250 while one emphasized that until recently as an NGO, TBB was 
not as effective as TBB of Notaries or the Chamber of Trade and 
Commerce251. Respondents said that when contribution was requested from 
TBB by asking their opinion or inviting TBB to the relevant Committee at 
the Parliament, this contribution was made or would be made252. In that 
regard, one respondent suggested that TBB should have a (permanent) 
representative in the Justice Committee253. 
  
Some respondents felt that TBB made important contributions to the 
legislative process because it was in the field254 and was independent255. The 
views of an organization that represents 60thousand lawyers had to be 
obtained especially in areas that concerned the rights to defense, fair trial 
and rule of law since it was attorneys that experienced the problem256. When 
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governments appreciated the importance of all this, then the views of TBB 
were sought257 but the legislature was not always appreciative258. It was 
insufficiently cooperating259 with TBB. Similarly, where TBB’s 
contribution was obtained, it was not taken into consideration because by 
that time, the Committee already formed a view on the issue260. Sometimes, 
contribution was sought “to save the looks” because the legislature failed to 
provide enough time for TBB to comment261. 
 
On the other hand, it was pointed out that TBB should pursue matters and 
subjects that are of interest to it, without awaiting invitation from 
committees. When this was done like in the enactment of the legislative 
sack concerning amnesty for public debts, TBB saw that it also obtained 
benefits262. These included the extension of social security rights for 
apprentice attorneys (premium to be paid by TBB); amending the act on 
apartment buildings so that attorneys can open offices in them without 
needing a permission from other property owners in the building; inclusion 
in the financial amnesty law of unpaid loans given to apprentice attorneys 
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and interest accrued for unpaid annual membership fees of attorneys263. The 
respondent said that the members of the Planning and Budget Committee 
relayed this to TBB as a criticism saying that many other institutions and 
groups were present in the Committee but it was the first time they saw 
TBB there264.  
 
Respondents also commented on the substance of TBB’s contribution. 
When a representative was sent by TBB to the legislature, the views 
expressed by the representative was usually his or hers as an individual 
rather than the institutional opinion of TBB265. One respondent described 
how he was sent to the Committee because he was considered 
knowledgeable in the field that was being discussed and was given free 
hand. However, because his personal opinion was going to be binding on 
TBB, he felt the need to consult. When he called two persons from TBB, he 
found them at different places and told them what his opinion was. He then 
asked whether they agreed with his position, they said “fine”. In his view, 
this was not a healthy way of working266. At the same time, making 
presentations and speaking convincingly at committees were personal 
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qualities, not equally possessed by everyone, therefore, undermining the 
quality of the contribution thus made by TBB267.  
 
Similarly, TBB could make use of universities, scientists and practitioners 
and produce reports that were much better than those produced by the 
Ministry of Justice to assist the Parliament, Justice Committee and the 
Ministry268. As TBB now had the resources, it could provide scientific data 
and draft projects or laws for committees rather than merely being present in 
Committees269. It was pointed out that research facilities at the Parliament 
were very limited and that MPs had only one political consultant. Therefore, 
they failed to follow what was missing in legislation270. This function could 
be served by TBB by working on one to one basis with the Justice 
Committee and the Parliament271. In that regard, TBB should have its 
private office at the Parliament and have itself represented not by one 
person but by a committee at the Parliament. Further, all draft laws and 
proposals should come to the Parliament and Committees after obtaining 
TBB’s views272.  
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In addition to representation in the Committees, respondents also mentioned 
the ongoing contacts that were established with political parties as well as 
visits made to deputy president of political party groups in the Parliament or 
Heads of Committees273. This was necessary because solving the problems 
of the profession could not only be done by initiating court action or writing 
letters274.  It had to involve dialogue with the Parliament. In that regard, one 
respondent described how in his term, lawyer MPs from all political parties 
were invited to dinner by TBB275. Most of the invitees -numbering around 
50- came. As there was no concrete expectation from the MPs, the event 
created a certain good will and warmth which later seems to have helped in 
the Committees. The respondent emphasized that this was done as a 
deliberate policy change on the part of TBB. In the past, there was no such 
attempt to engage the Parliament276, but today there was recognition that the 
lack of parliamentary interest in the profession was hurting it. It led to 
regulations being drafted that were violating laws. In addition, the Act on 
Attorneys had to change. All of this required (political) preparation277.  
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Some respondents indicated that attorneys were the profession that was 
represented in the Parliament with high numbers278 or one of the highest279 
or should be the highest280 although one said that the number was going 
down281. Despite that, there was a detachment between TBB and these 
MPs282. One respondent emphasized that while attorneys as professionals 
were present in the Parliament, their professional organization was not. 
While (before June 2011 election), four former presidents of bar in the 
Parliament were MPs of CHP, there was none that was an MP of AKP. If 
there was one, the problems of the profession would lend themselves to 
more solutions283. However, according to one respondent, attorneys were 
forgetting about the professional problems when they went to the 
Parliament284.  
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“As Nabi said, ten dervish would fit into one kilim 
but two sultans would not fit into one climate. 
Attorneys see themselves as the sultan. Because 
they do not have a hierarchical superior, they 
always want to act independently and with their 
free will. They shy away from acting in a collective 
manner. Unfortunately, this is how it is in the 
Parliament. (…) The attorneys in a political party 
do not share a common stand”. 
Interview 19. 
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Some respondents explained that local bars were also trying to engage the 
Parliament by contacting parliamentarians in their towns. Also, local bars 
attempted to reach the Committees directly especially when the legislation 
concerned a subject that was a prevalent problem in the town of the bar such 
as the legislation that involved children that were throwing stones at the 
police.  
 
As such, the respondent -also president of the local bar- contacted the 
Justice Committee. He was told that the Committee had to consult with 
TBB and if TBB agreed, the Committee would gladly listen to the local bar. 
TBB, however, declined saying that other bars may find such practice 
discriminatory285. In the end, the views of the local bar were submitted to 
the Committee as well as other political parties, in writing286.  
 
As briefly referred to above, TBB is also involved in the preparation of laws 
where an expert committee (lower committee) drafts the law before it comes 
to the Parliament. This procedure was followed when committees drafted 
the Code of Civil Procedure and the Code of Enforcement and 
Bankruptcy287. Alternatively, after seeking the opinions of local bars or on 
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its own, TBB established a committee and presented its work, for instance 
in the case of mediation or commercial code to the Parliament288. 
 
Lastly, one respondent mentioned that one of the Committee Presidents in 
the Parliament requested the assistance of TBB to pass a legislation that has 
been waiting enactment. This was done because it was felt that it the draft 
legislation was owned by the government, it would encounter resistance in 
the Parliament. Therefore, the Committee sought help from TBB to 
convince other political parties that it was a beneficial law for the whole 
country. This assistance was provided and the law passed289.   
 
The above findings illustrate that TBB is mostly in a reactionary position 
vis-à-vis the legislature. It awaits the Committees in the Parliament to invite 
it to provide its views. In other words, it is merely functioning as a 
consultative institution that is listened to when considered “necessary” by 
the relevant committee working on the issue that TBB deals with. It seems 
that TBB is currently trying to change this paradigm by being more pro-
active and present in Committees or in the Parliament even when not 
invited. It is also why it attempts to engage all MPs who are lawyers by 
dinner or social events. TBB seems to toy with ideas such as doing research 
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for the Parliament or establishing a continuous representation at the 
Parliament to make itself more relevant.  
 
On the other hand, the legislature seems to accept TBB as a counterpart at 
least on paper by inviting it to relevant committees, sending draft laws for 
comments or to request clearance for the representation of the profession by 
one local bar in a particular subject. Despite this, however, the invitation to 
the relevant Committee does not automatically translate or amount to policy 
making as a partner.  
 
IV.1.4: The relationship between TBB and the state institutions in 
general 
When asked about relations with state institutions, some respondents talked 
about TBB’s relations with the government while some mentioned state 
institutions -other than the three branches- that TBB was in contact with. 
Among state institutions, the most frequently mentioned one was the 
Ministry of Finance290 given its involvement in the provision of funds for 
criminal and civil legal aid; in tax issues such as VAT for legal services 
rendered; and tax inspection of attorneys.  
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Another institution was the Office of the Prime Ministry291 especially when 
professional problems could not be solved through normal channels. The 
Census Bureau292; the Traffic Bureau293 and the Land Registry294 were also 
mentioned given the frequent involvement of these institutions in the daily 
work of attorneys for birth, death and other personal and property issues. 
The Ministry of the Interior295 came up also often as it is the hierarchical 
superior of the local police that attorneys have to deal with especially when 
their clients are detained in the pre-trial process as suspects. As criminal 
defendants’ rights such as the right to counsel (at police stations) are 
triggered at this stage, the profession comes into contact with the Ministry 
especially when problems cannot be solved at the local level.   
 
Other state institutions mentioned by respondents included the Ministry of 
Work and Social Security as it concerned social security issues of 
attorneys296; Office of Income297 for taxes; Ministry of Foreign Affairs298 to 
obtain green passport and issues in international relations; municipalities299 
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to obtain licenses to open law offices; Radio Television High Council300 to 
initiate programs on law; the Ministry of Transport301 for the IT network of 
courts; Post Office302 for service of legal documents and the Head of State 
involving courtesy visits303. Lastly, respondents who answered the question 
by referring to the relationship between the government and TBB, talked 
about the current government as well as previous governments.  
 
It was significant, however, that many respondents believed that TBB had 
political inclinations as apparent from their description of TBB as 
“backyard” (of CHP). Respondents who used this term said that the 
prevalent political view in TBB has been until recently a singular world 
view: nationalist304, social democrat305 or  “Kemalist” in the line of CHP306 
whereby the official ideology was justified under the pretense of law307. 
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As a manifestation of this ideology, various examples were given: the 
former president of TBB’s comments regarding the Prime Minister for 
being a graduate of a preacher trainee school308; the holding of symposia 
and conferences in which the main idea was that the shift of politics in 
Turkey was bad309 or where presenters represented a singular world view310; 
officials of TBB being present at the residence of a suspect during police 
search in the Ergenekon investigation, thereby implying unlawfulness311; 
the current TBB administration not having a single member that represented 
the world view of the right or anyone east of Sivas (or Ankara)312; financial 
support given to local bars that were “Kemalist”313 and the office of a 
former general secretary of TBB being covered with flags, pictures and 
emblems of CHP314. 
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“(…) We have long understood that this 
cannot happen with social democrats, with 
Kemalists. And  we believe that without 
the liquidation of the 1-2% privileged class 
created by Kemalism, nothing can be done 
in this country. (…)” 
Interview 12. 
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When asked about why TBB was close to CHP, two respondents315 said it 
was the delegate system that caused TBB’s affiliation with CHP because the 
three large bar organizations that had disproportionately high number of 
delegates in TBB elections were under “Kemalist” administrations and were 
voting as a block316. Another contributing factor was the seniority 
requirement to become bar president which was unlike other professional 
organizations317. By the time someone became president of bar, he or she 
was introduced into the system, was moderated by the system and was made 
a defender of the status quo. 
 
What was important here was that respondents criticized TBB’s acting as 
backyard because it led to parting ways among lawyers318 and hurt the 
institution319. TBB was much more successful when it concerned itself with 
the problems of the courts and attorneys320. Acting like a “backyard” led 
TBB to be in bad terms with the legislature as well as the government321 
because it was used as a front to attack the government322.  
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Nevertheless, some respondents felt that it has been easy for the current 
government to describe TBB as “backyard of CHP” because some TBB 
administrators had organic ties with CHP323. However, this view was 
unjustified. On the other hand, one interviewee emphasized that at times 
there were declarations made by TBB that were also not liked by CHP. In 
fact, CHP criticized them because TBB was supposed to be on “their” 
side324.  
 
Whether it is true or not, the perception that TBB was the backyard of CHP 
seems to have brought TBB into an ideological or political clash with the 
current government. Many respondents said that the relations between the 
parties was not good325 because TBB was positioning itself politically rather 
than as a legal partner326. TBB President was to have said that he would not 
trust the government with “their act” on attorneys despite a carte blanche 
from the then Minister of Justice327. On the other hand, one respondent said 
that a draft Act on Attorneys was prepared but it led nowhere because the 
government tried to take advantage of the process by revoking the article 
that gave TBB the duty to protect human rights and freedoms as well as the 
rule of law because in their opinion, this provision had a political side to 
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it328. As a result, despite the need for amendments in the Act on Attorneys, 
the matter was not pursued with the current government for lack of trust to 
it329. 
 
According to some respondents, a media event in which the former 
President of TBB seems to have said that he has difficulty accepting a 
graduate of an imam training school as Prime Minister seems to have 
exacerbated the already tense relationship between the parties330.   
 
 
 
 
 
In addition, in the Ergenekon trial, “arguably one of the most important 
events of the Republic”, bars could not determine a position while some 
were against it331. This made the relationship even worse and turned it into a 
thrust of poles332. One respondent described the relationship as mutual 
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“(…) I am a member of MHP, and I really do not like the 
Prime Minister but I do believe that this statement about 
imam and sermon schools was not right.(…) That bar has 
members or relatives of members that are graduates of 
those schools. A Union President cannot determine such 
category. If you accept this, tomorrow someone will say I 
cannot accept someone from Nevşehir or someone from 
Diyarbakır”. (…) 
Interview 11. 
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polemic because the government viewed TBB as an institution against it 
while TBB believed the government would not agree with any of its 
requests333. 
 
 
 
As a result of all this, TBB was not accepted like the public notaries. None 
of their events was attended either by the executive or by the legislature334. 
For instance, when the respondent served between 2006-10 as president of 
bar, TBB could not establish a single contact with the government335. Where 
there was “incompatibility of blood” between the parties, then things went 
against the interests of the profession336. The financial problems of the 
profession were not helped by all this because the government developed 
unsympathetic ears to their demands337. According to one respondent, 3-4 
years ago, the government did not send money for criminal legal aid to 
punish attorneys338.  
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“If you position yourself on the side of the 
status quo, you become an element to be fought 
off. But if you position yourself on the side of 
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On the other hand, those who believed that “this government was not our 
government” found no reason to talk with them. There was in fact fear of 
contacting the government because of the belief that “if we ask for 
something, this might lead to something detrimental for us”339.  
 
 
 
 
 
One respondent said that the self imposed distance of TBB led to stagnation 
because when one did not contribute to anything, one did not ask for 
anything either340. Or where a demand was made, it was made as an 
oppositional tactic and not really with the intention to do something 
together. In a way, this was an outcome of the political polarization in 
Turkey341. When TBB showed political reactions, then governments also 
viewed everything coming from them with prejudice and looked for booby 
traps342. Consequently, the views of TBB were not taken into consideration 
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government comes that shares our views and until then, we 
will not contact them; make requests for anything; do anything 
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ideology is, at least for me. This government is a government 
elected by the people and is a legitimate one. As long as it is 
legitimate, I do not understand why we should not contact 
them or reject that contact.” 
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by the government because the former President of TBB criticized it 
strongly343. 
 
In that regard, many respondents talked about the government’s removal of 
the requirement to take the bar exam to become an attorney. This was done 
despite the fact that TBB made preparations for it such as signing protocols 
with the ÖSYM (Öğrenci Seçme ve Yerleştirme Merkezi) to conduct the 
exam344. When this took place, an ad hoc Committee was established from 
presidents of bar to speak with the Prime Minister. Although the meeting 
was attended by 45 bar presidents and took place in the Prime Minister’s 
office in Dolmabahçe, it could not achieve anything345. Efforts in the 
Committee also went nowhere346. According to one respondent, due to its 
anger at TBB, the government amended the law in one night and lifted the 
requirement of a bar exam347. 
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“(…). They were deciding the opposite. Who 
was saying that the exam should not be lifted? 
CHP. We also said so. If CHP said the exam 
should be lifted, maybe the exam would not be 
lifted. That’s how politically tense it was 
(…)”. 
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In a subject that really concerned TBB, neither the Justice Committee nor 
the current government listened to it. Although the bars screamed and 
shouted, they did not care348. They did not ask for the view of TBB349 
despite the fact that judges and prosecutors are selected by an exam and 
exams existed in many institutions350. Even security guards were selected on 
the basis of an exam351. The only profession that accepted members without 
an exam was attorneys352. The exam was a must to ensure quality353. Now, 
reversing this required effort and pressure354 which was being currently 
exercised355. 
 
Some respondents attributed this reaction to the current government’s desire 
to streamline all institutions whether they be of civil society, professional 
organization or government so that they are in harmony with itself, failing 
this, the government brought these institutions into line356. In a similar vein, 
the government was trying to devalue these institutions, render them 
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ineffective or create alternative institutions357. MUSIAD was mentioned  as 
an example of the latter tendency, to replace TUSIAD. Similarly Memur 
Sen was brought forward instead of Kamu Sen because the latter was 
perceived as pro MHP. According to this respondent, examples abound in 
every subject from universities to media358.  
 
As a result, NGOs were under pressure to make statements that only 
concerned their members and nothing else359. This somehow kept them 
quiet360. In that regard, the speech of the Prime Minister made at TUSIAD 
before the 2010 referendum was telling. In the speech, he said that “if 
someone remained impartial, it also meant disposability361”. In the 
respondent’s opinion, this was not only said to TUSIAD which is 
considered to be the strongest NGO in Turkey. In a way, it was giving a 
message to less powerful centers by creating a perception that “if he can 
pressure TUSIAD like this to take a side in the referendum, who are we to 
resist”362.  
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On the other hand, some respondents said that the relationship between TBB 
and governments has always been restrained363. One respondent described a 
protest during the government of Tansu Çiller whereby attorneys walked to 
Anıtkabir with their robes364. Before the 1980s, during the National Front 
governments, the parties could not agree either and governments also did 
not take TBB’s opinions into consideration365.  
 
One respondent said that the relationship between TBB and governments 
depended on the perspective of governments concerning the judiciary and 
defense. Because democracy in Turkey was not institutionalized, this was 
not a proper perspective366. For governments that valued democracy and 
human rights, TBB was an important resource because it produced 
knowledge and followed developments in the world367. However, 
governments did not embrace TBB because the post 1980 coup mentality of 
guardianship continued.  The governments undercut the advance of TBB but 
should have listened to it more368 failing that could only hurt the law, the 
republic and the state, the legislature and the executive369. 
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One respondent stressed that it was the inherent differences between the 
executive and judiciary that led to conflict. According to her, the executive 
was concerned with getting things done rather than how things were 
done370. The bars, however, asked questions whether things were done 
according to the law; whether the outcome was fair and demanded 
accountability371. Bars’ duties was to take a stand concerning violations of 
rights by the executive; make statements; start legal action in court and 
criticize. All of this led to resistance by the executive. 
 
 
  
 
 
Some respondents disagreed that the relationship between TBB and the 
governments was always strained. As a sign of good relations in the past, 
one respondent described the introduction of criminal legal aid in 1992. The 
then Minister of Justice Seyfi Oktay was a colleague and delegated the job 
of provision of criminal legal aid to bars372. Or when the amendments to the 
Act on Attorneys was made in 2001, it was a result of the cooperation 
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“There is a tendency to disregard attorneys, bars and 
everything we do. They do not want us. Attorneys are 
always seen as troublemakers. Bars are seen as 
troublemakers. ‘They are arrogant, they think they know 
everything’…Consequently, there is an effort to prevent 
the things they do; a great endeavor to stop their entry 
into the system; not provide information; push them out 
and make them unable to work.” 
Interview 9.  
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between the government whose Minister of Justice was Hikmet Sami Türk 
and TBB373.  
 
Nevertheless, governments would want to get along with the professional 
organization of a profession that had many members in its ranks because in 
every political party there were many attorneys. Further, attorneys were 
connected with society374. One respondent disagreed, however, stressing 
that it should not be about parties having a harmonious relationship and 
getting along so that legal aid payments of attorneys were made in a timely 
fashion375.  In his opinion, in order to achieve justice and for rule of law to 
rein, TBB was to obtain results where necessary by challenging the 
government (not just for the sake of it) and not back down376. 
 
Lastly, respondents also commented on the relationship between state 
institutions in general and TBB. Some respondents pointed out that the 
relationship was problem/issue driven despite the fact that there were 
courtesy visits between the parties377. The relationship was pushed by TBB 
in the sense that it was TBB that knocked on the door of the government for 
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its problems to be solved378 rather than other way round. The relations were 
official379, ceremonial and at times distant380. Even when the parties came 
together as a matter of protocol and said nice things to each other, everyone 
knew that behind those nice words, there were other things381. Two 
respondents said the relationship was a very complicated one, defying 
definition382 and had to be evaluated differently at each situation383.  
 
One respondent said that state institutions did not know the constitutional 
design and status of TBB384. When compared with the past (before 1992) 
the bars now had their rightful place in the protocol but they still did not 
have much role385. In that sense, TBB or the bars’ place in the protocol was 
emphasized. It was next to the Head Prosecutor but recently, the presidents 
of universities got in between the Head Prosecutor and the President of the 
Bar. While in small towns, this did not create a problem, in big cities where 
there were plenty of universities, the place of the bars has become much 
further away from the Head Prosecutor.  
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As a result, TBB started legal action at the Council of State to stop this 
practice but the judgment stated that “equal does not necessarily mean next 
to, as long as bars were not put down a row”386. Similarly, despite being 
next to the Head prosecutor in the protocol, the President of TBB would not 
be accepted to VIP rooms. Or attorneys IDs were not accepted as valid 
ID387. These practices showed that state institutions did not see TBB 
according to its constitutional status388. Because of that, until 19 May 2006 
the President of TBB did not attend ceremonies, at which time his rightful 
place in the protocol was restored389. 
 
If the President of the Bar was in his rightful place, state institutions would 
also take TBB seriously given the fact that the state ran over form390. As a 
result, a governor would take an institution that is in the fourth row in the 
protocol more seriously than the one in the eighteenth row. Indeed, when 
the government valued a relationship and kept good relations with an 
institution, then other state institutions also did so. The perfect example of 
this was TOBB, despite its lower status in the protocol391. Some respondents 
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believed that TBB was being ignored by state institutions392. A 
manifestation of that was the fact that when the Head of State invited 
institutions of the higher judiciary to discuss problems in the judiciary, he 
did not think of inviting TBB as one of the institutions393.  
 
The state had to take TBB seriously and value its views. The relationship 
should be friendly and objective and observe the interests of justice, courts 
and attorneys because this was mutually advantageous394. If politics was not 
involved, it could be a perfect, harmonious relationship395. It had to be a 
cooperation without accepting a hierarchy given Molierac’s words: 
“Attorneys did not use slaves, they also did not have a master”396. However, 
it was difficult to call it a warm and positive relationship given the problems 
attorneys were having in land registry offices, frictions with the Police, in 
courts concerning review of files, obtaining copies and information from 
court files397. 
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According to one respondent, the state was viewing TBB as an 
association398 although TBB was a different, constitutional institution that 
represented the defense. A manifestation of this lack of perspective was that 
case assignments from criminal legal aid were paid much less fees (by the 
government) than the mandatory minimum fee tariff that applied in private 
client relationships. The lesser payment was justified on the grounds that 
criminal legal aid was a form of public service.  However, attorneys were 
then required to pay 18% VAT up front. In addition, their transportation 
costs were covered only in amounts applicable for public transportation399.  
All this showed that the government did not see the judiciary as an equal 
power to be treated equally but as an association that it could charge VAT 
for rendering a public service400. Indeed, there was economic dependency 
between TBB and the state401. Lastly, one respondent described the 
relationship between the state and TBB as cooperation on the basis of the 
sacred state which has become hostile with AKP due to change of status 
quo402 while another described the relationship as a useless fallacy403.  
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While there were various state institutions discussed by respondents under 
this heading, they overwhelmingly referred to the government. The findings 
illustrate that the political involvement of TBB as “backyard of CHP” and 
its challenging attitude towards governments seems to have led to a distant 
if not hostile relationship between state institutions in general and TBB. As 
a result there is agreement that TBB is not treated like favored groups like 
TOBB.  
 
The relationship between the parties seems to have deteriorated especially 
when the current government came to power with public declarations made 
before the media regarding the Prime Minister. Later, the relationship 
apparently stagnated with both parties refraining from contact feeding even 
more lack of trust and resentment. While this seems to have led to the 
accumulation of professional problems and the status of the profession to 
decrease, the last drop appears to have been the lifting of the bar exam. This 
seems to have been the most important professional issue for TBB. In their 
opinion, the reversal was possibly done “to punish” TBB in one night. 
Given all this, findings show that there was hardly any contact between the 
government and TBB let alone policy concertation.  
 
At the same time, the findings shed light why there is conflict between the 
parties. Despite the fact that in the corporatist interest group structure TBB 
was designed as a protective interest group, by staying close to CHP which 
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has spent decades in opposition, TBB seems to have not only identified 
itself with CHP but also seems to have adopted CHP lines under the 
pretense of defending human rights vis-à-vis right wing governments, 
moving it from a protective interest group to a promotional interest group.  
 
IV.1. 5 : TBB vis-à-vis other professional organizations 
In trying to understand the relationship between TBB and state institutions 
from a corporatist perspective, I specifically asked in the interviews about 
TBB’s relationship with other professional organizations that were also 
given a constitutional status. The goal of the question was to see whether 
and to what extent corporatist “partners”  were coming together, if at all, to 
discuss and determine policies among each other or with the government.  
 
Respondents mentioned joint meetings and press statements404 issued with 
various professional organizations and unions405 depending on the political 
agenda of the country406 such as human rights and legal issues407. While in 
attendance, however, TBB acted with the sensitivity of being an institution 
of the judiciary408. In a similar vein, bars’ place in the official protocol and 
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their public status distinguished  TBB from other professional organizations 
as they lacked those qualities409.  
 
Nevertheless, TBB provided legal assistance to fellow professional 
organizations as well as regulatory support410, for instance in the case of 
financial consultants. This was done during the enactment of a law that 
required every firm with a certain capital to retain a financial consultant. 
When consulted, TBB approved the adoption of this law by saying that it 
was in compliance with the law411. It was indicated that cooperation with 
other professional organizations was issue-based because a continuous 
engagement would undermine the independence of bars412. Similarly, it was 
indicated that where TBB was not involved in the drafting of a joint 
declaration, then it refrained from signing it413. In fact, as an institution of 
law, TBB did not sign “their” statements414.  
 
Further, some respondents underlined that given its different status, the 
other professional organizations and TBB should not even be regulated by 
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the same article in the constitution. Rather, TBB should be regulated in the 
same article as the judiciary415. Further, TBB was performing a much more 
important task than other professional organizations given its much wider 
jurisdiction416. Unlike other professional organizations, TBB was not stuck 
in its professional sphere and was much more important than them417. Even 
the election procedure of bars was different than other professional 
organizations. For instance, in bars the president was not a primus inter 
pares vis-à-vis other board members but separately elected by the general 
assembly which made him/her stronger418.  
 
Some interviewees stated that there was a certain distance between these 
organizations and TBB. Other than showing the courtesy of attending 
meetings they were invited, there was not much contact419. It was also 
indicated that there could be conflict of interest between some professional 
organizations and TBB, notably the Union of Public Notaries420. However, 
TBB should have a leading role among the professional organizations 
because it was much more suited to play this role than say the Chamber of 
Medical Doctors, most of whom were civil servants or the Chamber of 
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Traders (TOBB) for whom the protection of property was more important 
than their lives. Therefore, they would not want to incur the wrath of the 
government421.  
 
On the other hand, some respondents said that TBB could be as effective as 
the Chamber of Traders422 or much more known than other professional 
organizations423. The opposite view was also aired on the grounds that the 
proximity of bars to the state and its institutions was preventing them from 
being as critical as other professional organizations424. Similarly, TBB was 
not taking as serious risk as other professional organizations for instance in 
the “Kurdish problem”425.  
 
When prompted with which professional organizations TBB cooperated, 
various answers were given: Chamber of Medical Doctors426; Chambers for 
Architects and Engineers427 and Chambers of Financial Consultants428. 
More specifically, when it came to the health conditions in prisons, work 
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was done with the Chamber of Medical Doctors which apparently led to a 
protocol among the Ministries of Health and Justice, the Chamber and the 
bars429. Similarly, when new regulations were intended for doctors, again 
cooperation was made with the Chamber of Medical Doctors430. When it 
came to environmental issues, cooperation was made with the Chamber of 
Forest Engineers and Agricultural Engineers. When it came to legally 
challenging building of hydro thermal plants, work was done with the 
Chambers for Architects and Engineers431. Or when the issue was zoning, 
then the partner was the Chamber of Architects432. When there were tax 
issues, the cooperating partner was the Financial Consultants or in labor 
issues the unions433. The Financial Consultants Chamber was important 
because they and lawyers worked in two service sectors where regulations 
were intertwined434. However, when there was no issue based cooperation, 
then political views of these organizations became important. When these 
views did not fit TBB’s, the relationship did not go further than one of 
courtesy435. 
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To sum up, TBB seems to be engaged with other professional institutions on 
an ad hoc and courtesy basis. The cooperation seems to be triggered when 
invited or consulted by the institutions. While TBB does not like to be 
consulted only when needed when it comes to state institutions, when it 
comes to other professional institutions, this almost seems like an issue to 
be proud of. This is because TBB attributes itself a different and superior 
role than other professional institutions. Nevertheless, in terms of 
corporatist relations, one does not see any policy concertation among 
professional organizations.  
 
IV. 1. 6. Summary of findings as to relations between TBB and state 
institutions 
Data shows that when it comes to the relationship with the judiciary, the 
structural roles in the court system determine parties’ relationship than 
anything else. In that regard, respondents shared many anecdotes that 
showed the superior tone and attitude adopted by prosecutors and judges 
towards attorneys, reminiscent of an authoritarian political system where the 
court is an extension of prosecution and there is not much room for defense. 
As a result, when it came to TBB-judiciary relationship, this attitude was 
replicated on an institutional level. In terms of the relationship between 
TBB and the legislature, this appeared to mostly take place in expert 
committees to which TBB awaited invitation while lately there also seem to 
be attempts by TBB to engage all political parties, MPs and the various 
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committees at the Parliament more pro-actively (without waiting for an 
official invitation).  
 
The relationship between the Ministry of Justice and TBB, on the other 
hand, ran on multiple layers. First layer was about the routine oversight 
exercised by the Ministry over TBB concerning approvals of licensing and 
disciplinary decisions; financial issues; and permissions given for criminal 
investigation of attorneys. The second layer involved the Ministry as the 
instigator of justice policy in the government. In that capacity, it was 
responsible for the daily running of the justice system such as courts and 
prisons as well as for preparation of laws that are drafted by bureaucrats 
mostly in Committees. This latter layer in the relationship is where 
functions may be expected to overlap with TBB since policy decisions are 
considered by TBB as its professional turf where it also claims interest.  
 
While this may be an area where the parties may be expected to be engaged 
in policy concertation, it seems that the Ministry is content with ad hoc 
contacts it has with TBB that are run in an official manner. It also appears 
that when there is contact, this is done mostly to save the looks and not 
really to share power in policy making. In fact, even the oversight functions 
of the Ministry that may be considered routine are run without established 
mechanisms between the parties. Data shows that not only there is lack of 
will or platform for joint policy making but also the staff of the Ministry 
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demonstrate the attitudes of the bench towards attorneys and are 
nevertheless disinterested in the latter’s problems.  
 
Having said that, data also showed that TBB’s critical stance towards the 
government effected its relations with the Ministry of Justice. Two attitudes 
were described one of which rejected contact with the Ministry because the 
government was seen as the “other” while the second attitude wanted 
contact and dialogue with the government and the Ministry for the 
resolution of professional problems. Nevertheless, data showed that a new 
beginning was made in the relations between the parties with the election of 
the new President at TBB.  
 
Overall, data shows that none of the three branches seems to be ready and 
willing to share power with TBB in any corporatist policy making and 
content themselves with merely consulting, indicating a strong monist 
tendency on the part of state institutions. 
 
V.1: Reasons for conflict between TBB and state institutions 
After summarizing the responses to the first research question as above, 
now the second research question can be answered. To find out what may be 
the reasons for conflict between TBB and state institutions, I did not directly 
ask a question to that effect. Rather when answering other questions, 
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respondents often provided explanations concerning the subject. One 
obvious explanation for conflict came out of the relationship between TBB 
and state institutions. This will be discussed in Chapter Four in length. 
Therefore, for the moment suffice it to say that the continuing monism on 
the part of state institutions is the primary cause of the conflict. 
Nevertheless, I identified below three additional themes that seem to 
contribute to conflict between the parties. 
 
V. 2: Socio-economic change 
In Chapter Two, I stated that social and economic change was eroding the 
professional project as well as the legitimacy of involuntary membership 
institutions like TBB. One of the reasons for that was the increase in the 
number of people studying law thanks to the increase in law school 
numbers.  
 
Indeed, respondents pointed out to the wider availability of education. 
According to some, for a long time, people in Anatolia could not have 
higher education because few people had the means to send their kids to 
Ankara or Istanbul for university436. But today they understood the value of 
education437. As a consequence, it was no longer kids with better economic 
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conditions or from higher bureaucratic families that studied. In the last 20-
30 years, it all changed438. Becoming an attorney has also become popular 
with the people in Anatolia. Before, it was preferred by an aristocratic elite 
especially when this respondent looked back as someone who became an 
attorney in the early 1980s in his Aegean town439. This was not surprising 
given the fact that the initial years of practice required support from the 
family, something that could be done only by those who had that type of 
economic means. It also kept the number of attorneys small.  
 
The small numbers meant for some respondents440 that -with the initiative of 
elder colleagues- they have become member of the bar’s board as soon as 
they were admitted to the practice. At the time, there was also no seniority 
requirement to serve at the board. Consequently, as the most junior member, 
some spent a lot of time in their first years, serving cologne and candy to 
guests441. Another anecdote of low attorney numbers in one of the three big 
cities indicates that when an attorney died, social solidarity was something 
organized by the clerk at the court house whereby everyone contributed on 
the basis of voluntarism so a funeral could be organized for their 
colleague442. 
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Today, the number of law schools meant that each year there were 5000 
graduates from law schools, most of whom became attorneys. They initially 
worked in law firms for a salary until they felt competent to open their own 
firms443. However, some felt that the increase in the number of attorneys 
and the fact that there was no filter to become an attorney, led to economic 
hardship for all attorneys444 as well as diminishing respect for the 
profession.  
 
Further, legal education was getting worse given the fact that the number of 
law teachers in the country was limited and old schools were losing their 
cadres to newly established private schools445. Loss of quality in legal 
education was the concern of other respondents as well446. The fast increase 
in attorney numbers went hand in hand with the fast decrease in overall 
quality in the profession and loss of social status447. Indeed, it brought unfair 
competition among colleagues and led to abuse. One started to hear 
attorneys being beaten if he or she went to seizure of property (for unpaid 
debts) or attorneys getting killed if he or she could not get their client 
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released448.Under the circumstances, being an attorney has become 
something for those who could not become anything else449.  
 
One respondent said that the increase in the number of attorneys, was an 
attempt to reverse the “contemporary political stand” of the profession. 
Even if this was not done consciously, socially this was the case. It was 
making itself felt450. The new generation was coming from a different world 
of thought. This worried some for it could change TBB in the future451. 
Indeed, one respondent said that there was a change in the member 
profile452 while one said that he defined himself as an attorney of the 
republic and most of the members were conscious about the fact that their 
profession was a product of the republic and legal revolutions453. 
 
On the other hand, the increase in attorney numbers meant that it was no 
longer easy to disregard the mass of attorneys as there was recognition that 
it was no longer possible to raise quality in the justice sector or meet the 
demand for justice without attorneys. In other words, all of this was the 
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outcome of change in society. Needs and new relationships could no longer 
be addressed through old structures454.   
 
In addition to socio-economic change in the country and in the profession, 
respondents referred to incidents that took place in their dealing with TBB 
during their presidency. In that regard, the first issue pointed out was TBB’s 
“guardian”  role in the legal meaning of the word455. The fact that thirty 
five456 decisions of local bars was subject to the approval of TBB, (e.g. in 
disciplinary matters) was an illustration of this guardian authority457.  These 
interventions violated bars’ independence458 and led to uniformity459. To 
illustrate, in a Southeastern city of Turkey, courts filed complaints with the 
bar even if attorneys arrived to the hearing for five minutes late. The local 
bar viewed these complaints as an attack on the defense and dismissed them 
as not requiring disciplinary action. However, TBB lifted the dismissals460.  
 
                                                       
454 Interview 20.  
 
455 Interviews 7, 8, 25. Legally, a guardian “is a person lawfully invested with power and 
charged with the duty of taking care of the person and managing the property and rights of 
another person, who for defect of age, understanding or self control is considered incapable 
of administering his own affairs”, Black’s Law Dictionary 1983: 361. 
 
456 Interview 21. 
 
457 Interview 3. 
 
458 Interview 3. 
 
459 Interview 25.  
 
460 Interview 25. 
 
226 
 
Or local bars provide criminal legal aid service to the public which requires 
an office and personnel. While the expenditures of the office are covered, 
the proper carrying out of the function also requires on the job training of 
criminal legal aid lawyers. However, TBB objects to the use of funds thus 
allocated saying that training cannot be counted as an expenditure461. The 
respondent conceded that this strictness came from previous abuse by bars 
by convening trainings in five star hotels or hiring too many office staff and 
paying them high salaries. While he agreed that some order was necessary, 
these actions were tying the hands of bars and made bars dependent on 
TBB462. 
 
Further illustrations of intervention by TBB included the rejection of the 
picture of an attorney on his license because he had a “religious beard”. 
However, the then bar president of town, being a former MP, personally 
intervened, talked to TBB and resolved the issue463. An extension of this 
was the requirement of a tie for men and the ban on jeans for women even 
under the attorney costume. While the profession should be performed in a 
neat and clean fashion, forcing one attire on the profession as a whole was 
inappropriate given the profession’s independence464. Other interventions 
included regulations concerning the location of a law office and how to 
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decorate it465; issuance of ID cards for attorneys although attorneys were not 
TBB’s member; and signing of their licenses by TBB466.  
 
Similarly, in the past attorneys have been convicted before the then State 
Security Courts. As a result of that, the attorney had to be removed from the 
profession. However, due to the presence of a military judge on the court, -
found to be a violation of the right to fair trial by the European Court of 
Human Rights-, the local bar refrained from removing the attorney. TBB, 
however, reversed this decision467.  
 
In addition to these interventions, TBB had a tendency to expand its 
authority468. For instance, transfer of a member from one bar to another bar 
was not subject to the approval of TBB. TBB would, however, consider this 
in its jurisdiction and intervene especially when the attorney who was sworn 
in before an Anatolian bar wore a headscarf469.  
 
In sum, socio-economic change seems to be leading to much wider 
availability of education and growth in the number of attorneys. This also 
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means growing diversity in the profession while creating apathy towards 
uniform solutions. In other words, socio-economic change makes it difficult 
for one organization to represent an increasingly diverse profession with 
diverse needs and priorities. 
 
In addition, respondents felt that some bars were in competition with 
TBB470. This was observed during the amendment of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure. Larger bars often wanted to directly engage with the Committee 
drafting the code, the party groups in the Parliament or the Ministry of 
Justice. They justified this course of action on the ground that TBB lacked 
an audience471. Further, their human and economic resources allowed them 
to solve their problems on their own while smaller bars472 with less member 
numbers needed more support from TBB473.  
 
In the past, there was no competition between TBB and the bars because 
TBB did not have the resources to compete474. To illustrate the absence of 
resources, TBB could invite bar presidents in their two year presidency to 
its building in Karanfil Street in Kızılay only once. Its then conference room 
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was designed like a classroom and the lunch served consisted of 
sandwiches. The lack of resources also meant that international professional 
organizations took Istanbul or Ankara bars as their counterpart but after 
2001, the new counter party was TBB, contributing to the perception of 
competition475.  
 
As result of the 2001 amendments that automatically provided a portion of 
the fee for every power of attorney issued in the country as income to TBB, 
today, TBB had serious amounts of funds476. These funds were used to 
better the conditions of local bars and TBB477; to provide credit for 
apprentice attorneys or for health services; to build a hotel and a 
administrative building478; to better the social welfare (health and 
retirement) conditions of attorneys479. TBB’s work today was no longer 
confined to the routine that finished when convened once a month for half a 
day480.   
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Whereas in 2001, TBB had eight staff members, today it had 80. Its building 
was beyond comparison to any other similarly situated professional 
organization in Europe or Middle East. Even members of the higher 
judiciary brought their counter parts to TBB’s building. State officials 
including the Head of State or Ministers who due to security reasons could 
not visit the former building have visited the new building481. Not only 
income coming from power of attorneys but also funds transferred for 
criminal and civil legal aid provision made a difference for bars482.  
 
However, not everyone agreed that the resourcefulness of TBB was a good 
thing. One respondent suggested that the funds available to TBB was 
sometimes used to discipline local bars by withholding or releasing them 
when needed483. Further, despite lacking funds, TBB was initially dynamic 
and involved in legal problems, affecting politics484. Equally, it was 
publishing serious legal books, distributing them and was much more vocal 
concerning problems while its approach to law was more humane485. To the 
dislike of this respondent, when TBB became too powerful, local bars were 
crushed under it. In his opinion, TBB was just a coordinator, the main actor 
was the local bar. When too much money was involved, the problems of 
                                                       
481 Interview 26. 
 
482 Interviews 26, 29. 
 
483 Interview 25. 
 
484 Interview 23. 
 
485 Interview 12. 
 
231 
 
local bars or legal problems were less of a concern. Therefore, TBB should 
have less money but be more active and coordinate more486. Another 
respondent was equally critical. In his opinion, it was a better idea to 
become a president of the Trade Exchanges than a Minister given their huge 
buildings, 30-40 consultants, cars and amazing budgets487.   
 
Some respondents indicated that larger bars wanted TBB to follow their 
stances488 or wanted to be the center489. When they took the microphone, 
they shared their views including political ones with the public and believed 
that TBB should also do the same490. 
 
 
 
 
Some believed that the delegate system of TBB contributed to this state of 
affairs because delegate numbers were determined according to the number 
of members in a bar. Today, TBB had over 400 delegates and the highest 
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number of delegates were from Istanbul (86-87 delegates); Ankara (40-50 
delegates) and İzmir (15-20 delegates)491. When these three bars came 
together, they determined the outcome of elections at TBB492 because 
smaller bars that had 30-40 members were represented with just 3 delegates 
one of which was the President of the bar (as a natural delegate)493.  
 
Further, elections in the three large bars was different than the elections at 
other bars because in the former, elections were between lists494. Each 
group, consisting of members with a homogenous world view, produced a 
block list. In other bars, there was no list. Thus, in order to get the 
maximum number of votes, presidents had to include people of different 
world views495. In addition, the electoral system was majoritarian. Thus, in a 
bar with 25000 members, if the highest number of votes was 5500, that list 
got to represent the whole bar and produced all the delegates496. Therefore, 
in large towns, political criteria became important to get elected497. For the 
last 30-40 years, except a brief period, Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir all have 
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been ruled by “Kemalists”498. According to one respondent, while Istanbul 
and Ankara still were strongholds of “Kemalists”, “Anatolian bars” were 
today being taken over by the AKP-MHP line499.  
 
According to some, the competition between TBB and the large bars was 
undermining the unity in the profession500. The principle should be to act 
together in order not to give such appearance501.  Indeed, recent declarations 
by bars concerning the plans of the government for establishment of 
intermediary court of appeals and opening new chambers at the court of 
cassation in order to reduce delays on appeal, divided bars: 24 of them were 
against the measures while 37 of them supported the proposed changes. The 
numbers are known because both camps issued press statements giving their 
reasons for approval or rejection502.   
 
While bar presidents meeting was designed as a venue for problems to be 
aired by bars and solutions sought to common problems503, the Eastern bars 
and Central Anatolia’s conservative democrat bars appeared as “the other” 
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in those meetings504.  When prompted how this was done, one respondent 
described that bar presidents meetings consisted of sessions, open and 
closed to the media. While in the closed session, the opinion of bars were 
sought, these would not be shared with the public and the view of TBB 
would be declared as if it was the opinion of all bars505.  
 
The parting of ways in that regard has been the use of names of bars without 
consulting them in a newspaper ad by one large bar organization.  
Consequently, the bars in the ad made a counter declaration in a Central 
Anatolian town which was portrayed as the “revolt of Anatolian bars” by 
the media. One respondent said that the largest three bars have been ahead 
of “Anatolian bars” in terms of human and economic resources and political 
awareness but lately the latter also acquired an identity and could declare 
their opinions independent of the largest three506. 
 
In sum, socio-economic change in terms of education, mobility and wealth 
not only increased the demand and numbers in the profession, more 
importantly, it also made the profession more heterogeneous. The importing 
of social cleavages to the profession, not only undermined the professional 
project in terms of supply (and market) control but it also demonstrated that 
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the existing structures and habits of TBB were increasingly unfit for the 
profession. At the same time, socio-economic change also meant that local 
bars were becoming more confident in asserting their independence and 
resisting uniformity. If one outcome of this was seen in the relationship 
between local bars vis-à-vis TBB; it was also seen in the relationship of 
local bars and the big three. When the latter attempted to dictate policies to 
local bars (independent of TBB) as they used to, this was increasingly 
resented by local bars.  
 
V.3: Conflict of interest in terms of the functions of TBB 
I argued in the theoretical framework that in a corporatist interest group 
structure, professional organizations such as TBB are designed as protective 
interest groups. In a corporatist system, having the ear of the government, 
they function as insiders that deliver protection to their members. Therefore, 
they do not need to exert pressure on the government through the public or 
the media. It was also indicated that a promotional interest group did not 
function like that.  
 
During the interviews, it became clear that TBB was swinging between a 
protective interest group and promotional interest group. One of the reasons 
for this situation seems to be the role confusion as to what TBB is and what 
it stands for. This was clear from respondents’ description of TBB which 
varied according to their understanding of it: an NGO, a public body, an 
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interest group, performed political functions, etc. Respondents used various 
adjectives and definitions for TBB and sometimes criticized it for acting the 
way it did or failing to act in the way it was supposed to because in their 
understanding this was how an NGO or a public body should have acted. 
Equally, they sometimes justified the actions of TBB on the grounds of 
being a public body or an interest group.  
 
According to some respondents, TBB was a coordinator507. This 
coordination was needed in order to ensure that bars formed common 
positions on common issues. In other words, it was necessary for solidarist 
purposes508. One respondent justified TBB’s existence on the basis of 
importance of institutions in a democracy509. Meanwhile some respondents 
said that TBB was a peak organization510 representing bars511. Some 
respondents denied that on various reasons: One said that the goal in 
establishing TBB was not the creation of an upper body but standardization 
and better voicing of problems512. Another said that TBB did not have such 
representative authority; there was no similar organization in the world and 
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such a structure would violate bars’ independence and although in the old 
act it was designed as such, it no longer was the upper body of local bars513. 
 
At the same time, despite having a public character514 and being a 
professional organization515, TBB was non-governmental516. As one 
respondent put it, just like an NGO, TBB was always in opposition517. One 
interviewee said that being an NGO was the only redress TBB had518. 
Where something went wrong, it was TBB’s duty to criticize but not for the 
sake of criticizing but to show how it was supposed to be519. Some said that 
TBB was independent520 -the character of the legal profession-; as well as a 
democratic mass organization; a pressure group521. TBB also constituted 
part of civil society522.  
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The conceptual differences in these descriptions notwithstanding, even 
when it was said that TBB was an NGO, it was pointed out that it was a 
different kind of NGO. To illustrate the point, one interviewee explained 
how he responded to a letter by the Council of Europe directed at all NGOs 
including TBB. The letter invited NGOs to a meeting where each NGO 
would have three minutes to speak. The respondent answered the invitation 
by saying that TBB was not that kind of an NGO and would not say 
anything in three minutes. Thereupon, TBB was given a special 
appointment where the meeting lasted an hour523.   
 
This “difference” was also stressed to distinguish TBB from other 
professional organizations. Although TBB was a professional organization, 
it was not the Chamber of Doctors or Dentists or Drivers or Hairdressers524. 
What distinguished it from those was the word “public” in its title. It was 
carrying out a public duty in adjudication, the activity where the state’s 
authority was the most apparent. Consequently, any attack against an 
attorney was punished like it was made against a public servant, in an 
aggravated fashion525. As a result of this public function, bars were in the 
state protocol, served in the court house and acquired an official status. 
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However, according to one respondent, this structure was clashing with the 
principles of being a free profession526. 
 
On the other hand, some respondents used negations to describe TBB’s 
functions. To begin with, they emphasized that TBB was not the superior or 
director of local bars527. TBB could not be an organization that formed 
policies that suited the government to obtain benefits because that would 
undermine its independence528. It was to defend rule of law and judicial 
independence at any price. Another respondent said that TBB should not be 
seen as a professional organization only, it was an institution of the 
judiciary, an institution of the defense529. It was a legal institution530. A 
respondent sharing this view stated that the judiciary consisted of a trivet of 
prosecution-defense and judgment, participation in which by the people was 
through attorneys because the judiciary was adjudicating on behalf of the 
people531. She further said that among the three branches, it was the job of 
the judiciary to criticize; to be the bad boy in the system as an insider; to be 
the trouble maker; to act like a safety valve in the system532. Consistent with 
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this role, TBB should be objecting to violations of rights by the executive by 
initiating court action; promoting fair trial and justice and contributing to 
the legislative process533.  
 
Some respondents believed that TBB was the representative of the 
people534. This was so because the law symbolized the people. In this 
respondent’s opinion, when attorneys articulated the needs of bars, and TBB 
acted on it, in a way it also acted on behalf of the people. Thus, TBB was an 
institution that was responsive to society’s demands535. Further, TBB sided 
with the law, liberties and democracy. In that sense, it was not objective. 
The law, as defended by TBB, should apply everybody equally. However, 
TBB failed on both counts. It was siding with one ideology536 and was 
pretending that it was the ideology of all attorneys. In addition, it was also 
acting discriminatory537. Another respondent said that TBB was not a 
loyalist538 institution but viewed the law from a legal perspective and 
showed the right way539.  
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One respondent said that TBB’s views in areas where it has expertise should 
be binding540. Just like TUSIAD’s opinions on the economy was considered 
important, TBB’s opinions on the law should be even more so. TBB could 
comment in every subject relevant for the future of the country because it 
formed part of the country’s administrative structure which allowed it to use 
administrative power.  
 
On the other hand, one respondent underlined that as an institution, bars and 
in particular TBB were institutions inclined to political reflexes. The 
question was, however, whether there should be any limit to this and if yes, 
what that limit should be541. Real persons could advocate their world views, 
gather support but it was inappropriate for the bar as a non-real person to 
defend a particular world view as if all attorneys shared it, because TBB 
was an organization that was not based on common ideology but on 
common profession542. It was a common platform for attorneys543. In that 
sense, there was no common ideology to be represented by TBB because 
bar members were a heterogeneous group. Only when there were issues that 
most of the attorneys could agree on (except marginal ones) those could and 
should be defended by TBB544.  
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According to this respondent, in today’s world, there should be no room for 
institutions such as the Union of Trade Chambers, Artisans Chambers or 
similar that have been established by law. Further, if these institutions were 
to remain as public bodies then they were not or could not be NGOs. While 
recognizing that there was a need for an institution to keep a registry of 
attorneys, attorneys’ contribution to political life should take place through 
civil organizations because real pressure groups exist on the basis of 
voluntary financial contributions and on common ideas. When a bar 
president is expected to take political sides, each member would expect it 
according to his/her world view. This also meant political immobility on the 
part of the organization: which ever view is adopted, there would be those 
left disappointed. Meanwhile, the attachment of professional organizations 
to the state not only reduced their democratic reflexes but also the chances 
of civilian initiatives to develop because it was presumed that the existing 
structures already represented those interests545. 
 
 
 
This MP further believed that there was a general NGO problem in Turkey 
and justified his views by the example of labor unions in the country. 
According to him, KESK, KAMUSEN and Memur Sen were all established 
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with political reflexes, the latter being connected with AKP. Thus, instead 
of defending the rights of civil servants, it was justifying the mistakes of the 
current government from the viewpoint of civil servants. In his opinion, this 
was a typical example of yellow unionism, a phenomenon generally found 
in professional organizations because a person that is deemed a public 
servant is at the same time expected to challenge public authority. Not 
surprisingly, they did not and these challenges were then made by marginal 
groups. In that sense, what was expected from bars was to fill the lack of 
social reaction in society which contributed to the development of political 
reflexes by these organizations546. This point was confirmed by one 
respondent who said that the intention with the establishment of TBB and 
similar institutions was to balance the three classic powers and prevent that 
the legal, economic, social and cultural development of society was 
monopolized by political parties547.  
 
Lastly, the MP questioned if membership was voluntary, how many people 
would continue to be a member of their professional organization. In his 
opinion, mandatory membership did not make an institution strong. One 
respondent commented on the same point and somehow confirmed the 
suspicion of the MP: the removal of the requirement for public sector 
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attorneys to be members of bar organizations after the military coup led 
many to delete their membership, weakening the bar548.  
 
In sum, TBB seems to not only have protective interest group functions but 
also promotional interest group functions as apparent by respondents’ 
comments. Further, it seems to view itself as part of the state or 
administrative structure with a public role while having functions 
attributable to civil society groups. It is therefore only apt to call this as a 
role confusion which seems to be fuelling TBB’s conflict with the 
government. This is because in a corporatist system, interest groups are 
designed as protective groups. However, when a protective group also has 
promotional functions, it inevitably leads it to criticize and challenge the 
government by resorting to public opinion. 
 
V.4: Attorneys’ interest in politics 
Unlike the previous themes that emerged from the data and were found to 
be contributing to conflict between the parties, this issue was explored with 
respondents directly because of my own interest in the subject. At the time I 
was designing the study, it was clear that the profession was interested in 
politics as evinced by the number of lawyer politicians. So seemed their 
professional organization, at least judging by the number of bar presidents 
who became MPs. Given this, I wanted to understand how this political 
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involvement came about also to see whether there were any country specific 
reasons for it. I also asked respondents what they thought about bar 
presidents who have later become MPs. While the question was asked 
initially to satisfy my curiosity, when I analyzed the data, it became clear 
that the profession’s interest in politics was contributing to the conflict 
between the parties. 
 
In fact, data analysis made me realize that the theme developed well beyond 
this question.  Even during the interview process it became clear that people 
have not accidentally become interested in politics after becoming president 
of the bar. Rather, 27 of the 30 interviewees were affiliated with a party but 
only 7 were in my original list. In other words, 20 of the 30 interviewees 
were members of a political party before becoming president of the bar, 
clearly showing interest in politics at the local level. Aside from that, I also 
discovered that bar presidents that have not become MPs were nevertheless 
involved in politics, as member or administrator of political parties at the 
local level. I therefore decided to add another question about politics to my 
questionnaire asking whether my interviewee had become a member of any 
political party in her/his life time.  
 
Of course, many respondents did not simply address these questions but 
talked about many issues relating to politics. One of this was the closeness 
246 
 
of the profession to politics549. As one respondent put it, just like soldiers 
registered at the military academy and dreamt of becoming general of staff, 
lawyers thought of becoming an MP when they registered at the law 
school550. The phenomenon was explained primarily by the fact that the 
profession was a free profession551 although some disagreed that this was a 
plus552. Being a free profession meant that one was not dependent on the 
state for income and obtained economic liberty easily553. One got room to 
maneuver554. Second, there was no legal prohibition for attorneys to engage 
in politics as it exists for civil servants555.  
 
Third, the Parliament was engaged in making laws. Therefore, there was a 
professional predisposition556 or an educational disposition557.  In politics, 
an attorney represented many people instead of just one (the client)558. 
Politics was focused on public relations and solving problems, needs met by 
                                                       
549 Interviews 1, 2, 7, 16, 28.  
 
550 Interview 12. 
 
551 Interviews 4, 5, 12, 15, 16, 25. 
 
552 Interview 11. 
 
553 Interview 14. 
 
554 Interview 11. 
 
555 Interviews 2, 5, 7, 14, 15, 16.  
 
556 Interviews 4, 11, 24, 30. 
 
557 Interviews 4, 20. 
 
558 Interviews 9, 27. 
 
247 
 
the functions of the profession559 because an attorney’s job was human 
relations engineering560 or engaging in social architecture561. Further, it was 
a profession that could say and write things. In Turkish politics, it mattered 
how one said things rather than what was said562. 
 
More importantly, attorneys were in touch with citizens 563 especially with 
those perceived as dangerous or excluded564. That meant they lived their 
problems565 because all social and economic events ended up in attorneys’ 
hands which were addressed and attempted to be solved through politics566.  
This was not the case for a teacher, a doctor or an engineer567. As a result, 
attorneys held the pulse of society568 and stood between state and society569.  
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Some respondents also stressed that attorneys carried a leadership role in 
society570. No one would ask a teacher in the street about an incident but 
they would ask it to an attorney and expect explanation571. For people who 
were not well educated, attorneys were considered as people who knew 
things. Attorneys could understand what they have read and explain it to 
others572. Therefore, they were listened to573. Just as bars were seen as an 
institution of law, attorneys counted among legal intellectuals574.  
 
On the other hand, attorneys had this idealism and mission to save the 
country575. It was not all about a good house and car and a better life 
standard. Being part of an important mechanism, attorneys had historical, 
ethical and social responsibility towards the society576. And the society also 
expected it from a successful attorney to either work for a political party or 
an association577. In elections, attorneys carried functions such as filing 
objections to the electoral process. Therefore, the professional position of 
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attorneys in small towns led to politics especially if one was politically 
interested578. 
 
In fact, two respondents explained that their enjoyment of respect from 
elders at a very young age was owed to their being an attorney579. One 
respondent described how he defended cases of fellow political party 
members for free (when they were prosecuted under the notorious art. 169 
of the former Turkish Penal Code)580. The assistance he rendered has been 
important for his climb up in the political ladder. At the same time, his mere 
presence in one of the first political Islamist parties in Turkey was 
extremely important as other elder attorneys were linked with AP and 
CHP581.  
 
While respondents justified the political involvement of attorneys on these 
grounds, some respondents also thought that bar work lead to politics582. 
According to one respondent, at one point, anyone who wanted to become 
someone in CHP had to become either a president of bar or delegate or 
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otherwise catch the attention of a former general secretary of CHP583. This 
lasted until TBB election in 2009 at which time his supporters were purged 
by the deceased President of TBB when he blocked the latter’s candidacy to 
become an MP in CHP584.  
 
Another reason for bar presidents to get involved in politics was that 
becoming president of bar allowed one to be known585 especially in small 
towns given the fact that it increased one’s contacts with the people586. The 
president was among the 5-7 persons in protocol A587, and as a non-civil 
servant, he or she could make statements before the public588 that would 
also empower him/her politically589. This, coupled with their closeness to 
social and political events kept attorneys close to political parties590. 
Therefore, attorneys were followed by political parties (or caught their 
attention). Where there was similarity of thought, then the political party 
and the president got to know each other591.  
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Attorneys were target candidates for political parties because there were 
couple of hundreds of attorneys in the town but only one president of bar or 
tens of thousands of workers but twenty union leaders592. For large cities, 
however, the same could not be said. In Istanbul, the only president of bar 
who was engaged with the bar and got later involved in politics was Orhan 
Apaydın and that was in the 1970s. Even in his case, he has become an MP 
first and then president of the bar593. 
 
It was pointed out that in Turkey it was extremely difficult for political 
parties to create cadres from their own resources. Therefore, it made sense 
to become the president of the 107 member “shuttle bus federation” by 
getting the vote of 75 and get noticed594. On the other hand, one respondent 
disagreed, stating that if he was not the president of the bar, his future in 
politics would be brighter because trying to do his job properly, he was 
criticizing people of all political colors595.  
 
As a more recent phenomenon, there were also those who were carrying two 
functions simultaneously596. They were the president of the bar as well as 
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the president of the political party in their town. When one respondent 
learned (from me) that this was the case, he said he found it extremely 
wrong because both jobs would get mixed up with each other. The 
presidency of the bar would always be used in politics597. If the person had 
intentions to engage in politics, he or she should leave the bar one year 
before the election598.  
 
One respondent said that she knew someone in this situation and observed 
that he had to put reservations to statements at TBB from time to time when 
those statements would be contradictory to the party line599. Other 
respondents also emphasized the independence they enjoyed for not being 
connected to the hierarchy of any political party600. 
 
 
 
 
One respondent said that he has been very much criticized for running both 
functions at the same time but he felt his political connection assisted that of 
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the bar presidency601 by allowing problems of the congested court house to 
be resolved by getting extra rooms in the government building; by hosting 
legal dignitaries in the province; and by getting timely payments for legal 
aid attorneys602. In other words, it served to solve problems with the 
government and legislature faster. Another respondent said that both 
functions sometimes ran parallel but without intertwining with each other or 
the professional organization becoming a backyard or pillar for politics. 
When prompted why he was saying this, he said that political parties viewed 
it that way or wanted to see it that way603. 
 
 
 
 
This point was confirmed by another respondent who said that political 
parties try and are nevertheless inclined to dominate professional 
organizations as subsidiaries because this allowed them to have (union) 
power in addition to the power of the political party604. In fact, all political 
parties that he served in the past, tried to establish a subsidiary or an 
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association in every profession whether it was lawyers, contractors or 
accountants or tried to pull those established, to their side605. 
 
Two further respondents said that at some point they also performed both 
tasks simultaneously but later quit, giving different reasons for doing so. 
One said he quit the party job because he thought it was inappropriate in 
public ceremonies to put a wreath first on behalf of the bar and 5-6 rows 
later, on behalf of the party. He felt that it led the bar to be defined with his 
political view. This wore down the profession and the bar606. The other 
respondent, on the other hand, said that when he became the president of the 
party in the province, he quit the job at the bar for political reasons, not for 
professional reasons607. In his opinion, this was a matter of political 
elegance, as in their school, being president of the party in a province was 
considered an important job. If he was a president in a charity, he could 
have carried on holding both titles but the bar job meant being under the 
discipline of another organization than the party608.  
 
As briefly mentioned above, respondents pointed out that political affiliation 
also led to the bar. Drawing from their own experience, they explained that 
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they were engaged in local politics to the extent that they have become 
member, administrator or president of the party in their province and then 
became president (administrator) in the bar609. Two respondents even said 
that they were grateful to their colleagues for electing them as president of 
bar, more than once, despite the fact that they had such an intense political 
identity. Both respondents believed they enjoyed the trust of their 
colleagues who voted for them in the confidence that the party function 
would not be mixed with the bar function610.  
 
One respondent said, however, that she turned down the offer to join the bar 
during the time she was engaged in politics, as she considered that wrong. 
When prompted whether both functions could not be separated, she said she 
has seen people who could not611. One respondent said that these lines had 
to be drawn by the person in question rather than by regulation externally612. 
Another respondent said that it was difficult not to mix both functions but it 
could still be reduced to a minimum613. 
 
                                                       
609 Interviews 1, 13, 23, 21. 
 
610 Interviews 1, 21. 
 
611 Interview 6. 
 
612 Interview 9. 
 
613 Interview 15. 
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Given respondents’ belief in the propensity of attorneys to engage in politics 
and the fact that being the president of a professional organization allows 
one to be known in society, many respondents considered it positive614 or 
natural615 that persons with bar experience later got into politics. They gave 
various reasons for this view. One reason was the fact that someone who has 
held a position in the bar knew the problems of the profession. When in 
Parliament, (s)he could put this knowledge to use by solving them616. 
However, expecting solely professional benefit would render the exercise 
fruitless. If the attorney was a good observer, and analyzed social events 
well, this could be an additional advantage617.  
 
 
 
 
 
Another reason was that experience gained through these posts would bring 
quality to politics618. The experience came from developing contacts with 
                                                       
614 Interviews 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 19, 23, 29, 30. 
 
615 Interviews 22, 24, 25, 28. 
 
616 Interviews 2, 15.  
 
617 Interview 2. 
 
618 Interviews 4, 5, 7, 30. 
 
“I have been an administrator in the local party organization of 
(…) between 2004-6. Local organizations do not consist of 
good names. As you know, civil servants are prohibited from 
engaging in politics. Unions and political parties may not 
establish contact. Many professions are by default out. We 
attorneys can get into it a little. In local politics, the 
unemployed are interested in political organizations in order to 
get a job in a municipality or a government institution. 
Contractors or the small businessmen in the local area are 
interested in order to sell their goods. When the party 
organization is left to these people, politics does not come out 
of that.(…)”. 
Interview 7. 
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colleagues, the judiciary and the press, as well as from managing a cadre619. 
In bar presidents meetings, one further developed contacts and heard the 
views of all bar leaders in Turkey who held the pulse in their respective 
towns in Anatolia620. Politics was not only about talking in rallies but 
included working in parliamentary committees; expert committees and the 
general assembly621. Therefore, this experience could be reflected in those 
places.  
 
Also, getting elected as president of bar was not an easy job because 
attorneys thought of themselves as equals which was not the case say in 
trade chambers. One could be an industrialist but graduate of elementary 
school whereas in bars everyone was a graduate of law school622. In 
addition, while in large cities political criteria was important to get elected, 
in small towns, criteria such as professional respectability and influence was 
more important. In other words, the election as president of bar served 
already running through a filter, showing that the candidate was qualified623.  
 
                                                       
619 Interviews 8, 23. 
 
620 Interview 8.  
 
621 Interview 23. 
 
622 Interview 8. 
 
623 Interview 8, 23. 
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While saying that they found it positive that people got involved in politics 
after their bar post, respondents also drew a line to political engagement by 
pointing out “as long as these posts were not used as jumping stones for 
politics”624 or as long as two functions were not mixed up625. If not, the bar 
would be serving the political ambitions of the person626. This was 
disrespectful for the choice of colleagues (who by law had to become a 
member of the organization627) because the political view of the president 
was not shared by all members. The president was elected to work for the 
professional problems and the bar628. The independence of the bar would be 
compromised if someone followed the party line as it would lead to bad 
governance at the bar629. It would also lead to loss of credibility and trust630.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       
624 Interviews 4, 5, 12, 19, 26.  
 
625 Interviews 10, 15.  
 
626 Interviews 7, 9, 10. 
 
627 Interview 16. 
 
628 Interview 7. 
 
629 Interview 12. 
 
630 Interview 7. 
 
“(…) A statement I make as president of bar to 
become an MP or something else would not be liked 
by them. What happens then? These friends would 
wear their robes and make a statement in front of the 
stairs of the court house and say ‘we disagree with 
such and such statement of the president’. The public 
then perceives that there are different opinions at the 
bar. Attorneys are divided, attorneys cannot get 
together. We shouldn’t do that. (…)” 
Interview 7. 
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Interestingly, one respondent said in order to emphasize that this was a 
professional not a political project, he paid attention to having people in his 
board of directors that came from different political colors. This was how he 
stressed that his priority was the profession631. There were also respondents 
who worked in the boards of their local bar with people from different party 
affiliations and this never constituted a problem632. Another respondent said 
although she got elected on a political color, after the election, she acted 
with the responsibility of representing the whole bar association. Because 
membership in a bar was required by law and members had different 
political opinions than her633.  
 
In that regard, what should be done was the politics of the profession634 or 
politics of law635. Lawyers’ politics was the supremacy of law, to work for 
the development of the rule of law and democracy. If these were the issues 
in one’s political agenda, no one could say anything to that636. Attorneys 
had to put forward their “lawyer identity”637. One respondent who was 
elected president of the bar after serving in the Parliament said he was proud 
                                                       
631 Interview 15.  
 
632 Interviews 21, 19, 20. 
 
633 Interview 9. 
 
634 Interview 21. 
 
635 Interview 5. 
 
636 Interview 7. 
 
637 Interviews 12, 13, 30. 
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that his colleagues judged him on the basis of his identity as an attorney 
rather than his political identity638. The new president of TBB also put 
forward his identity as an attorney639.  
 
Only three respondents expressed negative views about presidents of bar 
who later got into politics640. Their concern was that the impartiality needed 
for the bar would be compromised by political involvement. One 
emphasized that especially in Istanbul, a president of bar was frequently on 
TV given the fact that the print and visual media were based there641. This 
meant increased public visibility. It was therefore not right to turn this into 
political benefit as it would make the bar unreliable. In that case, actions 
and positions taken by the bar would be questioned retroactively to see 
whether there was any political interest to adopt that position642, no matter 
how impartial the president had acted at the time643. One respondent in fact 
argued that when someone’s goal was becoming an MP, he or she would no 
longer act with his/her free will but would use the position in the bar for 
political ends644. 
                                                       
638 Interview 21. 
 
639 Interview 15. 
 
640 Interviews 3, 16, 26. 
 
641 Interview 3. 
 
642 Interview 3. 
 
643 Interview 16. 
 
644 Interview 26. 
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In sum, attorneys in Turkey seem politically engaged just like their peers in 
other countries by virtue of the fact that they are a member of a free 
profession and have the skills needed in politics. At the same time, there are 
also country specific reasons for their engagement. For instance, the fact 
that bars have an official status and are part of the city protocol seems to 
raise their profile in terms of visibility in their town and getting them 
noticed by political parties. Further, the failure of political parties to create 
their own cadres seems to further contribute to their involvement. While 
viewing political engagement overwhelmingly positive, respondents still 
recognized that politics was an activity that could be easily used for 
personal gain and hurt the profession. 
 
V. 5. Summary of findings as to the reasons of conflict between TBB 
and state institutions 
This study set out to find out whether the interest group model in Turkey 
could be described corporatist by reviewing the relationship of TBB with 
state institutions.  It was observed that the monist state tradition that did not 
wish to share power meant that the corporatist structure did not lead to a 
corporatist policy making.  
 
In addition, the study also tried to understand the reasons for conflict 
between TBB and state institutions. It appears that there are several reasons 
for this. First, socio-economic change is increasing the numbers in the 
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profession and eroding its homogeneity as well as causing internal conflict. 
While financial strength of TBB allows it to position itself as a leader over 
all bars, it also causes clashes with the big three bars who until recently 
been able to not only dominate local bars but also TBB. When the growing 
assertiveness of local bars vis-à-vis both is added to this, it seems to become 
difficult for one organization to represent a heterogeneous profession. 
 
Second, there appears an incredible role confusion concerning what TBB 
was and what it stood for. Respondents mentioned many activities of TBB 
that could be described routine activities of a typical protective interest 
group. At the same time, respondents also demonstrated that they expected 
TBB to take a stand in various issues just like a promotional interest group. 
Not surprisingly, when the latter function was emphasized, this led to 
conflict with governments. 
 
Third, many respondents believed that as a profession attorneys were 
interested in politics. In addition to their professional disposition, 
respondents emphasized country specific reasons such as the visibility 
gained through being the president of bar especially in small towns or the 
prohibitions to engage in politics that disqualified many professions from 
politics. All of this contributed to their interest in politics and because 
politics is all about conflict, it also meant that high political engagement in 
the profession meant also friction with state institutions. 
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Chapter V: Discussion 
 
 
It was shown in Chapter One that by taking interest organizations into the 
corporatist structure, corporatist theory assumes that professional 
organizations become social partners and insiders in the system.This study 
therefore explored the nature of the relationship between one professional 
organization in the corporatist structure -TBB- and state institutions in order 
to see whether the relationship indeed amounted to policy concertation. Its 
second goal was to understand the reasons for conflict in this relationship 
since contrary to the assumptions of the theory, the relationship between 
state institutions and TBB was not consensual.  
 
To find the answers, I conducted thirty interviews with past and current 
presidents or administrators of bars from various parts of the country. Some 
of these interviewees were current or former MPs. The findings from these 
interviews were provided in Chapter Four. In this final Chapter, I will 
discuss these findings as they pertain to my research questions. While doing 
that, I will also bring in data from non-participant observations as well as 
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from a second set of interviews conducted with Ministry of Justice officials. 
Both data will be used to confirm or confront findings from the interviews 
with the presidents of bar.  
 
V. 1. Is there policy concertation between TBB and state institutions? 
Interest group literature provides that a corporatist interest group structure 
leads to corporatist policy making or what is called as policy concertation 
(Lijphart 1999; Cawson 1988; Schmitter 1982). In other words, the two tend 
to occur together. While policy concertation usually takes place between the 
government and representative organizations I, nevertheless, analyzed the 
data in terms of TBB’s relationship with all state institutions in order to get 
a grasp of the full picture. Findings of the thesis shows, there is no policy 
concertation involving any governmental branch despite the existence of a 
corporatist interest representation structure. Indeed, in all branches of the 
government monism reigns which precludes cooperation with non-state 
actors. In other words, in Turkey corporatist theory’s prediction that a 
corporatist structure leads to corporatist policy making is unconfirmed. 
 
I will start this discussion with the relationship of TBB and the judiciary. 
Data showed that the criminal justice system’s established roles that 
prioritizes prosecutors vis-à-vis attorneys and merge prosecutors with 
judges, determined the institutional relationship between the judiciary and 
TBB more than anything else. The exclusion of attorneys from the system 
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was a consistent theme throughout. This exclusion was manifested in 
derogatory terms used by attorneys to self-describe themselves in the 
judicial system such as “bride”; “step child”; “refugee” and even as a 
“figurant”. Not surprisingly, in cases where criminal legal aid was needed 
for the accused, the court asked the bar for the appointment of an attorney 
just like it ordered “a cup of tea from the office boy”645.  
 
Given the negative connotations of these statements and the adjectives used 
to self-describe the profession, there is not much left to say to the 
researcher.  At the same time, disrespect towards bar presidents seemed an 
established professional conduct as shown by anecdotes from various parts 
of the country such as one prosecutor not getting up when shaking hands 
with the president of bar. Some instances in fact bordered on harassment by 
head prosecutors such as initiation of arbitrary search practices at entry into 
court house or dictating correspondence procedures to bars. 
 
The mentality that did “neither share life nor the profession” with attorneys 
was very worrying in the criminal context in terms of defense rights since it 
meant that the defense was given less time and opportunity in the 
proceedings. Indeed, respondents described chilling practices such as final 
judgments being drafted before final defense was made or judges 
                                                       
645 Notes taken during the meeting between TBB and legal aid representatives of local bars 
that took place on 25 December 2010.  
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deliberating with prosecutors to reach a judgment. This point was also 
confirmed by bureaucrats when one of them said that the “prosecution is too 
strong in Turkey to the point of sometimes being scary”646 and another who 
said that the defense was weak647. Further, the former confessed that when 
he was a judge, “he also decided cases with prosecutors just like everyone 
else”. This is admitting that the functions of accusation (prosecution) and 
judging (court/judge) are merged to the detriment of defense. Over time, 
however, especially with international relations and the (EU process), the 
Ministry officials came to the view that the functions of prosecution and 
adjudication had to be separated648.  
 
Given this state of affairs, interviewees explained that there was no 
established or routine contact between the parties. Where there was contact, 
it appeared on an ad-hoc basis or as a “crisis containment” tool to mediate 
the controversy between the higher judiciary and the government. 
Depending on the issue, it also involved uniting with the higher judiciary 
against government plans concerning justice policy. In sum, none of this 
amounted to policy concertation between the parties.  
 
                                                       
646 Interview P5. 
 
647 Interview P6. 
 
648 Interview P5. 
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The higher judiciary appears to not only have a tradition of refraining from 
contact with the bar or attorneys but also rejecting any engagement with the 
bar. Further, the attitude seems to pervade the whole profession through 
professional socialization. Typical examples of this behavior was 
manifested with the visit of the President of one Higher Court who told the 
audience that “their tradition did not include visiting the bar”; or the once 
Head of Court of Cassation trying to censor the speech of the then president 
of TBB at the judicial year opening or Head Prosecutors dictating terms to 
bars in the use of court house while judges and prosecutors jointly resist 
attorneys’ participation in the HSYK. 
 
The weak position of attorneys seems to be addressed only recently with the 
changes in the structure of the HSYK. In that regard, some respondents and 
bureaucrats have stressed that a new beginning was made in the relations 
between the parties with the re-design of the HSYK after the 2010 
referendum. According to one bureaucrat, the presence of an attorney within 
the ranks of the HSYK opened the door for the invitation of presidents of 
bar to HSYK convened meetings of judges and prosecutors. In fact, hosted 
by the HSYK and called “status analysis at the judiciary”649, these meetings 
took place in sixteen different regions in which problems of the judiciary 
and their solutions were determined in a bottom up, participatory fashion 
with the attendance of judges, prosecutors and attorneys.  
                                                       
649 Interview P5.  
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Some attendees of these meetings were present in the bar presidents meeting 
and made positive comments saying they were hopeful about and supported 
this process650. In fact, one president of bar mentioned that for the first time 
he felt that that the HSYK was also “his HSYK” because its previously 
closed structure was now torn down. One bureaucrat also confirmed that the 
reaction they got from presidents of bar to the new design was positive651. 
Nevertheless, stamping out an entrenched tradition of exclusion may take a 
very long time. The fact that touches from “above” are needed such as the 
amendment of the constitution concerning the participation of a president of 
bar in the HSYK or the Minister of Justice himself getting involved in the 
establishment of a committee to work on the regulation of court clerks only 
confirms this point. In sum, when it comes to the judiciary-TBB relations, 
not only there is no policy concertation, there is barely any relation.  
 
Continuing with TBB’s relationship with the Ministry of Justice, it was 
clear from the interviews that although the most intense relationship among 
state institutions was with the Ministry of Justice, there was no established 
and routine mechanisms between the parties to discuss policy or any other 
matter. This was a point confirmed by bureaucrats652. Indeed, one low level 
bureaucrat said in his two and a half years at the Ministry, he did not come 
                                                       
650 Notes taken at the bar presidents meeting that took place on 21 January 2011 in Ankara. 
 
651 Interview P5. 
 
652 Interviews P1, P4, P5, P6. 
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into any contact with TBB because the procedure of criminal investigation 
of attorneys (where he worked) was “straightforward”653.  
 
On the other hand, one higher level bureaucrat explained that given his 
acquaintance with the president of a local bar, he made presentations to the 
members of that bar regarding the number of criminal investigations 
initiated against attorneys. These presentations in fact showed that the 
Ministry of Justice as an institution was not after all giving permission in 
every investigation for an attorney to be criminally charged. The listeners at 
the presentation were pleasantly surprised about the data and thanked 
him654. Equally, when pressured to make a public statement about the prison 
conditions, one president of bar contacted the bureaucrat who arranged for 
him to tour the newly built prisons. The president of bar later thanked the 
bureaucrat because he was saved from signing a materially wrong public 
statement655. This goes on to show that where relations are personal, parties 
make an effort to share information and act cordially but institutionally, this 
is not the case.  
 
Meanwhile, in issues surrounding legal aid, the Ministry seems to 
sometimes ask TBB’s opinion. Their request is then relayed by TBB to local 
                                                       
653 Interview P4. 
 
654 Interview P8. 
 
655 Interview P8. 
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bars. After filtering their responses, TBB responds back to the Ministry. In 
that sense, TBB functions like a conduit of communication and serves the 
purpose of a peak organization by facilitating coordination. Equally, the 
Ministry routinely responds to similar written requests made by TBB. For 
instance, if TBB writes a letter concerning the entry problem of an attorney 
into any prison to see his/her client, the relevant investigation is made and 
the matter is responded to656.  
 
Another possibility of cooperation comes about when new laws are 
prepared. TBB is invited to the committee working on the draft law as a 
contributor. In addition, thanks to its recently increased international 
relations, the Ministry seems to be in contact with TBB to develop projects 
with UNDP and other international partners. Other matters, such as 
licensing and disciplinary issues or criminal investigations also seem to flow 
“according to the law”. Where respondents refer to the process being 
straightforward or things going  according to the law, they seem to mean 
that legal-rational relations which require no human contact. One can 
therefore infer that there is no routine cooperation between the parties to 
formulate policies in a corporatist sense. Rather, it is a contact on an ad hoc 
basis as the situation requires. As a result, meetings or contact between the 
parties remains sporadic.  
 
                                                       
656 Interview P8. 
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At the same time, data show that the relationship between the parties has not 
been good to the extent that they sometimes communicated over the media 
due to the political positions taken by TBB and the challenging role it 
played vis-à-vis the Ministry of Justice officials657. In addition, the tone of 
the judicial year speeches made by the President of TBB also made relations 
between the parties tense658.  
 
Given this nature of the relationship and ad hoc basis of meetings, the fact 
that one bureaucrat described the Ministry of Justice “heard” some problems 
of the profession, for the first time in the Kozaklı meeting hosted by the 
Kayseri Bar659 is not that surprising. In fact, one bureaucrat told me that he 
heard about the practice of USB being given by the judge to the clerk before 
final defense is made for the first time in the HSYK’s status meetings660, 
demonstrating that the Ministry is indeed unaware of the problems of 
attorneys and defense.  
 
At the same time, data showed that following the Kozaklı meeting, a 
committee was established with the order of the Minister to solve the 
problems of the profession. This committee worked on amending the 
                                                       
657 Interview P8. 
 
658 Interview P6.  
 
659 Interview P6. 
 
660 Interview P6.  
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regulation on court clerks, among other things. Many attendees of the 
presidents of bar meeting seemed thankful for the amendment although 
some remained critical661. In the other meeting attended by the criminal 
legal aid representatives, one TBB official replied to the criticism of the 
wording of the amendment that the original draft was formulated 
differently. However, it was amended in the last minute with the insistence 
of the Ministry of Justice bureaucracy662.  
 
While this shows the unilateral decision making at the Ministry of Justice it 
also demonstrates the attitude of judges-prosecutors towards attorneys. 
Indeed, one bureaucrat agreed that the staff of the Ministry being former 
judges and prosecutors constituted a problem especially when attorneys 
expected solutions to their professional problems because it was those 
bureaucrats who viewed these requests with the usual suspicions of the 
bench663. The fact that as bureaucrats they performed a different function 
did not change their outlook. Indeed, I was able to observe in the committee 
meeting taking place between TBB and Ministry of Justice officials, the 
Ministry staff making references to past posts in the bench as former judges 
and prosecutors. Although they were now bureaucrats, these experiences 
formed the basis of their understanding of legal issues and practices.  
                                                       
661 Notes taken at the bar presidents meeting that took place on 21 January 2011 in Ankara. 
 
662 Notes taken during the meeting between TBB and legal aid representatives of local bars 
that took place on 25 December 2010. 
 
663 Interview P6.  
 
273 
 
For instance, one bureaucrat said he heard of a (questionable) practice for 
the first time at the Ministry because when he was a judge, he never 
practiced law like that664. Similarly, another bureaucrat said that as a judge 
he heard many expropriation cases in which the state tried to pay less for the 
value of the property but it usually ended up paying more. Similarly, one 
bureaucrat relayed a conversation of his when he was apparently trying to 
justify the Ministry’s method of legal aid payments to a TBB official. He 
said that when he was a judge, he was also getting paid with the signature of 
the Head Prosecutor, given the fact the Head Prosecutor is disburser of 
public funds in districts665.  
 
It can therefore be argued that the bureaucrats at the Ministry of Justice may 
well be constrained by their previous experience in the bench vis-à-vis 
attorneys and their professional problems. On the other hand, bureaucrats 
indicated that when they worked in small districts, their relations with 
attorneys were friendly but due to volume of work in large cities this was 
not the case666. In other words, there seem to be more humane relations in 
smaller communities but it is unclear whether this translates into more 
sympathy for attorneys’ demands. 
 
                                                       
664 Notes taken during the meeting between TBB and the Ministry of Justice officials that 
took place on 27 December 2010. 
 
665 Interview P8. 
 
666 Interviews P5, P8. 
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In terms of the logistics of the meetings between the parties, where there is 
higher level courtesy visits by the Minister or his Deputy after elections at 
TBB, this is made by going to TBB, to congratulate the President. Other 
meetings usually took place at the Ministry667. In terms of middle or higher 
ranking officials, where there is a personal relationship between the parties, 
as some bureaucrats claimed there was, the parties agree on the phone 
where to meet. If one of them feels that the latest meetings have been taking 
place at the place of the other, then the latest visitor hosts the meeting668.  
 
One junior bureaucrat669 said that when they made a visit to TBB, they 
always went with one of the Head of Divisions670 who is in hierarchy much 
above than junior bureaucrats because people wanted to talk to their 
counterpart. Indeed, the Ministry of Justice-TBB meeting I attended which 
was taking place at TBB facilities, started with the addressing of this issue. 
TBB officials protested the “decreasing seniority of Ministry of Justice 
bureaucrats who attended the committee despite members of the board of 
TBB being always present”671.  
                                                       
667 Interview P6.  
 
668 Interview P8. 
 
669 Interview P9.  
 
670 In Turkish: Daire başkanı. 
 
671 Notes taken during the meeting between TBB and the Ministry of Justice officials that 
took place on 27 December 2010. 
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Respondents’ description of established practices between the parties in 
terms of meetings and meeting rituals shows a formality unlike the 
informality described in policy concertation (Gerlich 1992). This is exactly 
why seniority of officials in attendance is attributed a symbolic importance 
by TBB or why junior level bureaucrats visit TBB with a hierarchical 
superior.  
 
Bureaucrats described the atmosphere in meetings between the parties to be 
cordial672, “without any problems”673 involving “coffee and tea”674 or 
“cookies and pastries”675 while one bureaucrat said that there can be intense 
debate but this was desirable in order to find the right solution because 
“everything TBB asks for, cannot be done”676. Even this statement suggests 
that TBB is in the position of making a request while the Ministry is in the 
position of approval, thereby precluding a partnership between the parties. 
In terms of how meetings progressed, one bureaucrat said that the legal texts 
that the parties worked on were shown on the screen and records were kept 
to reflect the issues discussed677. The latter is a manifestation of lack of 
intimacy between the parties (Gerlich 1992) and shows that another 
                                                       
672 Interviews P4, P6, P10. 
 
673 Interviews P9, P10. 
 
674 Interview P9. 
 
675 Interview P4. 
 
676 Interview P7. 
 
677 Interview P10. 
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characteristic of corporatism is lacking and that parties make an effort to 
keep relations in a legal-bureaucratic formality. 
 
While parties said that the relations were cordial, the committee meeting I 
attended started quiet tense when one TBB official started it with his protest 
against the decreasing seniority of Ministry officials and then complained 
about the slow pace of development in the committee’s work678. 
Bureaucrats responded to this with defensive explanations. After resolving 
this issue, the parties went on to discuss substantive matters but differences 
of opinion have been addressed head on, sometimes with cynical comments 
from bureaucrats such as these: “Am I not allowed to say what I think 
now?”; “If I am looking at things from one side, you are too”; “I am not 
taking a stand, I am just telling you what the three options are”679.  
 
Similarly, TBB officials replied with the same cynism: “Do not worry, your 
dear state will not face more proceedings because of this”; “Your 
perspective is always about how to protect the state and not the individual”; 
“You do not have to have bad dreams”; “What else are we going to see?”; 
“This may be your way of doing things but the practice is not like that”; “I 
                                                       
678 Notes taken during the meeting between TBB and the Ministry of Justice officials that 
took place on 27 December 2010. 
 
679 Notes taken during the meeting between TBB and the Ministry of Justice officials that 
took place on 27 December 2010. 
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hope you become an attorney one day and see what I’m talking about”680. If 
one remembers that these conversations took place in a committee that was 
established to resolve the problems of the profession, the conflictual nature 
of the relationship between the Ministry of Justice and TBB should be clear. 
The tone of this conversation does not suggest a partnership between the 
parties, social or not. 
 
While lack of routine contact is a problem especially if one is to talk about 
policy concertation, one high level bureaucrat said that he felt that bars as 
well as public notaries -as an institution- were worried that if they 
established contact with the Ministry, this could be seen as a compromise on 
their independence681. As such, at some point, his law school friends who 
have become notary public or presidents of bar contacted him directly to 
request his assistance to arrange for a meeting with the Minister or Deputy 
Minister. In his opinion these type of requests had to be made by the 
professional organization and engaging in criticism of the government, 
where necessary, should not prevent professional organizations from 
establishing contact with the Ministry682. However, where local bars were in 
friendly terms with the Ministry, it was used against them in bar elections as 
a propaganda tool by implying that the local bar was under the control and 
                                                       
680 Notes taken during the meeting between TBB and the Ministry of Justice officials that 
took place on 27 December 2010.  
 
681 Interview P6. 
 
682 Interview P6.  
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influence of the Ministry. This was why his friends contacted him directly 
to arrange unofficial meetings. This anecdote suggests that the Ministry is 
viewed not as a partner but as a superior (at least by some in the profession) 
whose intrusion and control is feared. 
 
On the other hand, there was also recognition that relationships were 
personal683 and not enough institutional684. Today, owing to the character of 
the new President of TBB, it was good. But if it was not for him, there 
would have been a fight every day685. Indeed, many respondents as well as 
bureaucrats said that the current President of TBB was a “luck”, indicating 
the personal trait of an individual than an institution. 
 
Given all this, it seems that there are various layers that determine the 
relationship between TBB and the Ministry of Justice. First of all, the 
Ministry has tutelary powers over TBB. These tutelary powers involves 
monitoring of expenditure (in legal aid); sometimes contesting decisions of 
TBB by going to court; sometimes exercising authority over the profession 
by giving permission for an attorney to be criminally investigated. In one 
sense, this tutelary relationship points out to the impossibility of policy 
                                                       
683 Interview P2. 
 
684 Interview P8. 
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concertation between the parties because when one of the “partners” is 
exercising oversight over the other, there can be no cooperation.  
 
The relationship is further complicated by the fact that the staff of the 
Ministry are former judges and prosecutors whose attitudes toward 
attorneys has been already described. At the same time, the historical battle 
of the profession to gain independence from the Ministry seems to put the 
relationship in a further awkward position. While the conditions of a cordial 
and routine relationship does not exist between the parties, TBB’s 
challenging stance does not contribute to the forming of such relationship 
either since being a policy partner requires moderation of demands to obtain 
benefits (Schmitter 1974).  
 
In terms of the relationship between TBB and the legislature, this appears to 
mostly take place in expert committees when TBB is invited. Lately, 
however, there also seem to be attempts by TBB to engage all political 
parties, MPs and the various committees at the Parliament without waiting 
for an official invitation. This was confirmed by a former bureaucrat and 
current MP686. Nevertheless, the contribution of TBB to the legislative 
process was like a formality687 because of its reactive nature. It was also 
                                                       
686 Interview P3. 
 
687 A former bureaucrat and current MP also confirmed that the current government was not 
taking institutions with different political views into consideration. Therefore, this practice 
did not go beyond asking for TBB’s opinion as a matter of formality, Interview P3. 
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argued that bureaucrats or MPs did not consider TBB’s input in a serious 
manner. In that regard, some respondents seemed to expect that the views of 
TBB should be taken before a law was brought into the Parliament or that 
their views should be binding on legal issues, clearly suggesting a 
corporatist expectation.  
 
On the other hand, the president of one committee in the Parliament said 
that what was important was the fact that TBB was given an opportunity to 
be heard in a pluralist way and its views were in the records, rather than the 
fact that the committee accepted their position688. He justified this on the 
grounds that committees were established for expertise and decided 
technical issues rather than political issues which were reserved for the 
General Assembly689. In that regard, it is clear that he envisions a 
consultative role for TBB to be played in the Parliament rather than a 
corporatist one.  
 
In sum, the least amount of contact of TBB among state institutions seems 
to be with the legislature. Further, it is based on a reactive structure. In other 
words, when TBB is invited, it participates in committees as a relevant party 
to be heard but not to form policy with. It seems that lately, TBB envisions 
a different role for itself by more proactively participating in committees as 
                                                                                                                                           
 
688 Interview P2. 
 
689 Interview P2. 
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well as being more politically engaged with all political parties. 
Nevertheless, this new structure also does not seem to amount to policy 
concertation. 
 
In terms of the relationship between TBB and other state institutions, the 
relationship appears to be again based on an ad hoc visits. The government 
is the most likely partner with whom TBB can expect to be engaged with in 
policy concertation. However, the ideological stance it took vis-à-vis the 
government seems to have not helped their relationship. There were 
multiple ways which showed TBB’s confrontational stance vis-à-vis the 
government. They  ranged from walking with robes in protest; to publishing 
bitter media declarations about policies it did not like; from acting like a 
“backyard” as imputed to it by respondents; to publicly stating to have 
difficulty accepting a Prime Minister from an imam training school; or 
having judicial opening year speeches that heavily criticized the government 
“in the presence of the Head of State while directly looking at the eyes of 
the government”690. These acts on their own show that unlike a social 
partner that makes requests and relays criticism behind closed doors, TBB 
tries to embarrass the government via the media.  
 
Given all this, the fact that the bar exam requirement was lifted by the 
government -as a punishment for their stance- and at the blink of an eye 
                                                       
690 Interview P6. 
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seems to have been the decisive moment for the profession to realize that 
this confrontational relationship was costing them too much. Respondents 
described how important they considered the exam for the standing of the 
profession and how prepared they were to conduct it after having signed 
protocols with ÖSYM and how they were not listened to by the government 
in a subject that was of really concern to them. As a result of this, many bars 
seem to have come together to elect an administration at TBB that would 
have a less confrontational relationship with the government. 
 
It is undeniable that currently, there is a change of heart on both sides to 
make the relationship work. Thanks to its new President, TBB appears to be 
making good with the government and state institutions by changing its 
previous politically stand-offish attitude and adopting a less controversial 
tone in order to establish dialogue for the resolution of accumulated 
problems of the profession. In addition, they seem to take a pro-active role 
in developing relations and do not shy away from contact. The government, 
on the other hand, having gotten rid of a relentless critic, seems ready to 
make concessions.  
 
This was apparent in the Minister of Justice ordering the establishment of a 
committee to solve the problems of the profession. In that regard, the 
change of the regulation on court clerks seems important as an issue that 
was emphasized by respondents. Similarly, the inclusion in the financial 
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amnesty law of debts owed by attorneys or the change of payment time of 
VAT or the revoking of the consent requirement from other property owners 
to open a new law office seem to have been achieved with this constructive 
tone and by working with the government as well as the Parliament. One 
bureaucrat said that these developments gave TBB hope691.  
 
Similarly, TBB seems to have played a mediator role in the Parliament 
during the adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure. Fortunately for TBB, 
the new era coincides with increasing recognition at the Ministry of Justice 
that structural change is needed in the institutions of the judiciary, requiring 
allies like TBB to push change. The signs of this include opening up HSYK 
to attorneys by including one person coming from the profession and 
working on the improvement of relations among actors.  
 
While the new era seems to have borne fruit in the short run for the 
profession, whether it can be maintained or whether by consensual relations 
alone problems of the profession can be solved remains to be seen. One 
point of concern is the perception that change in the attitude of TBB is owed 
to the President of TBB. Another is the delegate and the majoritarian 
election system at TBB especially in light of the attitudes of the “big three” 
vis-à-vis TBB.  
 
                                                       
691 Interview P1. 
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As important, the very same government while keeping attorneys happy, 
needs to balance the interests of a much larger number of people who make 
use of the services of attorneys. Indeed, the governments’ conflictual 
relations with other professional organizations are partly caused by its 
policies to make services cheaper and easier to reach for “consumers” as 
opposed to determine policies that benefit professionals (such as doctors, 
pharmacists and veterinaries). Further, currently the relationship between 
the parties does not seem to involve political exchange for the government 
(Molina & Rhodes 2002). In other words, it is unclear what the government 
“gets” from the corporatist structure. As a result, the government does not 
seem to have much reason to shy away from shaking the boat if need be. 
 
More importantly, better relations still does not amount to the establishment 
of a corporatist relationship between the parties, given the existence of 
structural problems such as tutelary powers of the Ministry of Justice over 
TBB. Nevertheless, the primary reason for lack of corporatist policy making 
seems to be monism. Indeed, whether it is the relationship with the 
judiciary, the legislature or the executive as represented by the Ministry of 
Justice or the government, state institutions appear to have a strong 
tendency towards monism in Turkey. In other words, they do not wish to 
share but retain decision making power. This was apparent in the interviews 
made with the representatives of legislature and the executive. In terms of 
the former, the words of the President of one Committee who said “what 
was important was the fact that TBB was given an opportunity to be heard 
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rather than the Committee accepted their position” is telling. Similarly, one 
Ministry of Justice official said “not everything TBB wanted could be 
done”. In the same vein, countless examples from the judiciary where 
prosecutors as well as judges did not bother with the views of TBB points 
out to a hierarchical and independent decision making power on the part of 
state institutions.  
 
In such a monist (even rejectionist) setting, no wonder that respondents 
stress that TBB’s views, recommendations and suggestions were not being 
taken into consideration; that they were not listened to and were being 
disregarded. It is maybe understandable that a politically accountable 
politician would want maximum room to maneuver and not want to bind or 
restrain him/herself with the positions of an unaccountable institution like 
TBB while merely consulting with them is politically safe. However, the 
picture that emerges out of the relationship between the parties is not one of 
corporatist policy making but one where under the cover of a corporatist 
structure, the affected interest remains outside the policy process as a mere 
consultant or combatant (Schmitter 1982).  
 
On the other hand, the corporatist structure is not without benefits for TBB 
and attorneys in terms of material benefits as well as enjoyment of semi-
official status. In fact, TBB has its cake and eats it too, given its willingness 
to also play the outsider.  The state, on the other hand, “appears to be 
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consulting with” with the professional organization of attorneys and 
portrays that an “independent profession” takes care of its own affairs while 
materially, it may be called a “partner” in the business of attorneys by 
collecting fees, withholding tax and VAT.  
 
Given all this, one wonders why then there is a need for a corporatist 
structure in the constitution. Indeed, the case of Turkey is significant 
because a corporatist structure did not lead to policy concertation. Whether 
this holds true for all other professional organizations and if yes, to what 
extent is an empirical question that needs further research. Nevertheless, the 
findings of this research may be read as a manifestation of strong monism 
on the part of the state institutions in general, thereby suggesting that 
relations may not be so different in other sectors either.  
 
Having concluded that the corporatist interest group structure did not lead to 
policy concertation, it is still worthy of note that the structure nevertheless 
led to the establishment of various patterns of behavior. For the profession, 
one outcome seems to be that it conditioned it towards statist solutions 
given the “advantage of being able to call on the state to come to their aid” 
(Suleiman 1987: 274). In other words, even when there is no policy 
concertation, there nevertheless is “proximity and interdependence” 
(Schmitter 1982: 268).  
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Indeed, respondents mentioned the free character of the profession only 
when they described that it gave them time to engage in politics. Very few 
interpreted it as a way to earn income independently. On the contrary, 
respondents had an expectation that the state should generate income for the 
profession by for instance passing a law that made it mandatory that people 
were represented by attorneys or by increasing fees that were paid to 
criminal legal aid attorneys or by bringing a mandatory legal insurance 
scheme.  
 
Not even one respondent said that attorneys should generate income from 
the market or engage the people, to be able to do so. Surprisingly, this was 
stressed by a bureaucrat who emphasized that attorneys had to make 
themselves indispensable for the public and earn income through this, 
instead of holding on to what they already had or viewing legal aid as a 
moneymaker692.  As a result of this conditioning, instead of turning to the 
public and stimulating their demand for legal services and thereby 
expanding the legal pie, most respondents turned to the state and defended 
gate keeper mechanisms such as the introduction of a bar exam. Similarly, 
they advocated a halt to opening of new law schools by the government in 
order to fight the growing competition in the profession and the economic 
problems caused thereby. As discussed in Chapter Two, however, these 
mechanisms have been long abandoned in other countries.  
                                                       
692 Interview P1. 
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Ironically, on the one hand the profession is concerned with its 
independence, on the other, it advocates more state action that makes it then 
even more dependent on the state. Worse, this dependency is recognized by 
only few respondents. As a consequence, the activities of TBB are also 
geared towards state institutions and few, if any, are directed at the public. 
Where they are so, they remain sporadic at best such as the organization of 
seminars and conferences. 
 
I observed another manifestation of this gravitation towards state centric 
solutions in the Ministry of Justice-TBB meeting, when the discussion came 
to cases involving wrongfully detained persons who are entitled to file a 
compensation claim against the state693. As a matter of law, if a party loses a 
case, that party pays the attorneys fees of the prevailing one. In wrongful 
detention cases, the losing party is the state. Therefore, it is the state that 
pays the attorneys’ fees of the wrongfully detained person. This seemingly 
straightforward matter suddenly flamed up by a provision in the attorneys 
fees tariff. This provision calculates the amount of attorneys fees in these 
cases pro rata (%). This rate is then applied to the compensation amount to 
determine attorneys fees694.  
                                                       
693 For instance, if a person is detained during trial and is then acquitted, then he or she is 
entitled to collect compensation for wrongful detention. 
 
694 It should be noted here that when someone retains an attorney, he or she undertakes to 
pay that attorney according to an amount that cannot be below the minimum fee tariff. In 
addition, when the matter goes to court, the winning attorney is also awarded attorneys fees 
by the court in the final judgment. Therefore, a winning attorney may get paid twice: first 
by his/her client and then by the court who awards the losing party to pay the fees of the 
winning party.  
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It emerged in the meeting that the Ministry of Justice challenged this 
provision before the Council of State and the matter was still pending. 
Parties discussed that a final decision on the matter could take two years. 
Until then, a solution was needed since attorneys initiated execution 
proceedings against the state to collect their fees under this provision. As 
fees were calculated pro rata, they had the potential to reach high amounts 
because compensation is awarded by courts according to the applicant’s 
socio-economic status.  
 
One of the bureaucrats said that the Ministry worked on the issue and 
explained the three different opinions that emerged. The first view was that 
attorneys fees could be awarded as demanded. The second view was that 
this should not be allowed as it was a burden on the Treasury. The third 
view was that attorneys fees should be awarded to the applicant (not to the 
attorney) but there should be a certain cap on it to avoid unlimited liability 
of the state. The last two views were fiercely resisted by TBB officials at the 
meeting.  
 
One official said that the biggest problem of attorneys was not being able to 
collect their fees. For instance, he could have bought a building with the 
total uncollected fees in his professional life. The bureaucrat replied that if 
people were entitled to a compensation for unlawful detention, attorneys 
fees should be awarded to applicants for incurring legal costs instead of 
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attorneys. He justified this on the ground that the annual rise made by TBB 
in the fee tariff was being made in disregard of economic indicators.  
 
By trying to justify the yearly rise in the minimum fee tariff, TBB officials 
replied that the tariff guaranteed the state tax income because the state 
charged 18% as VAT and 20% as withholding tax. When TBB increased the 
minimum fee tariff, this also raised tax revenue for the state. The argument 
went that the state was almost “50-50 partner” in “their” business. Further, 
these amounts meant reduced tax evasion for the state.  
 
This discussion was very illustrative of TBB’s statist inclinations. First, 
TBB was trying to justify itself by resorting to income generation for the 
state. Second, TBB did not question the ethics of collecting income by 
grabbing a compensation -in its source- awarded to an applicant who has 
been subject to unlawful detention by the state. Third, it showed the lack of 
an economic perspective by not taking indicators such as inflation which 
affects the purchasing power of the public (their clients) into consideration. 
Lastly, these issues were discussed with equally state centric bureaucrats 
creating the danger that the cooperation of these partners could result in 
“solutions” that possibly go against the interests of the people.  
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Sure enough, after the meeting, TBB and the Ministry of Justice officials 
had lunch together during which legal insurance was discussed as one 
solution to generate secure income for attorneys. When discussing whether 
to adopt this scheme, one bureaucrat remarked that “well, citizens will pay 
for this insurance, but they would object to that, so we should put this in the 
law in an inconspicuous way”.  
 
This only goes on to show that while failing to collect fees is a problem for 
many people in Turkey from wage laborers to businessmen, instead of 
trying to become better businessmen/women, attorneys try to address the 
problem with state coercion, such as the introduction of a mandatory legal 
insurance scheme, premiums of which are going to be paid by the people. 
This “solution” carries no costs for either the bureaucrats or the profession 
but citizens, perfectly illustrating the introverted nature of corporatism 
which discusses alternatives that are mutually acceptable (Gerlich 1992). 
 
At the same time, this anecdote illustrates well that the interest group 
structure provides TBB access to drafters of law (bureaucrats) and the 
ability to convince them for the adoption of measures that involve no cost 
for the government. This is why it is important to recognize that even if the 
current structure does not mean policy concertation, it nevertheless serves 
the profession. In fact, this is also in line with the profession literature set 
out in Chapter Two that points out to the economic side of the relations and 
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the flow of resources “from the state to the profession rather than vice 
versa”. (Halliday 1989: 378). As a result, the profession is conditioned even 
more to state centric solutions and corporatism’s moral and hierarchical 
order may look safe (Williamson 1989) in the face of rapid social and 
economic change. 
 
Another consequence of the close association of the profession with the 
state is that TBB or the profession exalts or reifies the state (Navaro-Yashin 
2002). For instance, when attorneys try to legitimize themselves, this is 
done by saying that their profession constitutes part of the judiciary (while 
they nag about not being treated so). At times, their wish for inclusion 
amounts to emulating the judiciary which finds its manifestation in the 
language used by presidents of bar to address each other as “my 
president695”. This is directly adopted from judges and prosecutors who call 
each other “my prosecutor696” or “my judge697” even if they are friends with 
each other.  
 
Similarly, when TBB officials brag about the profile of their visitors to the 
new building, it is by “high” state officials or higher judges who bring their 
foreign colleagues. Equally, when they feel disregarded, this is for being 
                                                       
695 In Turkish: “başkanım”. 
 
696 In Turkish: “savcım”. 
 
697 In Turkish: “hakimim”. 
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treated so by the “Head of State” when he for instance fails to extend an 
invitation that is sent to the members of the higher judiciary but not to TBB. 
Equally, the importance attributed to their function is measured by their 
proximity to the Head Prosecutor in the protocol and whether the president 
of TBB is admitted to the same VIP room just like the Head Prosecutor. It is 
therefore no surprise that they feel entitled to the same privileges as high 
civil servants such as green passport or lesser payment of fees for gun 
licenses.  
 
While in many countries attorneys designation as “officer of the court” 
affirms their quasi public standing (Halliday 1989), performing a public 
duty does not necessarily mean public status. However, the profession 
seems to have chosen to generate legitimacy through the state with the 
expectation that being near the state raises the status of the profession 
(McClelland 1991). While it may be comfortable for the profession to do so, 
it is also problematical since many respondents recognize the profession’s 
social relevance is in representing people and furthering their right to seek 
legal remedies. They, nevertheless, do not act on this premise.  Further, the 
legitimacy of the judiciary in Turkey has been highly controversial since the 
beginning of the Republic. Indeed, some respondents as well as presidents 
of bar in the bar presidents meeting made remarks showing that they 
perceived the judiciary as an entity that protects the state and the regime 
rather than individuals.  
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This state-centric approach is exacerbated by additional factors such as the 
age and defense work orientation of presidents of bar. To explain the 
former, the average age of respondents was 55. In other words, the early 
experience of the presidents of bar with the profession is of a more statist 
time in the profession. Concerning the latter, their understanding (probably 
practice also) of the functions of an attorney is mostly in a criminal context, 
contributing to their stately orientation. This defense work orientation shows 
itself even in the name of the hotel at the prestigious new building of TBB 
which carries the name “Litai”. As the website of the hotel proudly explains, 
Litais performed defense work in mythology698.  
 
The overemphasis on defense work not only fails to represent many 
attorneys who perform other functions in the profession but may be read as 
the prevalence of a closed, local (criminal law being one of the most 
national areas of law) and solo practitioner understanding of the profession 
among the respondents. What is more important, by defining an attorney as 
a defense lawyer only or as a subject in the criminal process, one “locks the 
attorney into the state” (İnanıcı 2000: 140).  
 
In view of the above, it is shown that the relationship between state 
institutions and TBB is based on a corporatist structure but this did not lead 
to corporatist policy making given the monist state tradition in Turkey. 
Nevertheless, the corporatist structure seems to have created benefits and 
                                                       
698 http://www.litaihotel.com/HtmlPage.aspx?PageID=1003. Access date: 30 March 2011. 
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conditioning on the part of the legal profession by establishing a pattern of 
close association with the state to legitimize itself and use state coercion to 
satisfy parochial professional demands. While parties seem to have entered 
into a new phase in their relationship involving more consensus and less 
conflict, it is still unclear what the government gains from this structure. 
Another question is whether this structure will be maintained or expanded in 
the new constitution.  
 
The finding of this thesis that in Turkey the corporatist structure did not lead 
to policy concertation points out to the opposite direction than the recent 
literature on corporatism which seems to be occupied with policy 
concertation that comes about as a result of non-corporatist interest 
representation structures (O’Donnell 2001, Baccaro 2003). The question 
therefore is whether we can still say that a corporatist interest group 
structure and corporatist policy are “fused”? This will be for later 
researchers to find out.  
 
V. 2. What are the reasons for conflict in the relationship? 
As far as I can see, there are four reasons that cause conflict between the 
parties. The first is, as described above, the monist state tradition that does 
not want to share any power and therefore does not let professional 
organizations in the corporatist interest representation model play a policy 
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concertation role. As this issue was already discussed, I will move to other 
reasons.  
 
V.2.1 Socio-economic change 
It seems that the big socio-economic change engulfing Turkey since the 
1980s had major effects on the profession. As will be remembered, the 
expansion of higher education and opening of new law schools meant led 
the profession to grow. However, bars have been against the opening of 
more law schools because growth of the profession increases competition. 
Nevertheless, instead of admitting to that, bars used “declining standards of 
professionalism” as a reason for their objection. Hence, their insistence on a 
bar exam to re-establish control over the supply since they currently feel 
like a rubber stamp institution for those who complete their apprenticeship 
period.  
 
In other words, being used to state granted protection and privileges, bars 
expect the government to take measures to stop or slow down the effects of 
socio-economic change on the profession. When this request is not granted 
or in fact taken back by the government by the abolishment of the bar exam 
requirement, it leads to conflict between the parties. In terms of market 
control, especially in big towns the profession is unable to enforce its rules 
on such large number of people.  
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At the same time, growth in the profession also increases heterogeneity of 
the profession and leads to resistance to top down imposition of uniformity. 
Indeed, some respondents argued that TBB has been intervening in issues 
such as pictures in attorney licenses or appearance and outfit of attorneys, 
similar to character and nationality requirements in the U.S (Burrage 1988). 
As discussed in Chapter Two, in the U.S., these requirements served to 
preserve the status of white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant attorneys when 
immigration and demographic patterns challenged it. Similarly, it can be 
said that these requirements aim to keep out professionals who value 
“religion” or “ethnicity” at a time they are perceived to threaten the status of 
elder generation attorneys’ “republican” values. 
 
In order to withstand the imposed uniformity, local bars seem to have 
started to form alliances to defend their views as opposed to being 
dominated by the “big three” or TBB. There are many recent examples of 
this: the joining forces of “Anatolian bars” and “Kurdish bars” to determine 
a candidate in 2009 TBB elections against the then President; one bar 
president’s open declaration that he would make a counter declaration if 
TBB made a declaration expressing support for Ergenekon trial; the 
organization and hosting by Kayseri Bar of a meeting in Kozaklı between 
the Ministry of Justice and bars; the recent media declarations of pro and 
opposing bars concerning the government proposal to increase the number 
of chambers at the Court of Cassation; election of former presidents of 
Afyon and Kayseri Bars to HSYK and the Constitutional Court respectively; 
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regional meetings of Eastern and Southeastern bars concerning the “Kurdish 
issue”699.  
 
In one sense, this new found confidence and assertiveness of local bars may 
be connected with the rise of AKP that propels the periphery to the center. It 
can also be read as member obstruction in resisting actions that they are 
displeased with especially in structures where exit is not possible (Schneyer 
1983). While currently this is not contributing to a conflict between TBB 
and the state institutions on its own, in the future, local bars may choose to 
cut off TBB and complain directly to the government.   
 
In addition to the conflict between TBB and the bars, there also appears 
conflict between local bars and the “big three” since priorities and problems 
of large and smaller bars are different700. Therefore, the former needs TBB 
much more than the latter. This was apparent in the speeches of their 
presidents or representatives in TBB-local bar association meetings that I 
attended. For instance, smaller bar associations used language such as “we 
demand that TBB work on the elimination of two different fee tariffs” or 
                                                       
699 For media announcements of two of the meetings see 
http://www.diyarbakirbarosu.org.tr/i/basina_ve_kamuoyuna321, Access date: 17 May 
2011; http://www.elazigbarosu.org.tr/Detay.aspx?ID=9199&Tip=Haber , Access date: 19 
June 2011. 
 
700 Interview P5.  
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“we ask for an amendment of the regulation” (on criminal legal aid)701. 
Similar requests were made as follows: “we expect TBB to contribute to the 
education we are providing” or “TBB should stop these type of practices” or 
“TBB should make sure that one software program is developed to be used 
by all bars”702. These statements express need while constituting input for 
TBB in formulating its policies. Sometimes, local bars also made 
suggestions as to how TBB should go about it: “contact MPs in the 
Parliament and lobby them”703.  
 
Nevertheless, local bars did not sit idle either and also contacted MPs in 
their locales for the resolution of their problems. However, they are not able 
like the “big three” to engage the Minister or the Deputy Minister directly. 
In fact, one bureaucrat indicated that while it is important what TBB 
thought on a given issue, the Ministry also had to take the views of 
especially one bar (among the “big three”) into account given its propensity 
to engage in protest behavior704 (like walking with their attorney robes and 
saying that rights and liberties were being undermined)705.  
                                                       
701 Notes taken during the meeting between TBB and representatives of legal aid of local 
bars that took place on 25 December 2010 in Ankara.  
 
702 Notes taken during the meeting between TBB and representatives of legal aid of local 
bars that took place on 25 December 2010 in Ankara.  
 
703 Notes taken during the meeting between TBB and representatives of legal aid of local 
bars that took place on 25 December 2010 in Ankara.  
 
704 Interviews P7, P8, P9. 
 
705 Interview P7. 
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In that sense, the “big three” were criticized for competing with TBB and 
thereby undermining the unity in the profession with demands and positions 
that were different than the one adopted by TBB. They were also criticized 
for attempting to dominate TBB according to their political agenda. For 
instance, when I attended the regional bars meeting of Southeastern and 
Eastern bars, I was surprised by the number of bars that came from outside 
the region. The president of one of the “big three” was also present and 
proposed to sign a declaration that demanded that courts of special 
jurisdiction706 are abolished. He wanted this declaration then be put in front 
of TBB. 
 
The proposal concerning abolishment of these courts was defeated by 
Southeastern and Eastern bars. Not because these bars believed this was not 
an important issue. To the contrary, they suffered from the practices of those 
courts. The issue was also in their agenda but they thought this was not the 
only issue that deserved to be singled out in a declaration. Indeed, the 
meeting was convened to discuss the new constitution; how to help the 
victims of the mass grave found in Mutki (Bitlis) as it was observed that 
evidence was being lost by digging the grave in a crude way with 
caterpillars; defense in mother tongue; how to join important cases that were 
being tried in mass and prevent courts from rejecting these requests.  
                                                       
706 Courts of special jurisdiction -as they are referred- are established on the basis of art. 
250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that gives courts “special jurisdiction” to hear 
certain cases. These usually concern organized crime cases as well as crimes against the 
security of the state, overturn of the constitutional order and national defense. For instance, 
the Ergenekon trials in Silivri or KCK cases are being heard by these courts.  
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It was pointed out that the platform for these type of declarations was TBB, 
clearly rejecting the leadership role attempted to be played by one of the 
“big three”. Indeed, the issue was also discussed in the bar presidents 
meeting. Presidents of bar argued that these courts were a continuation of 
the Courts of Independence or State Security Courts. Many said that they 
had to be abolished as they were protecting the regime. It was these courts 
which referred to Kurdish as an “unknown language”707.  
 
At the same time, in meetings I attended, the “big three” were among those 
who spoke the longest while people were very attentive to what they said. 
The tone and language employed by two of the “big three” has been also 
combative. For instance, presidents of two of the “big three” used sentences 
like the following: “They say that resources are limited and it could be taken 
away from us. Well, don’t let them! Is it that easy? If it’s that easy, what are 
we doing in those chairs? If you resist, they cannot take it, if you don’t, they 
take it just like this708”; “we have to resist, they are trying to control us 
today with this, tomorrow with something else, this is totally unacceptable”; 
“…..we are totally against it and we will do everything necessary 
concerning this, let me tell you that”; “we are at the back of their necks and 
we will make them realize that709”; “….if there is a worry, they will take 
legal aid away from us, let me ask who is going to take it from us despite 
                                                       
707 Notes taken at the bar presidents meeting that took place on 21 January 2011 in Ankara 
 
708 Notes taken at the bar presidents meeting that took place on 21 January 2011 in Ankara. 
 
709 Notes taken at the bar presidents meeting that took place on 21 January 2011 in Ankara. 
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you, who is going to dare this, who is going to have enough power, let them 
try. I challenge them….”; “in the same speech, this person who is accusing 
us of taking bribes gives good news and says it will be the bars’ turn. How 
is it going to be our turn, who is going to make it our turn and what is going 
to be done? Is it our turn? We are here, we are waiting for our turn710”. 
Similar language was used during interviews when some respondents who 
served as presidents of the “big three” referred to hostage taking (by the 
government); sitting in the chair of criminal defendant; resistance and fight 
when they described their relationship with governments or state 
institutions.  
 
Meanwhile, some bars were not happy with this combative tone. In fact, 
they congratulated TBB and thanked it for adopting a consensual language, 
expressly stating that nothing can be solved by challenging counterparts. In 
that regard, they pointed out to the success thus obtained in amending laws 
in favor of the profession by for instance changing the payment time for 
VAT in legal services and the regulation of court clerks. They applauded the 
new tone and TBB’s emphasis of professional issues as well as the new 
transparent administrative style711.  
 
                                                       
710 Notes taken at the bar presidents meeting that took place on 21 January 2011 in Ankara. 
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One of the reasons for competition of the “big three” with TBB seems to be 
because of the delegate system. Indeed, data indicates that it gives too much 
weight to the “big three” in disregard of other bar associations. Put 
differently, so far, if the big three came together, they have been able to 
determine the administration and thus the direction of TBB, without caring 
about what the remaining bar associations thought. The description of one 
respondent in Chapter Four as to how media declarations were prepared at 
TBB, only attests to this. However, socio-economic change seems to fuel 
local bars’ demand for voice while raising their confidence, making them 
less likely to tolerate being dictated either by the big three or TBB. In fact, 
these bars may even request the government for a change in the delegate or 
electoral system to reflect a more egalitarian design, creating another 
possible conflict between TBB and the government. In fact, the electoral 
system was blamed by two bureaucrats712 for TBB’s ills, suggesting that the 
issue may have been already discussed at the Ministry. 
 
Another contributing factor to the conflict between local bars and the big 
three may be that elections in the latter are conducted in a much more 
political way than the rest of the bars since they have political groups that 
are competing with each other. Candidates produce homogeneous lists 
based on political ideology that the members choose among. The 
majoritarian electoral system then reinforces the winner’s domination by 
                                                       
712 Interviews P8, P2.  
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producing administrations that constitute one block and defend one world. 
Thus far, these have been described as “Kemalist”. As a result, no matter 
how small the margin of the winning block, they represented the whole bar 
as if everybody agrees with their political stand. Only one respondent 
among the “big three” said they acted with the responsibility of representing 
the whole bar, suggesting that they played down their political identity after 
election.  
 
Given all this, growth in the profession led by socio economic change seems 
to have created increased competition in the profession and undermined 
market control by TBB. This causes conflict between TBB and government 
because TBB as a protective group needs to exercise a check on the number 
of attorneys.  More importantly, socio-economic change is also 
transforming a hereto homogenous community into a heterogeneous one. As 
a consequence, its interests are also diverging, signs of which are 
everywhere from ethnicity (Kurdish-Turkish); values (conservative 
Anatolian-Kemalist); age (young salaried -old solo practitioner); type of 
practice (criminal defense -other legal).  
 
Therefore, it is only natural that TBB is faced with conflicting demands 
reflecting these diverging interests. This not only brings to mind the 
question discussed in Chapter Two whether society benefits when lawyers 
join together in one association (Schneyer 1983) but also shows that 
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keeping interests unified on the basis of a weak link like professional 
community when other identities are clearly paramount is difficult 
(Armingeon 1997). This is especially so with a delegate system that is 
majoritarian and gives too much weight to the “big three” who until now 
seem to have dominated TBB with one world view in disregard of others.  
 
V.2.2 Promotional-protective group functions of TBB  
In a corporatist interest group structure, representative groups such as TBB 
are designed as protective interest groups. In that regard, when one looks at 
the activities of TBB and its law, one can see that it has protective interest 
group functions. Respondents mentioned many activities of TBB that can be 
described so, such as signing licenses to practice, preparing fee tariffs, 
acting as appellate body in disciplinary matters, ensure functioning of the 
profession according to ethical rules, etc. Other routine activities include 
taking care of social security issues of attorneys, building accommodation 
facilities or providing financial assistance.  
 
Activities such as issuing reports, organizing seminars-conferences, 
publishing journals, lobbying, on the other hand, seem to be made on an ad-
hoc basis rather than as part of a routine program with clearly defined policy 
goals. Nevertheless, viewed from the perspective of its activities, TBB 
typically has protective interest group functions. Over time, however, TBB 
seems to have developed promotional interest group functions such as 
306 
 
defending human rights, liberty and democracy (Özman 1995) which were 
added to its law after an amendment in 2001.  
 
These functions are clearly promotional interest group functions. Far from 
pacifying the profession by preventing bars’ engagement in politics (Özman 
1995), they seem to have brought politics right back into TBB. It should be 
recognized that human rights,  liberty and democracy are not only legal but 
also political concepts. As much as they help bars to organize protests and 
marches and draw attention to violations of law, they also prove that it is an 
“impossible dream” to have apolitical bars given attorneys’ closeness to 
social and political issues (Özman 1995).  
 
This was also obvious in various descriptions provided by respondents as to 
what TBB was. In that regard, they described TBB as an NGO, as part of 
civil society, as a public institution; a professional organization; a peak 
organization and an upper body. They said its job was to criticize, be in 
opposition and emphasized its public character. It was itself telling that 
respondents whose average bar work amounted to almost ten (9,7) years 
could hold such contradictory views about TBB.  
 
For those who believed that TBB was an NGO or part of civil society or 
was in opposition, it can be inferred that they would expect TBB to display 
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promotional interest group functions such as criticism and confrontation 
with the government. However, even those who thought of TBB primarily 
as a professional organization or a peak organization did not solely view it 
as a protective interest group.  
 
At the same time, whether they conceived of TBB as an NGO; a 
professional organization or a public institution, respondents were careful to 
point out to their “difference” from other NGOs, professional organizations 
or public institutions. For instance, as an NGO, TBB was “not that kind of 
an NGO” that would speak in two minutes. As a professional organization, 
they were “not like that of the doctors or hairdressers”. As a public 
institution, they were “sensitive” about the fact that TBB was an institution 
of the judiciary. For some, this difference amounted to a desire to be 
regulated in a different article in the constitution: not with other professional 
organizations but in the same article with the judiciary.   
 
Data further showed that an overwhelming number of respondents believed 
that until recently TBB was a “backyard” for one political party. What is 
important here is not whether the belief has merit but rather that it 
constitutes an important axis of friction among bar associations. For those 
who thought TBB was a backyard, it functioned as a promotional interest 
group. In their opinion, this role hurt the profession because first, it led to 
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confrontation with the government and second, it caused internal 
disagreement because not all bars agreed with TBB’s views.  
 
Here one can see that the promotional-protective interest group function of 
TBB leading to internal conflict. As a result, those who thought that TBB 
should perform less of a promotional and more of a protective interest group 
function seem to have eventually searched for a different administration at 
TBB. In fact, the alliance brought together by local bars to bring about 
regime change (described in Chapter Four) seem to have also wanted 
policies of TBB vis-à-vis governments to change sothat TBB played less of 
a political but more of a professional role. In other words, this was an 
attempt by its constituents to move TBB from a promotional interest group 
towards a protective group.  
 
However, the new situation was not to the liking of everybody. First, those 
who believed that TBB should be more vocal and confrontational vis-à-vis 
the government were unsatisfied with its focus on protective interest group 
functions. Second, the downplaying of promotional interest group functions 
seems to be based on the expectation that by refraining from criticizing the 
government, the profession will obtain benefits. While there is danger that 
the relationship can be reversed if these expectations are not satisfied, there 
is an additional danger. The new no-criticism is not a result of a change that 
believes that promotional functions of TBB should be abandoned. In other 
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words, those functions are down-played but still kept as a useful arsenal to 
launch an attack against the government-where necessary.  
 
This is possible because for the profession, TBB’s promotional functions 
such as protection of human rights and defense of law are apolitical 
subjects. Attorneys as well as bureaucrats713 continue to subscribe to 
liberalism’s view of the law as a “neutral” arbiter as their frequent reference 
to “acting with their lawyer identity” shows. This identity implies a person 
stripped from all beliefs, views and political ideologies. This is probably not 
surprising since movements such as critical legal theory and legal realism of 
the last century are yet to reach law school curricula in Turkey. However, 
through research these movements very much undermined the generic and 
impartial understanding of the law that applies to everyone equally as well 
as of the super human being that is the neutral and impartial lawyer. In sum, 
the new situation at TBB is not based on an understanding that a 
professional organization should only engage in protective functions. Where 
necessary, under the pretense of objectivity of the law, the professional 
organization can still wear its promotional functions hat. 
 
Similarly, many respondents have a broad understanding of politics as an 
activity, not only confined to the Parliament and political parties. As a 
result, respondents as well as many presidents of bar see a role for TBB and 
                                                       
713 Interviews P6, P8. 
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bars to be played “in healthy democracies”. The presidents of bar meeting 
saw intense discussion of the issue. The burning problem of the country, the 
Kurdish issue was brought up, with Southeastern bars asking TBB to 
abandon its silence and take a position. Likewise, KCK and Ergenekon 
trials were also brought up with participants demanding that TBB take a 
position714.  
 
This means that depending on the political agenda in the country which 
currently includes the making of a new constitution with controversial 
issues such as rights for minorities, secularism, military-civilian relations, 
TBB will continue to face these demands also because TBB and lawyers 
feel that constitution making is their terrain. Already, the latest declaration 
of Southeastern and Eastern Bars includes a provision that wants a role for 
professional organizations in the constitution making715.  
 
In view of the above, it will not be that easy to solve the promotional-
protective interest group division at TBB. Especially if TBB fails to develop 
the expected positions of its constituents or deliver material benefits 
improving the standing of the profession, a “coalition of the willing”, last 
examples of which were seen in the declaration wars involving the 
                                                       
714 Notes taken at the bar presidents meeting that took place on 21 January 2011 in Ankara. 
 
715 See for the declaration: 
http://www.tuncelibarosu.org.tr/Detay.aspx?ID=9231&Tip=Bildiri. Access date: 9 October 
2011. 
311 
 
establishment of the intermediary appeal courts, may take action. More 
importantly, it is a question mark whether the problems of the profession 
can be resolved by getting along with government alone especially when 
socio-economic change is forcing more and more change. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that the contradictory functions of TBB is one of the factors that 
contributes to the conflict between the government and TBB. 
 
V.2.3 Attorneys’ engagement with politics 
Data showed that the attorney-politician was also a phenomenon in Turkey 
just like it was in other countries. One of the explanations for the 
profession’s closeness to politics was the recognition that it dealt with social 
problems, solutions of which were provided by politics. The profession’s 
independence also allowed attorneys to earn income separately without 
depending on the state say like a civil servant.  In addition, there were 
country specific reasons such as the wide prohibition to engage in politics 
for many people including civil servants.  
 
Data further showed that while I conceived the bar as a recruitment path to 
politics, the reverse was also true. In other words, the majority of 
respondents became presidents of bar because they were politically 
engaged. Nevertheless, being the president of bar raised the profile of the 
person in the town by increasing his/her visibility and thus assisted in 
getting the attention of political parties. It looks like this is easier to do in 
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smaller towns in Anatolia than the “big three”, given the protocol status of 
bars. This may explain why respondents impute so much importance to 
being high up in the protocol. On the other hand, the “big three” seem to 
have the advantage of accessing the printed media and TV channels in 
general circulation easier than their peers elsewhere.  
 
In the meantime, respondents thought where the person had political 
ambitions, it was difficult to keep bars as a separate entity from a political 
party. This was because political parties were inclined to create institutions 
that were dependent on them to be then used in addition to their political 
weight. Another worry was that political ambitions could compromise the 
independence of bars.  
 
On the other hand, respondents viewed political engagement after having 
served as president of bar positively. But they carefully underlined to keep 
the two functions separate because the bar was a structure based on 
professional solidarity not on an ideology. What was significant here was 
the distinction respondents made between “politics of profession” or 
“politics of law” and “politics proper”. I interpret the former to engage in 
professional issues and trying to pressure the government about these issues 
than ideological ones. At the same time, the two are often intertwined with 
each other. For instance, providing criminal defense in the mother tongue is 
a legal issue as well as a political one. So is “proper attire” of an attorney 
313 
 
especially if properness forces uniformity on the profession under a state 
sanctioned ideology like Kemalism.  
 
What should be recognized is no matter how much one attributes them legal 
meanings, there is politics behind these “trivial” issues. As a result, because 
politics is all about conflict, there also is conflict. Therefore, it is impossible 
to evade divisive issues by labeling the discussion as “politics of 
profession”. In that regard, it is interesting that respondents who have such 
intensive involvement in politics manifest this anti-politics attitude. They 
seem to believe that if politics proper is left out of the bar, professional 
unity can be achieved not matter how different other interests and identities 
of attorneys are. Put differently, in the name of depoliticizing the profession, 
they are politicizing professional interests they deem uniform (which are not 
given the import of cleavages in society due to growth in numbers) and in 
fact alleviate professional solidarity to an ideology. In that way, less politics 
also amounts to politics.  
 
In view of this, given the intense political engagement of the profession in 
all political colors, no matter one labels it as “politics of the profession” or 
“politics of law”, this involvement is bound to cause conflict within the 
organization itself as well as between TBB and state institutions. This is 
probably why some respondents tend to prefer a corporatist relationship 
between the parties because corporatism’s moral and hierarchical order suits 
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a profession that sees itself above others. Further, corporatism shields 
attorneys from market forces, a benefit they certainly like.  
 
V.2.3: Conclusion 
This thesis showed that a corporatist structure is in place in Turkey given 
the existence of various professional organizations in it such as TBB. 
However, empirical data demonstrated that unlike the assumptions of the 
corporatist theory, this structure did not lead to policy concertation, at least 
in the legal sector.  The primary reason for its absence seems to be that the 
state tradition in Turkey is monist, resulting in state behavior that is 
autonomous from society and unwilling to share power.  
 
Equally important, rapid and intense socio-economic change in Turkey 
seems to undermine TBB’s homogeneity as an interest group. In that sense, 
growth in the profession continues to bring existing cleavages in society 
into the ranks of TBB. As a result, it is becoming increasingly difficult for 
one association to speak on the profession’s behalf. In fact, Halliday points 
out to Belgium where fundamental ethnic, linguistic and religious divisions 
may inhibit the unification of interest associations or Italy and France where 
greater political polarization leads to greater fragmentation of professional 
interest representation (Halliday 1989).   
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In Turkey, although cleavages in society existed, they did not initially 
inhibit unification or led to fragmentation because the interest group was 
able to keep itself homogeneous. Socio-economic development, however, 
sharpened these cleavages and undermined market control of the interest 
group. As a result, these cleavages were imported into TBB, causing 
heterogeneity as well as divergence of interests among members which 
seems to have then led to internal battles. Further, they bred role confusion 
in TBB causing it to swing between a protective and a promotional interest 
group depending on the demands made from state institutions. Attorneys’ 
interest in politics and their inherent skills as well as readiness to use 
political tactics (and organization) contributed to further politicization of 
these interests and thereby to conflict.  
 
While all this may be viewed as reasons to explain conflict between TBB 
and state institutions, its implication for corporatist policy making is more 
important. Corporatist theory seems to assume a protective interest group 
that is homogeneous in membership profile or at least similar in interests, 
values and outlook so that it can play its part and bargain with government. 
Where cleavages in society on the basis of values, ethnicity, age and type of 
practice are imported to the interest group like in the case of TBB, this 
presents a serious challenge to that role, leading to battles within the group 
as well as with the “partner” of the group, in the end undermining 
corporatist policy making altogether. One can therefore conclude that for 
corporatism to work the mere existence of a corporatist structure is 
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insufficient. State tradition of the country and the homogeneity of the 
interest group play also huge roles. Given all this, it will be up to future 
researchers to tell whether this finding is country specific or whether it 
merits a re-shaping of corporatist theory.
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Appendix 1 
 
 
“It says that professional organizations 
should not engage in politics. Who is 
going to? Only MPs?” 
Interview 29. 
Meslek kuruluşları siyasetle 
uğraşmasın diyor. Siyasetle kim 
uğraşacak? Yalnız milletvekilleri 
mi uğraşacak? 
“(...) For example, President of …. Bar 
goes on TV and talks about politics all 
the time but not about the law. I want 
my colleague, my friend from the bar 
to talk about the law. Instead of saying 
‘Dear Government, we are preparing 
the Act on Attorneys, we are bringing 
this to you, are you going to pass it as 
is from the Parliament?’, it is 
Ergenekon up, Ergenekon 
down…What do we care about 
Ergenekon?” 
Interview 30. 
Örnek, (…) baro başkanımız 
çıkıyor televizyonlarda hep siyaset 
konuşuluyor, hukuk konuşmuyor. 
Ben istiyorum ki, benim 
meslektaşım, benim baro 
arkadaşım hukuk konuşsun. “Ey 
hükümet biz avukatlık yasasını 
hazırlıyoruz, getiriyoruz sen bunu 
adam gibi meclisten geçirecek 
misin” diyeceğine, Ergenekon 
aşağı, Ergenekon yukarı. Bize ne 
Ergenekon’dan?  
“(…) We have long understood that 
this cannot happen with social 
democrats, with Kemalists. And  we 
believe that without the liquidation of 
the 1-2% privileged class created by 
Kemalizm, nothing can be done in this 
country (…)”. 
Interview 12. 
Biz bunun sosyal demokrat, 
Kemalistlerle olamayacağını yıllar 
önce bunu kavramışız. Ve 
Türkiye’de de o Kemalizm’in 
yarattığı %1-2’lik imtiyaz 
sahibinin hükümranlığı kırılmadan 
da bu ülkede hiçbir şey 
yapılamayacağına da inanıyoruz. 
“The president of an administrative 
court commented to a colleague in 
(Southeastern town) on the 
compensation to be awarded to the 
villagers: ‘you are right, we need to 
accept this case, but how is the state 
Bir ara bir ……’de arkadaş anlattı. 
Oradaki idare mahkemesi başkanı 
bu 5233ler var, köylülerin 
tazminatı ile ilgili. Dedi, sordu 
falan valla işte avukat bey haklısın, 
davayı kabul etmemiz gerekiyor 
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going to find the money?’. This is the 
mentality… You are not the Minister 
of Finance, you are not the defterdar. 
You issue your judgment, let it go to 
Danıştay for judicial review. The 
funds are to be thought by someone 
else, this is not your job. (…)”.  
Interview 12. 
ama devlet o parayı nereden 
bulacak? Böyle anlayış…sen 
maliye bakanı değilsin defterdar da 
değilsin. Sen o kararı ver, 
Danıştay’a gitsin. Hukuki 
süzgeçten geçsin, doğruysa 
doğrudur, o para işini başkası 
düşünecek, senin işin değil.  
“(…) The right thing to do is to sit 
quietly and not cause any trouble. The 
government knows the best. The 
Minister knows. And how does he 
know? The bureaucrats told him so.” 
Interview 16. 
Problem çıkarmayacaksın. Uslu 
duracaksın, hükümet en iyisini 
bilir. Bakan bey bilir, bakan 
nereden bilir, bakana da 
bürokratlar öyle şey yapmışlardır, 
inandırmışlardır. 
“As Nabi said, ten dervish would fit 
into one kilim but two sultans would 
not fit into one climate. Attorneys see 
themselves as the sultan. Because they 
do not have a hierarchical superior, 
they always want to act independently 
and with their free will. They shy 
away from acting in a collective 
manner. Unfortunately, this is how it is 
in the Parliament. (…) The attorneys 
in a political party do not share a 
common stand”. 
Interview 19. 
On derviş bir kilime sığarmış da 
iki padişah bir iklime sığmazmış, 
Nabi’nin sözü. Avukatlar hep 
kendisini padişah olarak görürler 
çünkü hiçbir hiyerarşik üstleri 
olmadığı için, hep bağımsız ve 
kendi hür düşünceleriyle hareket 
etmeyi isterler. Kolektif bir şuur 
içinde hareket etmekten de her 
zaman geri dururlar. Maalesef 
Meclisteki yapılanmanın da bu 
şekilde olduğunu ben görüyorum. 
(…) Parti içindeki avukatların 
kolektif bir duruşu yok. 
“(…) I am a member of MHP, and I 
really do not like the Prime Minister 
but I do believe that this statement 
about imam training schools was not 
right.(…) That bar has members or 
relatives of members that are 
graduates of those schools. A TBB 
President cannot determine such 
category. If you accept this, tomorrow 
someone will say I cannot accept 
someone from Nevşehir or someone 
Ben MHPliyim, sayın 
başbakandan da hiç 
hazzetmiyorum ama bu sözün 
doğru olmadığı kanaatindeydim. 
Şimdi o baronun imam hatip 
mezunu üyeleri de var ya da imam 
hatip mezunu yakınları olan 
üyeleri var. Bir BB başkanının 
böyle bir kategori belirleme 
hakkının olmadığı kanaatindeyim. 
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from Diyarbakır”. (…) 
Interview 11. 
 
Siz eğer bunu kabul ederseniz 
yarın birisi çıkıp ben Nevşehirli bir 
baro başkanını içime 
sindiremiyorum diyebilir veya 
birisi çıkıp ben Diyarbakırlı 
birisini içime sindiremiyorum der. 
“If you position yourself on the side of 
the status quo, you become an element 
to be fought off. But if you position 
yourself on the side of justice, law and 
the people, then you can force the 
government with your requests”. 
Interview 14. 
Eğer siz pozisyonunuzu 
statükodan yana belirlerseniz  siz 
mücadele edilmesi gereken bir 
unsura dönüşürsünüz. Ama 
pozisyonunuzu adaletten, 
hukuktan, haktan, milletten yana 
belirlerseniz, siz taleplerinizle 
hükümeti de zorlayabilirsiniz. 
“If we code governments, close to us 
or far away from us, same with us or 
not same with us, then these duties 
cannot be carried out. In that case, we 
will have to wait until a government 
comes that shares our views and until 
then, we will not contact them; make 
requests for anything; do anything to 
solve our problems and will wait until 
the government changes. It’s totally 
irrelevant what the government’s 
political ideology is, at least for me. 
This government is a government 
elected by the people and is a 
legitimate one. As long as it is 
legitimate, I do not understand why we 
should not contact them or reject that 
contact.” 
 
Interview 4. 
 
(…)Eğer iktidarları böyle bize 
yakın, bize uzak, siyasi görüşleri 
bizimle aynı, bizimle aynı değil 
diye kodlayacak olursanız, o 
zaman bu görevler yürütülmez. 
Yani o zaman diyelim ki biz kendi 
düşüncemize uygun bir iktidar 
gelinceye kadar, bizim 
düşüncemizde olmayan iktidarla 
hiçbir şekilde temas halinde 
olmayacağız, hiçbir şey de talep 
etmeyeceğiz, sorunlarımızın 
çözümü konusunda da bir çaba 
içinde olmayacağız, o zaman o 
iktidar değişinceye kadar 
bekleyeceğiz. Kaldı ki iktidarın 
siyasi düşüncesinin öyle veya 
böyle olması hiç önemli değil. 
Yani benim yaklaşımım açısından 
önemli değil. Bu iktidar halkın 
oyuyla seçilip gelmiş, meşru bir 
iktidardır. Dolayısıyla meşru 
olduktan sonra, o iktidarla temas 
içinde olmamayı veya o teması 
reddetmeyi ben anlayamıyorum. 
(…) 
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“(…). They were deciding the 
opposite. Who was saying that the 
exam should not be lifted? CHP. We 
also said so. If CHP said the exam 
should be lifted, maybe the exam 
would not be lifted. That’s how 
politically tense it was (…)”. 
 
Interview 30. 
(…)“siz burada particilik yapıyor” 
diyip sizin tersinize karar 
veriyordu. Şöyle söyleyeyim, 
şimdi sınav kalkmamalı diye kim 
söylüyordu, CHP diyelim ki 
“avukatlık sınavı kalkmamalı”. Biz 
barolar da kalkmamalı diyorduk 
ama CHP sınav kalkmalı deseydi 
belki de kalkmazdı yani o kadar 
siyasi olarak gerilmişlerdi. 
“There is a tendency to disregard 
attorneys, bars and everything we do. 
They do not want us. Attorneys are 
always seen as troublemakers. Bars are 
seen as troublemakers. ‘They are 
arrogant, they think they know 
everything’…Consequently, there is 
an effort to prevent the things they do; 
a great endeavor to stop their entry 
into the system; not provide 
information; push them out and make 
them unable to work.” 
Interview 9. 
Bizim her yaptığımız işi, 
avukatları ve baroları yok saymaya 
yatkın bir eğilim var, istemiyorlar, 
avukatlar hep baş belası olarak 
görülür. Barolar bir baş belası 
olarak görülür. Kendilerini çok 
beğenmişler, her şeyi bilirler aman 
onlar…. Dolayısıyla onların 
yapmaları gereken işleri engelleme 
çabası vardır. Onları sistemin içine 
sokmama, bilgi vermeme, onları 
zorlayarak dışarıya itme, iş 
yapamaz hale getirme konusunda 
büyük bir gayret var. 
“In (Blacksea town) at some point, all 
parties’ presidents were attorneys. We 
worked together in the same bar. (…) 
We were party presidents of the 
province and have then become MPs 
from AKP, CHP and from MHP”. 
Interview 11. 
Hatta …..’da bir dönem neredeyse 
bütün partilerin tamamının il 
başkanları avukattı. Biz aynı 
baroda beraber çalışıyorduk. Şu 
anda da hem AKP hem CHP’de üç 
avukat arkadaşımız burada birlikte 
milletvekilliği yapıyoruz.  
“On one day, I can say for Erdoğan’s 
Davos burst that he has done very 
well, on the other day I can issue a 
statement saying that the actions at 
Habur border crossing were against 
the law. This is the freedom I get from 
not being connected with a political 
party. The fact that I act without being 
Ben de bir gün diyelim ki 
Erdoğan’ın Davos’una “çok iyi 
yapmış” diyebilirken diğer gün 
Habur sınır kapısında hukuka 
aykırı işlemler yapıldığını çok 
rahatlıkla beyanını verebiliyorum. 
Bu rahatlığı veriyor bize bu 
herhangi bir siyasi partiye bağlı 
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concerned about my political future 
lets me praise the right and criticize 
the wrong.” 
Interview 6. 
olmamak. Siyasi gelecek rantı 
içerisinde, düşünce yapısıyla 
hareket etmemem doğru olanı 
övmek yanlış olanı ise dövmeyi 
çok rahatlıkla yaptırabiliyor. 
“Political parties think some 
professional organizations should 
come and provide support during 
election time and afterwards, fine, the 
mission is accomplished.  However, if 
a professional organization is 
dependant on a political party, whether 
you want it or not, in the end, 
professional problems will have to be 
discussed paralel to the party line. But 
this is a solidarity structure based on 
profession not on politics.” 
Interview 23. 
Siyasi partiler kimi meslek 
kuruluşları gelsinler, bizim seçim 
dönemimizde siyasi 
faaliyetlerimize aktif katkı versin 
ondan sonra, tamam görevi 
tamamladı diye düşünürler. Oysa 
bir siyasi partiye bağımlı bir 
meslek odası olması halinde, ister 
istemez o siyasi partinin 
paralelinde mesleki sorunları 
ortaya koymak ve tartışmak 
noktasındadır. Oysa bu bir mesleki 
dayanışma yapısıdır, bir siyasi 
dayanışma yapısı değildir.  
“I have been an administrator in the 
local party organization of (…) 
between 2004-6. Local organizations 
do not consist of good names. As you 
know, civil servants are prohibited 
from engaging in politics. Unions and 
political parties may not establish 
contact. Many professions are by 
default out. We attorneys can get into 
it a little. In local politics, the 
unemployed are interested in political 
organizations in order to get a job in a 
municipality or a government 
institution. Contractors or the small 
businessmen in the local area are 
interested in order to sell their goods. 
When the party organization is left to 
these people, politics does not come 
out of that.(…)”. 
Interview 7. 
……de, 2004’te örgüt yöneticiliği 
yaptım, iki sene biliyorum. 
Örgütler çok iyi isimlerden 
oluşmuyor. Biliyorsunuz devlet 
memurlarında yasak var, siyaset 
yasağı var. Sendikalarla siyasi 
partilerin ilişki kurması 
yasaklanmış. Yani bir çok meslek 
grubu zaten dışarıda kalıyor. Biz 
avukatlar biraz girebiliyoruz işin 
içine. Onun dışında yerel yerlerde 
özellikle belediyelerden veya  
kamu kurumlarından iktidara 
yakın olan kamu kurumlarından 
işe girebilmek için işsizler yani bir 
şey bulmak için siyasi partilere ilgi 
gösterir, müteahhitler ve o yörenin 
esnafları, onlar da mal satmak için. 
Şimdi bunlara kaldığı zaman 
örgütler işte oradan bir siyaset 
çıkmaz. 
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“(…) A statement I make as president 
of bar to become an MP or something 
else would not be liked by them. What 
happens then? These friends would 
wear their robes and make a statement 
in front of the stairs of the court house 
and say ‘we disagree with such and 
such statement of the president’. The 
public then perceives that there are 
different opinions at the bar. Attorneys 
are divided, attorneys cannot get 
together. We shouldn’t do that. (…)” 
Interview 7. 
 
Benim yaptığım bir açıklama baro 
başkanı olarak işte bu milletvekili 
olmak için veya başka bir görev 
için bunların hepsini 
kapsamayabilir. O zaman ne çıkar 
bu arkadaşlar onu kapsamadığı 
vakit çıkarlar cübbelerini giyerler 
bir açıklama yaparlar adliyenin şu 
basamaklarının önünde. “Biz 
başkanın bu görüşüne 
katılmıyoruz” derler. O zaman 
kamuoyu da şöyle algılar. Baroda 
farklı görüşler de var. Avukatlar 
bölünmüş, avukatlar bir araya bile 
gelemiyorlar. Gibi şeye gelir. Buna 
şey yapmamak lazım. 
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Appendix 2 
  
Görüşme tarihi:  
Görüşme başlangıç saati:   
Görüşme bitiş saati:   
Görüşülen kişinin adı: 
Görüşülen kişinin kurumu ve pozisyonu: 
 
Tanıtım:  
Bu mülakatı, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Siyaset Bilimi bölümünde yapmakta olduğum 
doktora tez araştırması kapsamında yapıyorum. Tezimde, bazı mesleki kuruluşların 
anayasal statü ile devlet içinde yer alması şeklindeki düzenlemenin, TBB-devlet ilişkisinde 
nasıl işlediğini inceliyorum.  
Bu nedenle, TBB-devlet ilişkisinin nasıl yürüdüğüne ilişkin ilk elden tecrübesi ve gözlemi 
olan kişilerin görüşlerine başvurmak, konu hakkında daha net bilgi edinmek açısından 
gereklidir. Aşağıdaki soruları özellikle bu bakımdan cevaplamanızı rica ediyorum. 
Bu  görüşmelerde verdiğiniz bilgiler tamamen saklıdır ve bilimsel olmayan hiçbir sebep 
için kesinlikle kullanılamaz. Adınız hiç kimseye verilmeyecek ve yazılı veya sözlü olarak 
hiçbir şekilde kullanılmayacaktır. Vereceğiniz bilgiler gizli adlarla aktarılacaktır. Hiçbir 
soruya cevap verme zorunluluğunuz yoktur, ama verdiğiniz takdirde hiçbir etki altında 
kalmadan kendi düşüncenizi belirtmeniz rica olunur.  
Sormak istediğiniz herhangi bir soru varsa lütfen sorunuz. 
Yardımlarınız için şimdiden teşekkür ederim. 
 
Görüşmeye başlamadan önce söylediklerinizi daha sonra eksiksiz 
hatırlayabilmek için teybe kaydetmek için izninizi almak istiyorum.  
 
Teyp kullanılmasına izin vermiyorum □  izin veriyorum □  
___________________________ imza 
1. Doğum Tarihi:  
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2. Cinsiyet:  1> Kadın   2> Erkek     
 
3.  TBB’de/Baro’da ne kadar görev yaptınız ve görevleriniz nelerdi?  
 
4.  TBB’nin faaliyetleri nelerdir? /TBB’nin Barolarla ilgili faaliyetleri 
nelerdir? 
 
5. TBB’nin faaliyetleri sırasında hangi devlet kurumları ile ilişkisi oluyor? 
(yasama-yürütme-yargı) 
 
6. TBB’nin devlet kurumlarıyla ilişkisine dair kamuoyuyla veya 
meslektaşlarla iletişim? (basın açıklaması, yürüyüş, dergi) 
 
7. Sizce TBB ile devlet kurumları arasındaki ilişki nasıl tanımlanabilir? 
(siyasi konjonktürün veya görüşün etkisi, liderliğin tavrı ve üslubu) 
 
8. TBB’nin diğer anayasal meslek kuruluşlarıyla ilişkilerini anlatabilir 
misiniz?  
 
9. Baro başkanlığından/TBB görevinden milletvekiliğine 
geçmenizle/geçilmesiyle ilgili ne söyleyebilirsiniz? 
10. Eklemek istediğiniz herhangi bir şey var mı? 
11. Başka kimle görüşmemi önerirsiniz? 
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Appendix 3 
Görüşme tarihi:  
Görüşme başlangıç saati:   
Görüşme bitiş saati:   
Görüşülen kişinin adı: 
Görüşülen kişinin kurumu ve pozisyonu: 
 
Tanıtım:  
Bu mülakatı, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Siyaset Bilimi bölümünde yapmakta olduğum 
doktora tez araştırması kapsamında yapıyorum. Tezimde, bazı mesleki kuruluşların 
anayasal statü ile devlet içinde yer alması şeklindeki düzenlemenin, TBB-devlet ilişkisinde 
nasıl işlediğini inceliyorum.  
Bu nedenle, TBB-devlet ilişkisinin nasıl yürüdüğüne ilişkin ilk elden tecrübesi ve gözlemi 
olan kişilerin görüşlerine başvurmak, konu hakkında daha net bilgi edinmek açısından 
gereklidir. Aşağıdaki soruları özellikle bu bakımdan cevaplamanızı rica ediyorum. 
Bu  görüşmelerde verdiğiniz bilgiler tamamen saklıdır ve bilimsel olmayan hiçbir sebep 
için kesinlikle kullanılamaz. Adınız hiç kimseye verilmeyecek ve yazılı veya sözlü olarak 
hiçbir şekilde kullanılmayacaktır. Vereceğiniz bilgiler gizli adlarla aktarılacaktır. Hiçbir 
soruya cevap verme zorunluluğunuz yoktur, ama verdiğiniz takdirde hiçbir etki altında 
kalmadan kendi düşüncenizi belirtmeniz rica olunur.  
Sormak istediğiniz herhangi bir soru varsa lütfen sorunuz. 
Yardımlarınız için şimdiden teşekkür ederim. 
 
Görüşmeye başlamadan önce söylediklerinizi daha sonra eksiksiz 
hatırlayabilmek için teybe kaydetmek için izninizi almak istiyorum. 
(İmzalat). 
 
Teyp kullanılmasına izin vermiyorum □  izin veriyorum □  
___________________________  
İmza 
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1. Doğum Tarihi:  
 
2. Cinsiyet:  1> Kadın   2> Erkek     
 
3.  Ne kadar zamandır (kaç yıldır) Bakanlık’ta görevlisiniz ve görevleriniz 
neler?  
 
4. Bakanlıktan önce ne gibi görevleriniz oldu?  
 
5.  Şimdiye değin TBB ile yapılmış toplantılara katıldınız mı? Kaç tane? 
Hangi konularda?  
 
6. Bakanlık, TBB yetkilileri ile ortalama ne sıklıkta görüşür?  
 
7. TBB yetkilileri ile yapılacak olan görüşmelere nasıl karar veriliyor? 
(mevzuata mı bağlı, duruma mı bağlı, Bakan/Genel Müdür mü istiyor?) 
 
8. Görüşmeye ilişkin prosedür nedir? (Kim arıyor, nerede buluşuluyor, 
gündem nasıl belirleniyor?)  
9. Toplantılarda neler oluyor? (Kimler katılıyor? Ne kadar sürüyor? Tutanak 
tutuluyor mu?)  
 
10. Toplantılarda nasıl karar alınıyor ve kararların yerine getirilmesi nasıl 
gerçekleşiyor? (anlaşma, protesto) 
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11. Alınan kararların kamuoyuyla paylaşılması nasıl oluyor? (basın 
açıklaması, yürüyüş) 
 
12. Toplantılardaki ortama ilişkin neler söyleyebilirsiniz? 
 
13. Sizce TBB ile devlet arasındaki ilişki nasıl tanımlanabilir?  
 
Zaman ayırdığınız için teşekkür ederim.  
 
12. Herhangi bir siyasi partiye üye misiniz? 
Zaman ayırdığınız için teşekkür ederim.  
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Appendix 4 
 
Görüşme tarihi:  
Görüşme başlangıç saati:   
Görüşme bitiş saati:   
Görüşülen kişinin adı: 
Görüşülen kişinin kurumu ve pozisyonu: 
 
Tanıtım:  
Bu mülakatı, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Siyaset Bilimi bölümünde yapmakta olduğum 
doktora tez araştırması kapsamında yapıyorum. Tezimde, bazı mesleki kuruluşların 
anayasal statü ile devlet içinde yer alması şeklindeki düzenlemenin, TBB-devlet ilişkisinde 
nasıl işlediğini inceliyorum.  
Bu nedenle, TBB-devlet ilişkisinin nasıl yürüdüğüne ilişkin ilk elden tecrübesi ve gözlemi 
olan kişilerin görüşlerine başvurmak, konu hakkında daha net bilgi edinmek açısından 
gereklidir. Aşağıdaki soruları özellikle bu bakımdan cevaplamanızı rica ediyorum. 
Bu  görüşmelerde verdiğiniz bilgiler tamamen saklıdır ve bilimsel olmayan hiçbir sebep 
için kesinlikle kullanılamaz. Adınız hiç kimseye verilmeyecek ve yazılı veya sözlü olarak 
hiçbir şekilde kullanılmayacaktır. Vereceğiniz bilgiler gizli adlarla aktarılacaktır. Hiçbir 
soruya cevap verme zorunluluğunuz yoktur, ama verdiğiniz takdirde hiçbir etki altında 
kalmadan kendi düşüncenizi belirtmeniz rica olunur.  
Sormak istediğiniz herhangi bir soru varsa lütfen sorunuz. 
Yardımlarınız için şimdiden teşekkür ederim. 
 
Görüşmeye başlamadan önce söylediklerinizi daha sonra eksiksiz 
hatırlayabilmek için teybe kaydetmek için izninizi almak istiyorum. 
(İmzalat). 
 
Teyp kullanılmasına izin vermiyorum □  izin veriyorum □ 
___________________________  
imza 
1. Doğum Tarihi:  
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2. Cinsiyet:  1> Kadın   2> Erkek     
 
3.  Şu anki göreviniz nedir? (bakanlıkta veya mecliste) 
 
4. Bundan önce ne gibi görevleriniz oldu?  
 
5.  Göreviniz kapsamında TBB ile bir araya gelmeniz veya 
karşılaşmalarınızdan bahsedebilir misiniz? 
 
6. Bu görüşmelere dair prosedür nedir? (Kim arıyor, nerede buluşuluyor, 
gündem nasıl belirleniyor?)  
 
7. Bu karşılaşmalarda neler oluyor? (Kimler katılıyor? Ne kadar sürüyor? 
Tutanak tutuluyor mu?)  
 
8. Karşılaşmalardaki ortama ilişkin neler söyleyebilirsiniz? 
 
9. Sizce TBB ile devlet kurumları arasındaki ilişki nasıl tanımlanabilir?  
 
Zaman ayırdığınız için teşekkür ederim.  
 
 
